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PREFACE 
The reason of the law is the life of the law; for though a man 
can tell the law; yet if he know not the reasons thereof, he shall 
soone forget his superficiall knowledge. 
Lord Coke. 
The purpose of this thesis is to facilitate investigation and 
discussion of an area of contract law which is of great importance and 
in equally great confusion. The area concerns the concept of a condition 
and certain related problems in the performance of a contract. 
This field is vast and is discussed at length by all the modern 
contract writers. It is unnecessary to cite instances of modern problems 
or to refer to the many eloquent observations as to the intractability 
and plain awkwardness of the area, because my purpose is not to investigate 
the many difficult modern problems of performance but rather to facilitate 
their investigation and analysis. The treatment is purely historical, 
covering only the period up to the end of the eighteenth century. I am 
concerned not to tackle the ideas of 11 breach going to the root of the 
contract 11 , "failure of consideration", "fundamental breach" and so on, 
but rather to examine and to clarify the older and more basic concepts 
upon which these relatively modern ideas depend. 
The province of this work, then, is to examine the early concept 
of the condition and to trace its development from an early stage to 
that time, about the end of the eighteenth century, when the modern 
dichotomy between condition and warranty, and its countless attendant 
problems, started to evolve. The basic idea of condition, and the 
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dichotomy between condition and covenant, will be traced from their 
origins in real property law through an evolutionary process in contract 
law up to the date mentioned. The changes in the nature of the condition 
precedent thus brought about, the story of dependency and independency of 
covenants and the evolution of concurrent performance (concurrent 
conditions) are intertwined and will all be examined. 
No treatment of the development of many problems of performance 
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has yet been produced. 
The field is so wide, the interconnected factors and trains of development 
interlinked in such complexity, that perhaps it never will be. And 
yet the attraction of this area of the law is that while so much remains 
far from settled at the present day, the materials on which a settlement 
may be based are right at hand, for the principles of discharge and 
performance of contract have been discussed in the courts for hundreds 
of years. 
It is my belief that one of the major causes of the confusion which 
exists today is a failure correctly to analyze certain ancient and basic 
concepts of the law and to perceive the changes, sometimes subtle, 
sometimes marked, that these concepts have undergone over the years. 
Therefore, this thesis will attempt to make some analysis of the origins 
and evolution of certain basic concepts, an understanding of which is 
vital to an understanding of the modern law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The utility of precise terminology and exact meaning is 
more in connection with differentiating problems from pseudo 
problems and with formulation of results than in providing 
solutions. 
Dean Roscoe Pound. 
There may be much truth in the observation that too ~uch attention 
is devoted to the erection of elegant and symmetrical systems within 
our law, awkward decisions being rationalized and cases or doctrines 
hopelessly out of line being proclaimed exceptions. 
Yet while much of this theorizing may be condemned, it is important 
to delineate our bpsic doctrines in contract law so that we can analyze 
their development and interaction for it may well be that much of the 
I 
confusion present in the modern law is attributable to insufficient 
attention to important conceptual distinctions between conditions, promises 
and consideration.: These concepts will be dealt with more fully later, 
but a brief outline is appropriate here. 
The promise is the basis of a contractor's legal liability. It may 
not be the ultimate basis, because enforceability is attributed to the fact 
that the promise is under seal, in the case of a deed, or is supported 
by consideration in the case of a simple contract. But it is the causa 
causans of liability, a positive act by the contractor essential to 
contractual liability. 
Consideration is a concept quite distinct from that of promise. For 
the purpose of this work it has two important facets. 
- 4 -
First of all, it may form the ultimate basis of enforceability of a 
contract, for though consideration ii not generally needed in contracts 
under seal, it is vital in the case of a simple contract. This aspect 
of consideration will become important when we trace the development 
of the enforceability of simple executory contracts, the consideration for 
one party's promise being the promise of the other party. 
Secondly, the factor of consideration may fur'nish an important aid 
to the construction of contracts. Thus if performance A is promised in 
return, or in consideration, for performance B, then it may well be 
inferred that one performance is intended to be a condition precedent 
to the liability to perform the other. Thus the three concepts, promise, 
consideration and condition, may coincide in a case and, indeed, it may 
not be important to differentiate between them in a particular case. But 
it is important to keep the concepts clearly separate so that when a more 
complicated and difficult fact situation arises the method of procedure 
is clear. 
Let us take what would appear to be a simple fact situation: A promises 
B to perform X; B promises A to perform Y. Although simple in the extreme, 
this example raises one of the most basic and important issues in the 
history and development of contract law, namely, when can one party enforce 
performance by the other party? Is his own performance a condition 
precedent to the liability of the other party? There seem to be both 
consideration and a promise, and therefore enforceability; on the other 
hand, these very elements also suggest a condition to that enforceability. 
The Condition. It is almost trite to say that the word 'condition' 
may be used in several senses, for it has been pointed out more than once 
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that the word has many different connotations in everyday or lay usage 
and probably even more in legal language. 
It is perhaps sufficient to cite the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
to gain a preliminary view of the difficulties of definition of this noun. 
Condition 
I. (l) Something demanded or required as a prerequisite to the 
granting or performance of something else; a provision, 
a stipulation. 
(2) Law. In a legal instrument, a provision on which its 
legal force or effect is made to depend 1588 
(3) Covenant, contract, treaty 1718 
(4) Something that must exist or be present if sqmething else 
is to be or take place; a prerequisite ME. 
(5) A restriction or qualification 1841 
(6) A clause expressing a condition in sense 4; called in 
Logic the antecedent, in Grammar the protasis, of a 
conditional proposition 1869. 
II. (l) Mode or state of being ME. 
(2) State in regard to wealth; circumstances; hence, social 
position, estate, rank ME. 
(3) Mental disposition; character; temper 1611; 
personal qualities 1830 
(4) Nature, character 1586 
(5) A characteristic, attribute (of men or things) 1712. 
From a glance at the above one may deduce that this word is likely 
to be used in different ways by different Courts and by different 
commentators. Indeed Dr. Stoljar1 has provided an interesting list of 
twelve quite different ways in which the word may be used by lawyers and 
there may well be more. It is, of course, possible to set some of these 
meanings on one side since their use, when it occurs, is readily recognizable 
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and should not confuse us. Thus condition in the sense of state or 
quality of goods is one of these meanings. 
But this still leaves a number of meanings, all valid because of 
repeated usage by the Courts and all liable to intermingle and confuse 
unless attention is paid to their context, the background of the area of 
the law in question and the whole history of the confusion surrounding 
this word condition. 
Of course, some confusion is almost inevitable in the case of any 
word, for the reason that words do not have an absolute meaning within 
themselves but are only useful when considered in conjunction with other 
known objects and concepts. Hards can describe, modify and distinouish 
objects and concepts, but their meaning is subject to the circumstances 
in which they are used. 
Clearly, discussion of the concept of a condition can only logically 
proceed in relation and contradistinction to other concepts, for 'condition' 
is a word of many meanings, its usage only being rendered intelligible by 
examination of its background and its relation to other concepts. 
Furthermore, when one says 'condition', one should then immediately 
ask, 'condition of what?', for condition is a word that, in itself, refers 
to a larger entity or concept. It is not logical to examine 'condition' 
in vacua, but only in conjunction with that larger entity of which it is 
a part. 
In the light of all the above, it is natural that commentators have 
contrasted condition with a number of other concepts. Thus, a condition 
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rather than a covenant; a condition inside the contract rather than an 
external condition; a condition precedent rather than a r.onnition 
subsequent; a condition rather than a mere warranty and so on. 
Unfortunately, the properties and meanings of condition change just 
as the comparisons. If we were to start afresh, this might be avoidable, 
but it is a feature of our case law that distinct points in particular 
contexts are resolved and settled rather than symmetrical concepts 
formulated. As the body of cases that are decided over hundreds of years 
is amassed, one clear and precise concept of condition is going to break 
down in favour of a number of concepts of condition, each applicable to a 
different type of problem. 
The point is that the usual treatment of noting the properties of, 
and requirements for, a condition is misleading, because built into 
this approach is a comparison with other concepts such as those listed 
above. And as we try to enumerate comprehensively the properties of a 
condition, we unconsciously slide from one comparison to another in our 
effort to provide a treatment that is complete. 
The result is that treatments become inconsistent within themselves 
and, of course, the treatments of different writers tend to be very 
different. Comparisons may therefore bring forth great confusion and 
loud lamentations. 
This is not to say that anyone is 1t1rong. If it were possible to 
gather all commentators around a table and point out that their treatments 
differ on various points, they would probably say, '!1ell I really rneant 
this when I said that', and 'I make the same point, but under a different 
! 
heading' and 'I agree with that concept, but I've described it in different 
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terms 1 , and so on. 
Our basic problem, then, is that different people use different words 
to mean the same things and it is impossible to change this. Further, 
it is useless to formulate yet another definition and say 'This is it. If 
all other definitions are scrapped and this alone is adopted there will 
be no more confusion'. Such a process is useless for several reasons. 
First of all, it is completely impracticable. As Professor Corbin 
observed: 
(H)owever beautiful and exact may be the usage and terminology 
of this book, comparatively few people will read it; and it is 
impossible to compel millions of contractors to conform to it. It 
will not even be possible to induce lawyers, and other supposedly 
skilled draftsmen of contracts and statutes and constitutions, to 
conform to it. The Courts, and the lawyers and law writers, must 
take the raw material that is prepared for them by contractors and 
draftsmen and determine its meaning and operation. 2 
Secondly, even if we all did adopt some abstract definition, we 
would be little better off, because condition does not have meaning in 
the abstract. We need the background of decided cases and related concepts 
to give it body and substance. 
Now it is submitted that, while we cannot banish all the different 
approaches and treatments to a state of limbo, it is possible to formulate 
a treatment that is consistent within itself. If we can keep the original 
concepts, and the way in which those concepts developed, clear and 
distinct, we may be able to light the way for an examination, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, of the way in which confusion has arisen 
in the more modern law. 
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Turning then to the history of the concept of condition, it might be 
suggested that the various types of conditions should first be investi-
gated. For example, the condition precedent could be contrasted with 
something called a condition subsequent and with yet another relation, 
the concurrent condition. But such analysis usually bogs down in confusion 
and ambiguity due to the failure to consider the logically prior question, 
'condition to or of what?', condition is a word that naturally involves 
a larger entity, and discussion of the word by itself is logically unsound. 
Therefore, before we concern ourselves in dividing up the concept into 
various types of condition, let us first consider what the original concept 
and role of the condition was at law. What did it originally qualify? 
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P A R T I 
THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF CONDITION 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONDITION IN LORD COKE 1 S TIME 
If we consult the heading •condition' in the digests, we find that 
its primary meaning, and the great bulk of learning on the topic, was 
concerned with conditions of real property estates. 3 There were several 
reasons for this emphasis. First of all, land was of the utmost 
contemporary importance, not only because we speak of a time before the 
industrial revolution, but also because the pattern of life could then 
still be said to be regulated more according to status than individual 
freedom of contract, and this concept of status was intimately connected 
with land. 
A second reason, more vitally connected with the matter at hand, was 
that there was as yet no general theory of contract, for we speak now of 
the period before the evolution of the enforceable simple bilateral 
contract. 4 Further, the action of Debt, while truly a forerunner of 
contract law, was based rather on concepts of property and, more importantly, 
ex hypothesi dealt with executed consideration, thus avoiding the problems 
of conditions and performance that we wish to discuss. 
The personal actions of Debt and more especially Covenant are 
naturally of great importance and will be discussed in due course. However, 
because real property law was of such great importance, it is natural 
that much of the early development of the law should have centred on it 
and this development was, quite predictably, to have a great effect on 
the development of a general theory of contract law. 
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Today there are major differences between real property law and 
contract law; but most so-called contractual principles have their 
origins in the antiquities of property law. If \•Jewish to resolve 
modern problems, it is to· these origins that we should first turn. 
(A) THE NATURE OF CONDITIONS OF ESTATES 
Originally, the doctrine of conditions derived from the feudal 
system of land tenure, the performance of feudal services being a 
condition annexed to the landholder's title by law and custom; if he 
neglected to perform them, his feudal superior might re-enter. This 
in turn applied to each relation in the feudal hierarchy, the condit-
ions being well accepted and understood. 
For various reasons, 5 however, parties began to introduce other 
conditions and it was early recognised that this was possible. Lord 
Coke observed: 
A condition annexed to the realtie, whereof Littleton here 
speaketh in the legal understanding, est modus, a qualitie 
annexed by him that hath estate, interest, or right, to the 
same, or whereby an estate, etc. may either be defeated, or 
enlarged, or created upon an incertaine event. 6 
Lord Coke's formulation suggests a division between conditions 
precedent and subsequent, a distinction which was part of the law from 
the earliest times. But in the particular area we wish now to discuss, 
the nature of the actual estate held, this distinction was not of great 
significance. We are not talking of a contract to convey land, but of 
something separate and independent, a continuing estate. 
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The question that should always be borne in mind when puzzling 
over the distinction between conditions precedent and subsequent is, 
precedent or subsequent to what? If we ask this question we realize 
that a condition of a continuing estate is really neither precedent 
nor subsequent because it is actually part of the estate itself. 
However, if it is insisted that the conditions we are about to dis-
cuss be classified, they are clearly subsequent, in the sense that 
they come after the grant and may defeat an estate already vested. 7 
The essential point to be remembered is that while this condit-
ion was not part of the limitation,8 and therefore an actual re-entry 
was originally needed to terminate the estate, it was thought of as 
something very intimate to the estate itself, something beyond the 
province of mere personal contracts. Perhaps the following passage 
will illustrate the position. Challis described the nature of the 
real property condition in this succinct fashion: 
At the common law, a condition may be annexed to an estate of 
fee simple, by a breach of which, if it is a negative condition, 
or by the performance of which if it is a positive condition, a 
right of entry accrues to the grantor or his heirs; and if an 
entry be made, the estate to which the condition is annexed is 
destroyed; whereby the fee reverts to the grantor or his heirs, 
in the same manner in all respects as before the grant of the 
estate subject to the condition. But the benefit of a common 
lawcondition cannot be reserved to a stranger; nor is the estate 
! 
subject to the condition destroyed, until an entry has been made 
in pursuance of the right of entry. 9 
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Thus the condition ran with the land and the right to exercise it 
was not extinguished by the death of the original granter but passed to 
his heirs. Yet it was not some sort of contractual right, for it could 
clearly not be assigned; rather it was a type of estate in the land in 
the grantor10 and hence his heirs, but an estate the law would not allow 
to be transferred. Indeed, the concept of estate was considered 
socially prior to contract, dating from an age when men lived according 
to their rank and status, with which went fixed and certain incidents of 
land tenure, rather than according to private contractual arrangements. 
Perhaps this distinction between estates and contract will be 
rendered somewhat clearer through the exposition of some examples, or 
consequences, of the concept. A good example11 is afforded by the 
doctrine of repugnant conditions, which meant that while some conditions 
could be attached to an estate, certain others could not, for they were 
repugnant to the estate itself. 
The modern reader may well ask, first of all, why should a man be 
prevented from affixing certain conditions to his contract of conveyance 
and secondly, if he is prevented, where does one draw the line? The 
rationale and answer to these questions is to be found in the nature of 
estates in land. 
If one refers to any text on the law of real property, one will see 
that originally the intricacies of estates in land, though perhaps not 
simple to modern minds, were well recognised and known to contemporary 
lawyers. Possession and finality were crucial, the freedom to create 
complex contractual conditions much less so. As stated previously, it 
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came to be recognised that new conditions, apart from feudal rents and 
services, could be annexed to grants, and yet these annexations were 
viewed with suspicion. It was still thought that the incidents of 
landholding were well known and right and should not be interfered 
with. 
These two concepts, the freedom to annex conditions on the one 
hand and the independent entity of land tenure on the other, naturally 
conflicted, and produced problems. One result was the doctrine of 
repugnant conditions, which meant that certain incidents of an estate 
could not be interfered with, for to do so would· be to attack the very 
nature of the estate granted. In effect, ther~fore, a new type of 
estate would be granted, and, as the law recognised only fixed and 
standard types of estate, such crucial modifications could not be 
allowed. 
Though elaborate statements are to be.found in the contemporary 
digests, 12 for our purposes the following-examples from Megarry and 
Wade will suffice: 
Conditions subsequent are ... jeal~usly regarded by the law 
and such a condition is void (so making the fee simple absolute) 
if it infringes any of the following rules: 
(i) It must not take away the power of alienation. One of 
the incidents of ownership is the right to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the property. A condition against alienation is said 
to be repugnant to this right, and contrary to public policy, if 
it substantially takes away the tenant's power of alienation; 
and such conditions are void .... 
(ii) It must not be directed against a course of devolution 
prescribed by law ... 13 
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But the position of real estates was to be contrasted with 
contracts. A condition that was considered to be of a collateral 
nature could be imposed: 
If A be seised of Black Acre in fee, and B enfeoffeth him of 
White Acre upon condition that A shall not alien Black Acre, 
the condition is good; for the condition is annexed to other 
lands, and ousteth not the feoffee of his power to alien the 
land where the feoffment is made, and so no repugnancy to 
the state passed by the feoffment; and so it is of gifts, or 
sale of chattels real or persona1. 14 
A second illustration of the intimate nature of the link between 
condition and grant is afforded by the doctrine that none but the 
grantor of the land could impose a condition on the estate, for the 
condition, to forfeit an estate, must be part of that estate and not 
a collateral contractual matter. Thus in the case of Tresham v. 
Robin (1574) Tresham brought an action of Debt on a recognizance 
against Robin, the condition of which was to stand to an arbitration 
award. The award was that Robin should have the land 'yielding and 
paying £10 per annum' and the question was, did the words 'yielding 
and paying' make a condition of the estate? In other words, did 
non-payment mean a forfeiture of the estate? It was decided that the 
payment was not a condition of the continuance of the estate, for it 
was never part of the grant made by the original grantor and hence was 
not a part of the land, but was merely a separate matter of contract. 
The Court held: 
(I)f a man makes a feoffment in fee, reddendosalvendo £10 for 
years, the same is a condition. But in the principal case, it is not 
a condition; for it is not knit to the land by the owner itself, but 
by a stranger; i.e. arbitrator ... 15 
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A further example is afforded by the old doctrine of impossibility 
of performance of condition, which again illustrates the distinction 
between something contractual and an executed estate. 
Thus if A granted an estate to B, upon condition that if A per-
formed a certain act the estate would revert to A, or unless B did a 
certain act the estate would revert, and the act concerned became 
impossible by act of God, the estate became absolute. However, if the 
condition of a bond became impossible, the whole bond became void; that 
is, it did not become absolute as in the case of real estate. 
(A)nd the reason of the diversitie is, because the state of the 
land is executed and settled in the feoffee, and cannot be 
redeemed back again but by matter subsequent, viz. the performance 
of the condition. But the bond or recognizance is a thing in 
action, and executory, whereof no advantage can be taken until 
there be a default in the obligor. 16 
A further illustration of the nature of real property estates and 
conditions is afforded by the fact that a right of re-entry for breach 
of condition could not be granted to another person by the original 
granter or his heirs: 
(A)nd the reason hereof is, for avoyding of maintenance suppression 
of right, and stirring up of suits; and therefore nothing in action, 
entrie, or re-entrie, can be granted over; for so under colour 
thereof pretended titles might be granted to great men whereby 
right might be trodden down, and the weak oppressed, which the 
Common Law forbiddeth, as men to grant before they be in possession. 17 
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Thus we again find, in these last two examples, the concept that 
the estate was something independentfrom, and quite different from, 
an executory contract. The last illustration also displays the inti-
mate concern the Common Law had for a man's estate, and for the pres-
ervation of peace and the status guo; if a man was in possession of 
this thing called an estate he should not have to resist claims from 
third parties who purported to have an independent right granted by 
the original grantor of the estate. Therefore, once again, the concept 
of estate was shown to be different from that of contract, for the 
Common Law did not permit a person to make a grant of land to one person 
with a grant of re-entry to another. 
We shall now proceed to examine more fully the nature of the real 
property condition. 
(B) CONSTRUCTION OF CONDITIONS OF ESTATES 
We have seen that the concept of estate was separate and distinct 
from contract and that the law favoured finality with respect to 
estates. It is not surprising, then, that conditions to defeat vested 
estates were construed contra proferentem. As was stated in 
Carpenter v. Smith (1670): 
Provisoes and conditions, which go in defeasance and destruction 
of estates, are odious in law, and shall be taken strictly, and 
shall not be construed beyond the words of the condition or 
. 18 prov1soe ... 
Something has already been said about the reasons for this attitude, 
but perhaps they may be summed up thus. First of all, there was the 
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ancient principle that a deed is to be taken most strongly against 
its maker, 'but by the obscure wording of his own contract, he should 
find means to evade and elude it. 119 Secondly, and more specifically 
related to our case, the early law placed great stress on the 
importance and significance of the actual ceremony of grant and entry 
into possession. Although these new conditions could be introduced, 
they were frowned upon as causing uncertainty and discord within the 
hitherto settled pattern of land law. 
Thus the Lord Chief Baron observed, in the case of Egerton v. 
Brownlow, that the reason for the odious nature of a condition was 
obvious, because a condition interferes with the absolute vesting 
of the estates, which the law always favours, and it controls the 
ownership; it seeks to exercise a dominion over the property 
after the death of the donor; it opposes the will (possibly the 
caprices) of the dead to the jus disponendi of the living. The 
law, therefore, while it encourages commerce and favours 
contracts deems a condition odious, and looks at it with 
. 1 20 Jea ousy. 
The conse~uence of all this was that in order to establish a 
condition it was not sufficient to show the intention to impose it, 
but precise words of condition must have been used, just as precise 
words were originally necessary to convey a fee simple. As was· stated 
in Carpenter v. Smith (1670), 'be the intention what it will, yet in a 
conveyance other words are requisite to make a con di ti on. Ea 
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intentione, or ad facie~dum, or ad effectum, will not make a 
condition in feoffments or grants.• 21 Thus the relevant test was not, 
as it is so often said today; the true intention of the parties as 
ascertained from all the circumstances etc., but rather depended much 
more upon the actual words used. 
Furthermore, it was not only required that words expressly 
stipulated a condition but that a certain form of words was used. The 
position may be summarised as follows. Just as questions concerning 
limitations of estates were decided on the technical and accepted 
verbal formulae, so it was thought that some words were, and others 
were not, proper words of condition, and that all phrases relevant to 
the question of conditions could be divided into several categories, 
as follows: 
First of all, some words were thought legally suitable for the 
creation of conditions and it was sometimes said that these words 
always made a condition whenever they appeared. Thus Littleton 
stated: 
Also, divers words there be, which by virtue of themselves 
make estates upon condition; one is the word sub conditione: 
as if A enfeoffe 8 of certain land, to have and to hold to the 
said Band his heres, upon condition (sub conditione), that 
the said B and his heires do pay or cause to be paid to the 
aforesaid A and his heires yearly such a rent, etc. In this 
case without any more saying the feoffee ha th an estate upon 
condition. 22 (my underlining). 
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Secondly, and a logical corollary of the first proposition, some 
words were not fit to make a condition, even though they might show that 
that was really the parties' intention, for they were not included in the 
legally recognised words of condition. 
Thirdly, a condition could be created by the stipulation of a for-
feiting event coupled with an express right of re-entry. Thus Littleton 
wrote: 
Also, there be other words in a deede which cause the tenements to 
be conditionall. As if upon such feoffment a rent be reserved to 
the feoffor etc. and afterward this word is put into the deed, that 
if it happen (guod si contingat) the aforesaid rent to be behind in 
part or in all, that then it shall be lawful for the feoffor and 
his heires to enter, etc. this is a deed upon condition. 23 
It is, of course, difficult to say just how the status of phrases 
was originally determined, but by the time of Lord Coke judgment had been 
passed on a large number of phrases which were held not to be words of 
condition. Thus Viner tells us that ad effectum, ea intentione, ad 
solvendum, ut adveniat, ad inveniendum, or perimplendum were all denied 
d. t. l t t . . d . . 24 con i iona s a us in various ec1s1ons. 
The position as to what words would make a condition per se was 
rather less clear. i~hile Littleton's statement that divers words had 
this status is adopted both in Viner's and Comyn's Abridgements, the 
only example given is that canonised by Lord Coke as the most proper 
phrase to make a legal condition, sub conditione itself. 
- 22 -
Indeed, although one can often discern in the books a longing 
for certainty, for a conclusive categorisation of words applicable in 
all cases, it is evident that from very early times a great number of 
the words which were sometin~s listed as conditional in fact belonged 
to yet a fourth class, words which might or might not be conditional 
per se, according to the context. It may well be that, in still 
earlier times, the categories were more final and that there were 
divers words which were always conditional. If so, this is particularly 
interesting for it shows, at a very early stage in history, a movement 
from a strict 'words' approach to a more flexible approach. 
Coke's treatment of the earlier writings of Littleton perhaps 
illustrates this point. Littleton, of course, had asserted that there 
were divers conditional words and after giving sub conditione as an 
example, did give further examples: 
Also, if the words were such, Provided always (proviso semper), 
that the aforesaid B do pay or cause to be paid to the aforesaid 
A such a rent, etc. or these, So that (ita guod) the said B do 
pay or cause to be paid to the said A such a rent, etc. in these 
cases without more saying, the feoffee hath but an estate upon 
condition ... 25 (my underlining). 
We can only guess as to the extent of the rigidity of interpretation 
in very early times but it is clear that by the time of Lord Coke there was 
a definite trend towards this fourth category of words, i.e. of equivocal 
meaning. Words such as proviso, while regarded as proper words of condit-
ion, received varied meanings according to their context. This does not 
mean, however, that there was overwhelming concern to discover the 
parties' true intention; rather, the Courts were still concerned with the 
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actual words, only conceding that their prima facie conditional effect 
might be modified through considerations of grammar, position, by whom 
the word was used, etc. 
To illustrate this stage of development let us examine the 
interpretation of the word proviso. 
Littleton attributed to this word a conditional meaning but 
Lord Coke in his Commentaries wished to give Littleton 1 s statements a 
restricted meaning: 
Our author putteth his case where a proviso cometh alone. And 
so it is if a man by indenture letteth lands for yeares, provided 
always, and it is convenanted and agreed between the said parties, 
that the lessee should not alien, and it was adjudged that this 
was a condition by force of the proviso, and a covenant by force 
of the other words. 
This word proviso shall be also taken as a limitation or qualifi-
cation, as hereafter in his proper place shall be said. And 
sometimes it shall amount to a covenant. All which do appear by 
the authorities in the margent. 26 
It is evident from this contemporary statement that other vital 
concepts are present besides that of the ancient idea of condition, and 
it is to these concepts that we must now turn. 
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CHAPTER II 
FROM PROPERTY TO CONTRACT 
(A) COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS 
Although we have thus far been concerned with the nature and 
interpretation of conditions of estates, when those conditions occur 
in deeds it is clear that there may be another type of stipulation 
also present in the deed. I refer to covenants, promises not part of 
the actual estate but nevertheless contained in the same deed, such as 
a covenant by the donee to pay certain sums or promises collateral to 
the actual estate by the donor, such as a warranty ·of title. 
It was recognised from the earliest times that there is a clear, 
fundamental difference between a condition and a covenant, and were it 
not for some confusion in modern cases it would seem otiose to state it. 
The distinction is that the covenant, like the grant of an estate, is 
the actual foundation of enforceability; once established there is prima 
facie legal enforceability. A condition, on the other hand may rebut this 
prima facie enforceability. In the case of a grant, it restricted the 
estate by stipulating an event by which it commenced or ended. In the 
case of a covenant, a condition could again restrict enforceability 
because the condition was part of the covenant; if the condition was not 
satisfied, the covenant did not come into being, for its legal viability 
depended on the fulfilment of the condition. 
But although the concepts are distinct, it seems almost inevitable 
that problems must arise, and of course this matter of condition or 
promise (or warranty) provides the backdrop for the discussion, (and 
confusion) in the modern law. 
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In the case of the old law the problem was not so much one of 
blurring of concepts, but of practical classification. This was 
largely due to the fact that the law attempted to resolve the cases 
by examination of the words and their status per se, but at the same 
time it was becoming apparent that people could, and did, use words such 
as proviso with reference to concepts other than conditions. To 
illustrate this point we shall now outline some of these difficulties, 
using proviso as an illustration of the way in which the problems 
arose. 
(i) LIMITATION OR CONDITION? : THE EXTENT OF THE PROMISE 
In the case of estates it is well established that there is a 
distinction, though perhaps a rather fine one, between estates on 
condition and estates determinable on the occurrence of a certain 
event. In the first case the condition is annexed to the estate, 
and hence re-entry is needed, while in the second the prescribed 
event is part of the estate, i.e. of the limitation of the estate, 
and the estate therefore determines automatically. 27 
Discussion of this rather technical doctrine is outside the 
scope of this work, but it is interesting for it furnishes a helpful 
parallel to contract law. In the case of contractual promises, the 
extent of the promise (the limitation) should be contrasted with a 
condition superimposed on that promise. Before asking any question 
about conditions, we should first ask, does the promise even prima 
facie cover the matter at hand? Only if the answer to this is 
affirmative should we then consider the problem of conditions to 
that promise. 
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We have seen that words such as proviso could qualify an estate, 
but we have also seen that there could be promises collateral to the 
estate in the same deed. The question therefore arose, did the word 
proviso in any given case qualify (i.e. limit or delineate) one of these 
collateral promises? 
Now this appears simple enough, but we must remember that it appears 
simple because we are prepared to glance at the words, ascertain what we 
think is the meaning of the parties, and then attribute that meaning to the 
words. But to a lawyer accustomed to affixing a certain meaning to words, 
at least words of condition, the fact that such words could have such 
radically different meanings was, though comprehensible, at least worthy 
of comment and notice. And, of course, the distinction was not usually 
so obvious as the situation I have put. Witness the case of Dive v. 
Maningham in 1550. The facts of the case do not concern us but, in the 
course of his judgement, Montague C.J. made this observation: 
(I)f one makes a lease for years of a manor except a close, etc. 
rendering annually a rent, etc. and the lessee is bound to perform 
all grants, covenants, and agreements contenta expressa, or recitata 
in the indenture, if he disturbs the lessor in the occupation of the 
close excepted, he has forfeited the obligation, for when he excepts 
the close, the other is content with it, and that the lessor shall 
occupy it, and then this is an agreement, and the said words viz. 
contenta expressa, et recitata do each of them go as well to the 
exception as to the rest. 28 
The point here is that the condition of a bond refers to covenants and 
agreements etc., and the question is, what is an agreement. With respect 
to the contrary opinion of Montague C.J., it would seem that there is not 
any agreement in the indenture as to the close excepted, for the subject 
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matter of the indenture encompasses only the rest of the land; the close is 
mentioned only to define the subject matter of the agreement. 
The same point arose again in 1598 in the case of Dame Russel v. Gulwell, 
which again involved a bond conditioned on performance of all covenants and 
agreements in a grant of land, except a certain close. The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant had entered the close excepted and so broken 
an agreement. Counsel put the matter thus: 
(I)t was a breach; for the exception is an agreement that the lessor 
shall retain it: for an indenture is the deed of every the parties; 
and therefore the disturbance of the plaintiff from the occupying 
thereof is a breach of the agreement. 29 
This was enough to persuade Gawdy J., who reasoned: 
(F)or the words in an indenture put in the generality shall bind both 
parties, and shall be taken to be the agreement of each party; and 
to that purpose cited 35 Hen. 8; Dyer 37; 21 Hen. 7 p.137 that a 
reservation of rent is as a covenant on the lessee's part. 30 
Again with respect, this was not correct. It is true that the words 
bound both parties, but the point is that before one asks if an agreement 
has been breached, one must first decide the subject matter of the contract 
and agreement. The exception goes to define the subject matter, and is 
completely outside the purview of the relevant agreements. The defendant 
was no more in breach of his agreement by trespassing on a neighbouring close 
specifically excepted from the contract than he would have been by trespassing 
on another close of the plaintiff twenty miles away ( and hence impliedly 
excepted). 
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And the majority of the court perceived and accepted this analysis, 
differing from Gawdy J. Thus Popham and Fenner JJ., observed: 
They agreed, that an exception is an agreement that shall charge 
the lessee; but that is, where he agrees on his part that the lessor 
shall have a thing dehors which he had not before: as if he lets 
lands, excepting a way, or common, or any other profit a prender, 
that is an agreement of the lessee's that he shall have the profit: 
and that if he be obliged to perform all the covenants and agree-
ments, if he disturb in this, he shall forfeit his obligation; for 
there the lessor hath an interest in the thing excepted {31). 
This is plainly correct, and the bulk of authority adopts this 
approach (32). 
The matter was settled in Bush v. Coles (1692), where the plaintiff 
had let to the defendant a house, except two rooms and free passage 
leading to them. The defendant blocked up the passage, and the question 
was whether an action of covenant would lie. It was decided the covenant 
did lie but the correct approach was clearly adopted: 
(T)he diversity is this, if the disturbance had been in the chamber, 
it is plain then no action of covenant would have lain; because it 
was excepted, and so not demised: aliter, where the lessee agrees to 
let the lessor have a thing out of the demised premises, as a way, 
common, or other profit apprendre; in such case covenant lies for the 
disturbance (33). 
So the position became settled that words such as 'proviso', 'except', 
'but not' etc. might well be used to define the promise. And, of course, 
when used in this fashion the word proviso cannot be said to be conditional 
in the sense that the whole contract may be avoided. 
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The case of Ayer v. Orme (1559) (34) again illustrates this point. 
The Archbishop of York leased lands in Battersey rendering rent there, 
proviso that during any vacancy of the see the rent should be paid to the 
chapter ut injure suo. The rent was in arrear and the lessor's bailiff 
re-entered. The question was whether this re-entry was lawful. The 
question as to the conditional status of proviso is thus neatly raised. 
If it is like sub conditione, it would appear that the re-entry is lawful. 
If, however, the context can be examined, it is seen that the word is 
used to modify or describe a covenant only. The Court accepted this 
second view and stated the result thus: 
(T)he proviso placed as above is not a condition, but an exception 
or saving in the sentence of the reservation of the rent, and as 
an agreement or covenant: for it is not annexed to the estate, nor 
to the thing granted etc. But it is like the case of a warranty, 
proviso that he will not vouch, 7H. 6 (43 b pl 21) and 9H. 6 (35 A. 
pl. 6) without impeachment of waste, proviso that he shall not 
commit waste wilfully in the houses etc. (35) And Littleton (sect. 
220) in grant of a rent-charge, proviso that it shall not extend to 
charge the person (36). 
Although this seems simple enough when analyzed, if one is used to placing 
great emphasis on fixed meanings of words, such radically different interpre-
tations are remarkable. 
We now move on to a second contemporary issue, which once again con-
stitutes an important and substantive background to modern law, although it 
might at first appear to be dry and, for today, irrelevant learning. 
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(ii) CONDITION OR COVENANT? 
As has been stated above, the early courts always recognised a clear, 
fundamental difference between a condition and a covenant (or promise). 
The distinction was that a condition, in effect, is always an integral 
part of the grantor's liability; if the condition does not occur then he 
is not liable, for it is an integral part of his grant. A covenant, or 
grant, on the other hand is the actual foundation of liability; it is the 
thing which prima facie establishes legal enforceability (to which, of 
course, there may be a condition). 
This distinction was clearly perceived in the early law and, as we 
have seen, the first criterion for ascertaining the presence of a 
condition was the actual wording used. 
Now although it was clear that some words, such as sub conditione, 
always kept their conditional meaning, we have seen that other words, such 
as proviso, came to receive a more flexible interpretation, their meaning 
changing with their context. 
But the important point was that the two concepts, condition and 
covenant, were still very distinct and so, while proviso could mean one 
or the other, it could not mean both at the same time, for the two 
concepts were mutually exclusive (37). 
The question, then, was to decide whether, in a given situation, an 
equivocal word such as proviso made a condition or a covenant. This 
problem again raised a number of difficult considerations, some of which 
were rather technical. 
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Let us take a convenient illustrative case, Henry Earl of Pembrook v. 
Sir Henry Barkley, decided in 1596 (38). 
The Earl granted by deed certain rights of custody of a forest to 
Sir Maurice Barkley with a clause in the deed as follows: 
Provided also, and the said Sir Maurice covenanted, granted and 
promised for him and the heirs male of his body, to, and with the 
said Earl, his heirs and assigns that neither the said Sir Maurice 
nor any of the heirs male of his body, nor any of their assignees, 
wi'll cut any manner of wood growing upon any part of the premises ... 
The son of Sir Maurice, Sir Henry Barkley, did cut some of the trees 
and converted them to his own use and the question was: 
(W)hether by this act done by the said Sir Henry, the now Earl of 
Pembrook may re-enter into the things granted by him. 
This matter stood upon two points and the issue that concerns us was 
11whether the last proviso makes a condition, or be but a mere covenant." 
The case was argued several times and there was a difference of opinion 
amongst the judges. The minority, Gawdy and Clench JJ., with whom Walmsley 
and Beamont JJ. were to concur in a later argument of the case, advanced 
three main points. 
First of all, it was said that the word proviso by itself is nonsensical; 
there must be some sentence attached to it, and here the relevant sentence was 
a covenant. Therefore, proviso here makes a covenant (39). 
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Thus the word proviso, traditionally a word of condition, was disposed 
of in a rather cavalier fashion. One reason for this was an apparent dis-
enchantment with the proliferation of the word: 
And further, it is common for scriveners and ignorant persons to make 
in effect every covenant to begin with a proviso in this manner, and 
therefore to expound such a manner of proviso as a condition, it shall 
be too perilous to the estates of men (40). 
But, as the reader will appreciate, such arguments, at this time in 
history, bordered on the heretical. The actual words used were still of 
immense importance and the traditional conditional connotation of words 
only slightly less so. 
Thus the 11 Chief Justices, Chief Baron and all the other justices and 
Barons 11 , the majority, quickly dismissed this argument: 
(W)e are not to alter the law for the ignorance of scriveners, who 
do they know not what by their ignorance, shall be corrected by the 
1 aw ( 41). 
The word proviso did make a condition 11 for the proviso here hath a 
perfect conclusion. For the words that the lessee shall not fell trees, 
refer to the proviso and to the covenant; so it rounds as well to the 
condition as to the covenant; and it shall be as if there had been 
several sentences ... 11 (42). 
The point here was that the minority had argued that because there was 
a covenant, established by express words of agreement and because the 
proviso referred to that covenant the proviso could only be a covenant. 
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The majority, however, decided that the clause was both a condition 
and a covenant; a condition because of the conditional word proviso and 
a covenant because of the later express words of agreement: 
(I)t was a condition and also a covenant, and it was for good purpose 
to have to be so: for suppose that the game had been destroyed by the 
said Sir Henry, shall this be a sufficient recompence or satisfaction 
to enter for the condition broken? no, and therefore the covenant was 
made to recompence him for damages (43). 
So we see in this first diversity between the judges the clear import-
ance placed on the distinction between condition and covenant. 
The minority led by Gawdy J., thought that the consequence of the 
distinction was that the fact that the subject matter of the proviso was also 
the subject matter of a clear covenant concluded the matter against the 
proviso being a condition. 
The majority decided that it was a covenant, but the conditional word 
proviso meant that it was also a condition. 
The temptation is to say that the majority were correct; that their 
reasoning was not at all inconsistent with the distinction between condition 
and covenant and, further, that their decision was a logical application of 
it. 
This is a valid viewpoint, but to understand what was behind the 
minority's reasoning we must look to their second argument, for although 
a~parently distinct, it is closely related. It is as follows: 
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And they (the minority) said further, that this last proviso shall be 
said entirely the words of the grantee himself, as the covenant is, 
and without words of the granter a condition cannot be, for it is for 
him to condition with the estate given, and not for him to whom the 
grant is made; and therefore suppose that it had been on the other 
part, to wit, provided always, and the grantor covenant that the 
grantee shall have the refuse of the brouse, and the like; this shall 
not be said to be any condition, but a mere covenant: in like manner 
shall it be on the other part (44). 
The origin of this argument was the fact that when a man granted an 
estate it was up to him, the granter, to delineate the type and extent of 
that estate; only he could determine the conditions applicable, because 
the estate moved solely from him. Hence, any things to be performed by the 
grantee could only be matter of covenant. 
Now while this was a valid argument in relation to unilateral grants 
of land, could it be applied to bilateral contracts under seal? Could a 
purely technical and grammatical approach be taken to determine who 11 spoke 11 
what, who 11 granted 11 what in a bilateral contract? 
There was some early authority which suggested an affirmative answer. 
For example, in an anonymous case in 1536 a lease was made by deed in 
which the lessee "covenants and grants to the lessor, that if he, or his 
executors or assigns, aliene the term, that then it should be lawful ·for 
the lessor and his heirs to enter, and oust the termor. 11 
The term was assigned and one question was whether the above clause 
was a 11 condition that gives advantage to enter or not 11 • 
- 35 -
The majority decided that it was not a condition: 
And it seemed to Marvynne and Shelley JJ., that it did not: but it 
is a constant principle, that a condition may not be reserved nor 
made by any one, unless on the part of the lessor, feoffor, or 
donor, for the condition is annexed to the thing given or leased and 
it is not like a rent or a common, the which the lessee may well 
grant to the lessor, for it is not a condition that can defeat his 
estate, etc. ( 45) . 
Fitzherbert J., in the minority, argued that a deed is the agreement 
of both parties and therefore a stipulation made to forfeit the estate is 
referable to either. 
But the majority was adamant that: 
(T)he covenants and grants which arise from one party are not the 
covenants and grants of the other party ... And it in no wise 
resembles the case which Fitzherbert hath put, That if an indenture 
run thus, viz. 'It is witnessed, that it is covenanted, granted, and 
agreed between the aforesaid parties, that one shall have certain land 
for years or otherwise, and that he shall not aliene', that is a good 
condition, for those words are spoken in the third person, and suit 
equally well to the lessor and lessee, so no resemblance (46). 
This view, which is to be found expounded in several of the early cases 
(47), once again illustrates the blinding effect produced by the use of certain 
words in the old law. It was probably based on a deduction from a quite 
separate rule that the word proviso used by a lessor with regard to his own 
obligations obviously did not go to voidability of the lease but only to 
delineation of the lessor's obligations; in this context, words were obviously 
needed that related to obligations of the lessee (48). From this true 
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principle, some judges may have deduced that a wider rule was true: that, 
for a condition of a lease, the words must always be attributable, through 
considerations of grammar, to a particular party (the lessor) and refer to 
the obligations of the other party (the lessee). 
In any case, as late as the year 1616 in the case of Whitchcocke v. 
Fox (49) this argument against a condition was still being seriously 
advanced. But in Whitchcocke v. Fox it was conclusively resolved that a 
deed is the agreement of both parties and that the mere fact that the 
grantee appears to 11 speak 11 the words under consideration is not sufficient 
per se to defeat a conditional construction. 
However, although Fitzherbert J.'s opinion was destined to be accepted, 
at the time of Pembrook v. Barkley the more technical argument advanced by 
the majority in the anonymous case still had considerable force. 
Thus the majority largely avoided the problem, deciding that it was a 
condition on the basis that the words were referable to the grantor: 
And when upon the habendum a proviso is added for a thing to be done by 
him to whom the deed is made or to restrain him to do any thing, this is 
a condition, as well as if it had been a condition which shall make or 
shall restrain to do such a thing, for they are in this case the words 
of the grantor, to restrain the grant in some manner, and to show in 
\'/hat manner he shall have it, and it is ahiays to him who passeth the 
estate, and to no other (50). 
But, of course, this is only lip service to the old doctrine, for it is 
merely saying that if the situation is equivalent to the grantor actually 
stipulating, then it will still be a condition, whereas the argument of the 
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minority was that if by the grammatical examination of the deed it is found 
that the clause in question is ''the words of the grantee'' it must for that 
very reason be construed as a covenant. 
Pembrook v. Barkley may therefore be viewed as an important stage in the 
transition from the technical and grammatical method of approach towards the 
position adopted in Whitchcocke v. Fox, and accepted thereafter, that the 
question of who said the words is not conclusive, because the deed is the 
agreement of both parties. 
Let us now examine another important case which was decided four years 
after Pembrook v. Barkley. Lord Cromwell v. Andrews (1600), argued before 
all the judges of England, provides a further example of the problems dis-
cussed and an authoritative statement of contemporary principles. 
A bargained and sold a manor to B, but with various advowsons and uses 
etc. which were expressed in the deed but need not be explored here. Then 
came the phrase: 
'proviso that B should grant by deed the advowson to A for life; 
with further covenant ... 1 
Thus the proviso was jumbled up amongst recitals and covenants and the 
question was whether A could re-enter after B's death, B not having granted 
the advowson. Was it a condition? 
The judges resolved thus: 
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First, that the said proviso makes a condition; for the law hath 
not appointed any place in a deed proper or peculiar to a condit-
ion, but its place is where the parties please. And it appears 
by Littleton, that proviso is as apt a word to make an estate 
conditional, as sub conditione, or any other word of condition. 
However, important qualifications are then made to this statement: 
(B)ut notwithstanding that, when this word proviso shall make an 
estate or interest conditional,three things are to be observed: 
(1) That the proviso do not depend upon another sentence, nor 
participate thereof, but stand originally of itself. 
(2) That the proviso be the words of the bargainor, feoffor, 
donor etc. 
(3) That it be compulsory to enforce the bargainee, feoffee, donee 
to do an act; 
and because they all concur in this case, it was resolved that it 
was a condition in what place soever it be placed ... (51). 
The point of delving into the?e expositions of ancient technicalities 
is this. The early courts originally adopted as their guidelines for 
ascertaining intention and justice the actual words used and every effort 
was made to give words fixed and clear meanings, but it came to be seen that 
the same words were often used in the contexts of completely different 
concepts. 
Rather than say, "Hell, it is all a question of intention 11 , the courts 
began to lay down rules to help them decide cases; but these rules were not 
founded on any general theory but rather on a number of diverse cases which 
established or demonstrated points which were considered analo~ous to, or 
exceptional to, the general doctrine of conditions. 
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The process was almost entirely empirical. As I have attempted to 
demonstrate through the illustration of the "condition or limitation?" 
problem, at first the decisions were hazy and inconsistent just because 
there were few well developed theories and concepts beyond that of follow-
ing the technical meaning of the actual words used. As distinctions became 
apparent, so there arose a variety of decisions, and to attempt to classify, 
and clarify, these decisions certain rules were laid down (52). 
Thus in Lord Cromwell's Case, supra, it was decided that the proviso 
should not depend on another sentence, that it should be the words of the 
feoffor etc; that it should be compulsory to enforce the feoffee etc. to 
do an act. 
By themselves such rules may seem arbitrary and puzzling, but when we 
put them into context we see that their adoption was an attempt to dis-
tinguish those cases where it was held that the proviso was a limitation 
or a covenant from those where it w'as a condition. The facts of these 
latter cases were examined and, by a technical process of deduction and 
corollary, it was thought possible to state positive propositions about 
conditions. 
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(B) THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONDITION AND COVENANT 
We have been examining a system which, though perhaps technical, was 
quite consistent and logical within itself. And the consistency, internal 
logic, and, of course, the technicalities, were attributable to the fact 
that the system relied on the pure interpretation of the actual words used 
by the parties. 
However, when we depart from absolute reliance upon the actual words 
used, we depart from the foundation of these qualities. And depart we 
must, for it has been long recognised that, although the actual words used are 
of vital importance, some degree of implication, someuse of common sense, is 
often necessary to explain equivocal statements in the light of their context. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to launch into an examination of the 
topic of implication of terms, but we must briefly outline its history and 
development in two important areas: covenants and conditions. 
(i) What Constitutes a Covenant? 
Perhaps the most basic, or limited, deviation from adhesion to the 
actual words used by the parties is to hold that the formal word 'covenant' 
is unnecessary and that less formal words may constitute a covenant. And 
it was early decided by the Courts that if it is plain that the scheme of 
the deed is that each of the parties promises to do certain things, but 
the word 'covenant' has not been used, a 'lesser' word will suffice. Thus, 
in Stanton's Case in 1582, a master brought Covenant on an indenture of 
apprenticeship, but counsel for the defendant apprentice raised several 
objections on demurrer: 
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Le primer fuit quia in le Indenture les pols sont q Apptice sra 
loyal and secreta sua relaret and similia, sans auters pals de 
covenant expsses: 
le Court tunt ceo nul exceptcon, car les pals imply 
covenant; si come lease est fait pur ans and les pals sont tiels, 
and le lessee faira tiel chose; ceux pals imply covenant sans 
plus a dire (53). 
A slight extension of this principle occurs when a covenant is 
implied because it is obvious from the whole context of the deed that 
the parties intended it, though a covenant is not actually stipulated 
for either in formal terms or in the less formal terms found adequate in 
Stanton's Case. An early example of this category is conveniently furn-
ished by the facts of Bush v. Coles (1692) discussed supra in a differ-
ent context (54). In that case the plaintiff demised to the defendant 
a house, excepting two rooms, and 'free passage• leading thereto. Although 
there were no express words by the lessee, it was held that the lessor 
could maintain covenant for blocking free passage, because it was seen that 
a new thing was created, distinct from the estate and yet dependent for its 
existence on the lessee's actions; it was therefore decided that the 
parties intended a covenant concerning the passage. 
Or, to take another situation, the question may be whether words are 
intended merely as introductory window dressing, 'mere representations•, or 
as covenants. If later positive covenants seem to assume that the intro-
ductory portions are covenanted, the courts will strive to interpret them 
as contractually binding. 
Thus in Sampson v. Easterby (1829) a lease contained a recital of an 
agreement for pulling down an old smelting mill and building another larger 
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one, and the defendant then covenanted to keep the new one in repair, but 
there was no actual covenant to erect it. The Court had little trouble 
deciding that there was an implied covenant to erect it upon which the 
plaintiff might sue (55). 
These, then, are some situations in which Courts have been prepared 
to hold that the strict letter of express covenant need not be adhered to, 
because it was clear that the parties intended to contract, to covenant, 
and it was thought ludicrous to insist on an absolutely formal manifestat-
ion of that intention. 
Express covenants and implied covenants in the above sense, have very 
few differences for our purposes. Naturally, as the law developed, the use 
and role of implication became more and more important, but for now we can 
see that implied covenants were at first but a narrow extension of the 
strict 1words 1 approach, the fundamental rationales of the law not changing 
at all. 
However, besides express and implied covenants, there is to be found 
a third category: covenants imputed by law. This concept is perhaps most 
easily delineated by referring to something familiar to modern lqwyers, for 
example, implied warranties of fitness in the sale of goods. The distinct-
ion between these terms and the implied terms referred to above is that the 
latter terms were implied from the facts and language in the particular 
case; terms imputed by law rest on doctrines of law, no doubt originally 
founded on particular facts that certain terms should be applied in 
certain factual situations unless the parties expressly exclude them. 
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This much more free approach is, of course, to be attributed to a 
period much later than that under discussion, but we can, once again, 
trace back the origins of this concept of imputation of terms to real 
property 1 aw. 
It was very early held that words of grant e.g. 1 demise 1 , 1 grant 1 
or • dedi 1 , 1 demi s i 1 , 1concess i 1 etc. by themselves implied certain 
undertakings by the grantor, such 1 as a covenant for title, quiet enjoy-
ment etc. (56). To tµke one example, in Style v. Hearing (1602) the 
defendant demised and granted land to the plaintiff for twenty years, but 
a third party evicted the plaintiff and established rightful title. Could 
the plaintiff sue the defendant in the absence of an express covenant? It 
was decided that he could: 
And resolved by all the justices, that upon the words demise and 
grant, without other words which 'comprehend any warrant in them, 
this action well lies (57). 
The important point to be stressed is that the principle of •covenants 
at law' was a limited one. The covenants were intimately connected with the 
words of grant; they were actually part and parcel of the grant (58). 
Tindal C.J. in a later case delineated the boundaries of these concepts: 
The distinction between covenants, and the only distinction (so far 
as relates to the present inquiry), we take to be this: they are 
either covenants by express words or covenants in law. 1 There are 
two kinds of covenants•, says Lord Coke (Co. Litt.139 b) 1 viz. a 
covenant in deed and a covenant in law•; or, as it is put in 
Vaughan 1 s Reports, p.118 - 1 All covenants between a lessor and his 
lessee are either covenants in law, or express covenants• ... 
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A covenant in law, properly speaking, is an agreement which the 
law infers or implies from the use of certain words having a known 
legal operation in the creation of an estate; so thnt, after they 
have had their primary operation in creating the estate, the law 
gives them a secondary force, by implying an agreement on the part 
of the grantor to protect and preserve the estate so by those words 
already created: as, if a man by deed demise land for years, covenant 
lies upon the word 1 demise 1 , which supports, or makes, a covenant in 
law for quiet enjoyment; or if he grant land by feoffment, covenant 
will lie upon the word 1 dedi 1 ••• 
In every case, it is always a matter of construction to discover 
what is the sense and meaning of the words employed by the parties in the 
deed. In some cases, that meaning is more clearly expressed, and there-
fore more easily observed; in others, it is expressed with more obscurity, 
and discovered with greater difficulty... But, after the intention 
' 
and meaning of the parties is once ascertained, after the agreement is 
once inferred from the words employed in the instrument, all difficulty 
which has been encountered in arriving at such meaning, is to be entire-
ly disregarded; the legal effect and operation of the covenant, whether 
framed in express terms. that is whether it be an express covenant, or 
whether the covenant be matter of inference and argument, is precisely 
the same; and implied covenant, in this sense of the term, differs 
nothing in its operation or legal consequences from an express 
covenant ... it is only those covenants which the law itself implies, 
that can be properly considered as covenants in law - a character and 
description which, as we have already seen, does not belong to the 
covenant now under discussion (59). 
As such, the position seems clear enough but, of course, there would be 
little point in discussing the matter if it remained so. It did not. 
Since covenants could in some cases be implied without express words of 
covenant, litigants began to assert that words which might appear to be 
conditions were really covenants, and so the question became once again, 
condition or covenant? 
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Before proceeding, however, we must examine our logically second 
question. 
(ii) What Constitutes A Condition? 
We have already attempted to answer this question in the context of 
estates, but we are now concerned to trace the development of the 
condition from estates to contract. 
One might perhaps say that it is not a question of development but 
rather of two co'ncepts, the real property con di ti on and contractual 
condition. This would be quite incorrect however for, as has been 
already observed and will be further demonstrated, the very roots of our 
law of contract are to be found in property law. 
There is, moreover, a much more subtle error: to say that there are 
only two things to be considered, the law of real estates and the law of 
contract. This is nearly correct, but it leaves out an area which 
constituted an intermediate stage of development, or perhaps more 
correctly the very means of development, from the one to the other. I 
refer to the lease for years. 
The Nature Of The Lease For A Term Of Years 
A detailed examination of this topic is beyond the scope of this work. 
The treatises on real property, and in particular Pollock and Maitland 
History of English Law contain detailed and accurate accounts. However, 
because this topic furnishes an important background to subsequent develop-
ment, a short outline will not be out of place. 
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As long ago as the end of the twelfth century, the tenant for a term 
of years was not considered to have an estate in the land, but was regard-
ed purely as a contractor with his lessor. 
He did not have an estate because he was not seised of the land, and 
he was not seised of the land because he was not entitled to invoke those 
remedies, the free Assizes, which protected seisin. 
If the reader finds this rather circuitous, perhaps it is, but then 
so are vast areas of our early real property law. Perhaps Pollock and 
Maitland put the matter most aptly when they state that the reasoning is 
not circular, but spiral: 
Its course is not circular but spiral, it never comes back to quite 
the same point as that from which it started. This play of reason-
ing between right and remedy fixes the use of words. A remedy, 
called an assize, is given to any one who is disseised of his free 
tenement:- in a few years lawyers will be agreeing that X has been 
'disseised of his free tenement,' because it is an established point 
that a person in his position can bring an assize. The word seisin 
becomes specified by its relation to certain particular remedies (60). 
However, beginning with the invention by Raleigh J. circa 1235 of the 
form of action quare ejecit infra terminum and concluding with the develop-
ment and extension of trespass de ejectione firmae, it became apparent that 
the tenant for years now did have real remedies and consequently did have an 
estate of some type. As Plucknett concisely observes: 
(A)s a result of the real remedies devised by Raleigh and extended by 
the Statute of Gloucester, it was clear that the lessee had a tenement, 
and in Raleigh's own day it was said that he was seised (61). 
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Thus, by the time of Lord Coke a term for yeqrs was an estate, and 
yet some aspects of its contractual origins remained. For our purposes 
the important point was that the interpretation of leases was much less 
rigid than that of estates; as in personal contracts, the courts at 
least purported to try to ascertain the true intention of the parties. 
Thus Bayley J. was to observe in Doe v. Watt: 
The words 'provided always, sub conditione, ita guod,' used in a 
conveyance of real estate, by themselves, made the estate condition-
al. But in a lease for years no precise form of words is necessary 
to make a condition. It is sufficient if it appears that the words 
used were intended to have the effect of creating a condition (62). 
And Lord Coke had also contrasted the position of a term of years with 
that of freehold estates: 
But for the avoydi ng of a lease for yeares, such preci s'e words of 
condition are not so strictly required as in case of freehold and 
inheritance. For if a man by deed make a lease of a manor for 
yeares, in which there is a clause (and the said lessee shall con-
tinually dwell upon the capitall messuage of the said manor, upon 
paine of forfeiture of the said terme) these words amount to a 
condition. 
And so it is if such a clause be in such a lease. Quad non licebit, 
to the lessee, dare, vendere, vel concedere statum, et sub poena 
forisfacturae, ~his amounts to make the lease for yeares defeasible, 
and so it was adjudged in the court of common pleas in queen 
Elizabeth's time; and the reason of the court was, that a lease for 
yeares was but a contract, which may begin by word, and by word be 
dissolved (63). 
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The ascertainment of intention is always a matter of degree. And 
though it was said that it is sufficient if it appears etc., the ways in 
which that intention could be investigated were still narrow; t~e words 
used were still of immense importance though other factors could now be 
considered. 
Lord Coke perhaps correctly expressed the matter when he said (supra) 
'precise words of condition are not so strictly required ... ' Thus, 
traditional words of condition could, and should, be used but these would not 
be strictly insisted upon if the intention was made manifest through other 
suitable words. 
We shall now see that the interpretation of leases was to play a major 
part in the development of contract law. 
(iii) The Change in the Distinction between Condition and Covenant 
To return to our question of 'condition or covenant?', let us examine 
some sets of facts that occur with respect to leases. 
If there is a clause providing for rent or repairs etc. in a lease, can 
the lessor re-enter (i.e. determine the lease) if the rent is not paid or 
the repairs not carried out? Alternatively, the lessor may not wish to re-
enter, but to sue for the rent. Is he restricted to re-entry? We have seen 
that a given word or set of words was regarded as having a conditional or a 
non-conditional meaning, but not both at the same time, and therefore the 
question was, 'condition or covenant?' 
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To give an example, in Simpson v. Titterell (1589) a lessor brought 
ejectment against his lessee, claiming a breach of a clause which was to 
thateffect the proviso semper the lessee would not aliene except in a 
particular way. The lessee did otherwise aliene, claiming that the clause 
was a covenant and not a condition, but, 
all the justices held it was a good condition to defeat the estates. 
For Periam J. said, proviso always implieth a condition, if there be 
not words subsequent, which may peradventure change it into a coven-
ant; as where there is another penalty affixed to it for non-
performance, as Dockwray•s Case, 27 Hen. 8 pl. 14. But it is a rule 
in provisoes, where the proviso is, that the lessee shall perform or 
not perform a thing, and no penalty to it this is a condition,· 
otherwise it is void; but if a penalty is annexed, aliter est: to 
which the rest of the justices agreed (64). 
It is interesting to note that the court was willing to advert to 
considerations somewhat beyond a mere examination of the actual word 
proviso involved. Thus, they observed that if there were a penalty 
annexed to the proviso that would show that a covenant and not a 
condition was intended. 
Similarly, in Geery v. Reason (1629) the plaintiff demised to the 
defendant certain rooms in Bear-Alley 'provided, and upon condition, that 
the said Reason (defendant) shall gather the rents of other the (plain-
tiff's) tenements in Bear-Alley.• 
The defendant did not gather and pay these rents to the plaintiff, 
who therefore attempted to sue in Covenant. 
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It was decided, however, that there was not a covenant to oblige 
him to collect the rents, but only a condition, for: 
(I)t is not to be intended that it should be a covenant to enforce 
him to gather and pay them where peradventure he cannot collect 
them ( 65). 
Thus, once again, an extrinsic consideration, (the fact that he 
would not covenant to do what was very difficult but only accept the 
task as a condition) was important to the court's decision. 
But let us assume there are no such aids to a decision; the decision 
is to be based purely on the words e.g. 'the lessee yielding and paying 
rent. 1 Is that a condition of the lease or a positive covenant by the 
lessee? 
Because of the difference between the concepts of condition and 
covenant and the technical rules considered above, we would expect such 
words to be considered as part of the grant - a condition rather than a 
covenant. And this seems to have been the original view of the law. 
Thus we have seen that in Simpson v. Titterell, supra, it was thought that 
the words would be void if they did not have a conditional character, for 
they could only be viewed as a covenant if a penalty were annexed, thus 
positively demonstrating the parties• intention to covenant. In an 
Anonymous case in 1589 a lease was made by deed and the lessor covenanted 
that the lessee, 'paying his rent•, should have quiet enjoyment. The 
lessee did not pay his rent and afterwards was ejected by title paramount. 
He thereupon sued the lessor on the covenant for quiet enjoyment, but was 
met with the objection that payment of rent was a condition to that 
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covenant. It was decided by Walmesly and Wendham JJ., against Periam J., 
that 
{T)he covenant is conditional, and that the lessee should not have 
advantage of it, if he did not perform the condition, which is 
created by this word {paying) (66). 
So we see that if words were referable to the grant itself they were 
likely to be construed as a condition rather than a covenant, for they 
were thoughtto be part of the thing granted and hence inseparable. This 
was plain enough when it was sought by the granter (or grantee) to 
attribute to them a conditional nature, but what if the granter wished to 
use the words as a covenant on which to sue? Remembering the difference 
between the concepts of condition and covenant, one would tend to say that 
he could not do so, in the absence of an express agreement (as, say, was 
the case in Pembrook v. Barkley supra). Howeve~ although this reasoning 
was originally correct, a number of factors combined to blur and complicate 
the traditional distinction and it is to this evolutionary process that we 
now turn. 
We have seen that it was possible to imply covenants in some circum-
stances where the words used were not of a formal nature. We have also 
seen that there were certain covenants at law in some cases, invoked by 
words of demise. 
However, cases soon arose which went.quite beyond these situations, 
the typical example being a lessor attempting to establish a covenant 
from words such as 'yielding and paying'. 
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Now, we have seen that these words originally went to estate; i.e. 
they were words of condition and therefore not of covenant. However, 
from about the mid-seventeenth century it came to be held that these 
words did connote a covenant. To summarise 
(a) In the beginning, the law was largely concerned with the extent 
of the estate, and this was always to be gauged by the words used. 
The precise words used kept their importance, but there was 
a swing to flexibility in that it was recognised that very few 
words, contrary to more ancient learning, had at all times a 
conditional impact. This flexibility was even more evident in 
th~ case of leases for years. 
(b) Because the extent of the estate was to be determined by the 
grantor, technical rules of interpretation abounded, not the 
least of which was that only the grantor could make a condition. 
However, as the trend to a broader view of contract law establish-
ed itself, this view was discarded and the rationale that the deed was 
the agreement of both parties became dominant. Therefore, such 
precise technical rules became increasingly irrelevant. 
(c) In the sphere of covenants, a trend to flexibility was also 
apparent. Words that hitherto had connoted a condition could 
now, in appropriate circumstances, constitute a covenant. 
Covenants could also be implied and imputed in certain limited 
circumstances. 
It is naturally very difficult to explain precisely what occurred but 
it is submitted that all these factors combined to produce changes that were 
at first perhaps subtle but were to have great repercussions. 
Let us return to the problem exemplified by the phrase 'yielding and 
paying'. The original position was that words which were intimately 
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connected with the estate, such as 'rendering rent' would make a 'covenant 
in law' (67). Now, as explained by Tindal C.J. in Williams v. Burrell 
(s_ill)ra), the effect of a covenant in law in no way derogates from our 
condition/covenant dichotomy; the words have a secondary force after they 
have delineated the estate so that the issue of conditions and covenants 
being mutually exclusive is not raised. 
However, due to quite different problems such as assignment, covenants 
running with the land etc., the distinction between express covenants and 
covenants at law was of great significance, and, by the mid-seventeenth 
century, it had become established that words such as 'yielding and paying' 
would create an express covenant. 
Thus in Newton v. Osborn (1653) (68) and Porter .v. Swetnam (1654) (69) 
it was held that such a clause was an express covenant, 'for the words are 
the agreement of both parties' (70). So the factors (a), (b) and (c) listed 
above had combined to produce a definite change in emphasis in the law: a 
swing from concentration on the precise creation of an estate by one party 
towards agreement of two contractors. 
Now, of itself, this process may not seem terribly significant, but let 
us change the facts slightly; or rather, revert to our original situation. 
Suppose the granter wishes to take advantage of a non-observance of a 
stipulation so as to re-enter. The question then is, did such a stipulation 
as 'yielding and paying' retain its conditional aspect in favour of the 
granter after various cases had decided that, on different facts, it could 
be taken advantage of as a covenant? 
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This problem crystallised in 1675 in the important decision of Hayes v. 
Bickerstaffe. The lessee brought an action for breach of an express 
covenant for quiet enjoyment, but the lessor pleaded that he had re-entered 
by virtue of a breach of condition of the lease. The stipulation relied on 
as a condition stated that the lessee 'paying the rent and performing the 
covenants on his part to be performed, shall quietly enjoy~ and it was 
alleged that he had not performed
1
those covenants. 
Now, because this stipulation actually referred to other covenants 
already in creation (the lessor had already covenanted pay the rent etc.) 
one would naturally expect it to be held to be a condition for, as Burrell 
for the lessor said, 'If it be not a qualification, the words are totally 
void' (71). 
·However, counsel for the plaintiff lessee took a totally different 
approach, and it is well worthwhile citing his argument: 
It is not conditional, but they are mutual covenants, and the parties 
have mutual remedies: he admitted, that where a liberty was granted 
to take such a thing, paying so many hens, there if the party did not 
pay the hens the grant was void, because the other had no remedy for 
the hens: and he cited the case of Ambrose Bennet, adjudged in the King's 
Bench, which was the very same with this case and there ruled by all the 
Judges; and he cited Owen 54 (the case of Michell v. Dunton), which he 
said was a stronger case, being in a will (72). 
Thus the argument was now not based on the intrinsic nature of the 
clauses in the document but the much wider consideration of whether or not 
the parties had sufficient remedy for a breach. If a party had no remedy 
then obviously the clause was a condition of the grant but if, so the 
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argument now went, each party had a remedy for breach then the clause 
should be construed as a covenant rather than a condition. 
These concepts of availability of remedies and inequality of damage 
will be examined in the next part of this work, but for the moment we 
should again note the drastic change in the interpretation of documents 
with regard to the condition/covenant dichotomy that had taken place. 
This change is well pointed up by Serjeant Pemberton's citation of 
the case of Michell v. Dunton (1587) in purported support of his 
argu~ent. In this case, the lessor executed a lease under which the 
lessor covenanted inter alia to repair. The lessor in his will devised 
the sa~e land to the lessee for a further term, under such covenants 
as were in the first lease. The lessor continued in possession under 
this second lease but did not do the repairs that were stipulated. The 
remainderman now argued that this repairing was a condition of the lease 
and that, it not having been performed, he was now entitled to possession. 
The argument by counsel for the remainderman was that the repairing 
must _pe a condition, because the remainderman had no covenant he could 
enforce, Shuttleworth contending that 1 (I)t is a condition, for he cannot 
have a covenant, and then it shall be intended that it is conditional'. 
However the Court rejected such argu~ents, the classic distinction 
between a condition and a covenant being still strictly observed. A 
clause was either a covenant or a condition, and if it was clearly 
intended to be a covenant by the parties, and it was so termed in the 
lease and in the will, then it could not have a conditional effect. 
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Thus Anderson J. observed that the 'nature of a covenant is to have 
an action, but not an entry, and therefore there shall be no entry'. 
And at length the whole Court resolved as follows: 
(T)he will expressing that the first lessee should have the land 
observing the first covenant shall not be now taken to be a condition 
by any intent that may be collected out of the will: for a covenant 
and condition are of several natures, the one giving action, the 
other entry, and here the intent of the will was, that although the 
covenants were not performed, yet the lessee should not forfeit his 
terme, but is only bound to such paine as he was at the beginning, and 
that was to render damages in an action of covenant (73). 
This seems a clear decision and one which was quite in line with the 
contemporary authority that we have already examined. The interesting 
thing is, of course, that the condition should be cited by counsel 100 years 
later in support of an argument which depended for success on a completely 
different approach to the analysis of conditions and covenants. 
The point is that in Michell v. Dunton it was decided that a covenant 
rather than a condition was involved and, in Hayes v. Bickerstaffe, 
Serjeant Pemberton was also concerned to argue that a clause was a covenant. 
He therefore cited Michell v. Dunton. The similarity between the cases is 
superficial in the extreme. In Michell v. Dunton, the decision turned on 
the rigid distinction between condition and covenant, and an argument based 
on the non-availability of a remedy was explicitly rejected. In Hayes v. 
Bickerstaffe, on the other hand, Serjeant Pemberton was concerned to erode 
this old distinction and to base himself on the question of remedies. 
Therefore, if anything, Michell v. Dunton was an authority against him. 
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But the time, it seems, was past for such nice analysis and, although 
Atkins J. doubted, the majority of the Court accepted these arguments. 
Thus: 
North C.J., remembered the case of A'Bennet, cited by Pemberton, and 
said it would be very mischievous if it should be otherwise; for this 
clause is now so usual, that it is but clausula clericorum and he said, 
if it should be construed conditionally, then if the lessee broke a 
covenant of the value of a penny, it would excuse the lessor of the 
breach of a covenant of £1000 value (74). 
Hayes v. Bickerstaffe was to be immediately consolidated by a number 
of cases applying it (75), yet it has always been the subject of some 
puzzlement (76). Just how did it happen that words which, looking back 
only a few years before the decision, would have been acceoted as condit-
ional had now suddenly lost that character? 
I hope I have shown some of the factors that contributed to this 
evolution but it is obvious that there are two important factors, which 
are intimately related, that have not yet been examined. 
In Hayes v. Bickerstaffe both plaintiff's counsel and the court stressed 
the importance of availability of remedies and the factor of the consider-
ation for a covenant. Once again we find that a number of topics are inter-
twined, a number of factors are contributing to the evolution of the lav1. 
Thus, in this instance, these topics developed parallel for the most part 
to the development we have been discussing, overlapping nov1 and again 
perhaps, then coming together in a case such as Hayes v. Bickerstaffe. 
It is to these factors of remedies and consideration, then, that we 
must now turn. 
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P A R T I I 
THE CONTRACTUAL CONDITION PRECEDENT 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CONCEPT OF A CONDITION PRECEDENT 
(A) THE NATURE OF A CONDITION PRECEDENT 
It has already been observed that in Lord Coke's day the field of 
learning called to mind by the word 'condition' concerned conditions of 
estates, and this topic, together with some of its influence on subsequent 
development, has already been examined. 
But while this was the usual and proper import of the word, it was 
recognised that the term was sometimes also used with reference to 
contracts. Thus Bacon observed: 
By the word 'condition' is usually understood some quality annexed 
to a real estate, by virtue of which it may be defeated, enlarged, 
or created upon an uncertain event. 
Also, qualities annexed to personal contracts and agreements are 
frequently called 'conditions', and these must be interpreted 
according to the real intention of the parties and are usually taken 
most strongly against the party to whom they are meant to extend, 
lest by the obscure wording of his own contract, he should find means 
to evade and avoid it (77). 
But the correct way to aprroach the topic of contract was to talk in 
terms of conditions precedent. 
A condition precedent was something that was intended by the covenantor 
to be performed before his liability on his covenant could be perfected. A 
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condition precedent could, of course, be stipulated for in the case of the 
vesting of real estates, and the early definitions covered both these 
cases of real estates and personal contracts. 
Thus Comyns states: 
A condition precedent is such as ought to be performed before the 
estate vests, or the grant or gift takes effect (78). 
And Bacon: 
Conditions precedent are such as must be punctually performed before 
the estate can vest ... (79). 
And both co~mentators then give examples drawn from both real property 
estates and personal contracts. But perhaps the most important point to 
be made is that stress very definitely was laid on the word 'precedent', for 
it meant exactly what it said. The event, or condition, had to occur 
before a good cause of action accrued. 
This was particularly obvious in the case of the action of Debt, which 
depended on an executed quid pro guo, and it is to this situation that the 
original doctrine of conditions precedent was primarily addressed. For 
example, besides the case of wills and vesting of real estates, Bacon gave 
the follo\ving examples of personal contracts after his definition cited 
above: 
As, if I grant, that if A will go to such a place about my business, 
that he shall have such an estate, or that he shall have £10 etc; this 
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is a condition precedent (3 H.6 7h. Roll. Abr. 414). 
So, if I retain a man for 40s. to go with me to Rome, this is a 
condition precedent, for the duty commenceth by going to Rome 
( 3 I~. 6. 33b Ro 11 . Abr. 414) . 
It is perhaps now possible to attempt some definition, or perhaps 
more realistically some description, of the terms 'condition• and 
'condition precedent' in the sphere of the law of contract. It was 
stated earlier that when we are faced with the term 'condition, we 
should ask, 'condition of what?' and if 'precedent• is added, we should 
ask 'precedent to what?' While some English writers have perhaps not 
attacked the problem in as clear a manner as they might have, learned 
American writers have formulated the problePl in these terms and have 
thus provided valuable guidance to, its solution. 
Thus Professor Williston wrote: 
It is a source of confusion of thought that the word 'condition' is 
frequently used without exact recognition of what the supposed 
condition qualifies. 
Generally in contracts, when reference is made to conditions, what 
is meant are conditions which become operative after the formation 
of the contract and qualify the duty of immediate performance of a 
promise or promises thereunder - not conditions which qualify the 
existence of a contract or promise (80). 
Let us analyse this passage. Professor Williston is stating the 
following things: 
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(1) People frequently use the word conditi~n in a way which is 
~isleading, because although it is rea1ised that it quali-
fies something, it is not made clear exactly what the user 
intends that something to be. 
(2) Although the usage of the word can vary, both in 1 ay and 
legal spheres, the usual or general meaning is that it is 
something which qualifies a duty of immediate performance, 
operating after formation of the contract. 
(3) There are other meanings of the word condition, of which 
two are first, the qualification of the existence of any 
contract, and secondly the definition or limitation of a 
promise in a contract - but these usages are not what is 
generally intended. 
Now the reader may think this analysis superfluous, or ex abundanti 
cautela, but I \llish precisely to state this approach, which is typical of 
both Professors Williston and Corbin, so that I may make some comments 
about them which might otherwise be difficult to follow. 
The above approach may be said to be this. There are a number of 
usages of the word condition, and it is impossible to ignore them. But, 
for the sake of clarity, we choose to adopt one clear and well established 
meaning of the word, and clearly to define our term condition in that way 
so that there can be as little misunderstanding as possible when we use the 
word condition. 
Professor Corbin clearly states this approach: 
Like all other words, the term 'condition' is used in a variety of 
senses. There is no law against this; and there is no single 
'correct' definition. People cannot be compelled to use a legal 
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term in the sense preferred by the present writer or by. the makers 
of a dictionary. A good dictionary attempts to report all usages 
that are common and respectable. The only hnsis for chnir.P nmnng 
definitions is the extent and the convenience of the usage. With-
out doubt this results in ease and variety of expression; but in 
many 1nstances, in which exactitude and clarity are especially 
needed, it results also in inexact thinking and in misunderstanding 
by others. It is to avoid such inexactness and misunderstanding 
that the term 1 condition 1 , for use in the present work, is defined as an 
operative fact, one on which the existence of some particular legal 
relation depends (81). 
Now of course I do not criticize this approach which, with respect, is 
eminently practical in that it recognizes the problem created by the 
multiple meanings of the word condition and takes the giant step towards 
clarity by adopting a treatment of the topic which is consistent within 
itself, because the terms used are clearly defined. 
However, it has been my submission that, in order to choose a worth-
while definition of 1 condition 1 it is best to go back into the history of 
the term to see if the word did originally have a clear, well recognised 
meaning. If so, then it is perhaps that meaning which we should now orima 
facie give to the word condition, all the time recognising that more recent 
decisions may be using the word in different senses due to subtle shifts in 
context and emphasis over the years. 
Now it is submitted that the word condition did originally have a 
clear, well recognised meaning. In the sphere of real property, we have 
seen that it meant a condition of an existing estate, on breach of which 
the estate was (or could be) divested. In the snhere of contracts we have 
seen that it meant a condition of a party's cause of action, something that 
had to be fulfilled before the party could enforce his contract. 
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The crucial point to note is that this concept was derived from 
property law, where the word used was 'condition' simoliciter. 
'Condition', as Bacon stated (82). was sometimes also used in relation 
to contracts but the more usual usa9e was 'condition precedent'. But, 
in relation to contracts, 'condition' and 'condition precedent' meant 
exactly the same thing, viz. a condition of, and precedent-to, the ful-
filment of a party's complete cause of action. 
This, therefore, is the foundation meaning of the word condition, 
the meaning on whi eh we may bui 1 d and \•1ith whi eh 1 ater deve 1 opments 
could be compared. 
And of course it is the meaning Professors Williston and Corbin 
adopt for their respective analyses of the modern law. And so the minor 
point I a~ seeking to make is this: granted that there are numerous meanings 
of the word condition and granted that we need to make a choice between the 
concepts for the sake of internal consistency of analysis, the way in l'lhich 
we make that choice is to discover what the original meaning was and then 
use that as our reference point, or our point of comparison, when examining 
the more recent rlevelop~ents in the law and the chan9ing concepts and mean-
ings of the word condition. It is submitted that this analysis is prefer-
able to that of adopting the most popular and general modern meaning, or 
even a meaning that seems correct in an abstract, logical sense for, 
although many modern decisions do proceed on a basis of application and 
adoption of the modern meanings and concepts of condition, thus suiting the 
last two methods of analysis noted, nevertheless the older cases and learn-
ing are of crucial importance. Not only do surprisingly ancient cases 
sometimes rise up that cover a modern set of facts and resolve a modern legal 
prob 1 em, they provide the very bedrock and foundation of our common 1 a1t1. 
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True it is that the law changes, and it must change to meet changing 
social needs and mores. But if we merely reason in the abstract, if we 
merely play with abstract concepts, inverting, substracting components, 
rearran9ing them like mathematical formulae, we will soon find ourselves 
quite adrift from any guiding principle, quite devoid of certainty and 
direction. 
l~e should therefore use our historical bedrock as at least a starting 
point upon which we can engraft'changes and modifications, always clearly 
recognizing what we are doing· and why. In this way we will be able to 
retain clear principles rather than be faced with the veritable maze of 
these grafts and alterations that, without the background and context of 
the original principles, mean very little. 
Having said all this, somewhat in anticipation of developments we 
have not yet fully covered, let us return to our historical treatment of 
the condition precedent. 
We turn now to the reasons and rationales of the insistence upon 
performance of a condition precedent before a promise could be enforcerl. 
(B) PERFORMANCE OF CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
We should always remember that, before the advent of the enforceable 
simple executory contract, the actions of Covenant and Debt governed many 
fact situations that we would now subsume under a general law of contract. 
Of course, the intricacies of the evolution of the action of Assumosit 
and a general theory of contract as distinct from Trespass and Debt are 
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largely outside the scope of this work. However, for our purposes, it is 
important to remember that the basis of many remedies that we would now 
regard as contractual was originally thoughtof in terms of grants of 
property; the foundation of liability was based on the concept of 
property rather than promise. Thus in one case it was said: 
(C)ontracts of debt are reciprocal grants. A man may sell his black 
horse for present money, at a day to come, and the buyer may, the 
day being come, seize the horse, for he hath property then in him, 
which is the reason in the Register, that actions in the Debet and also 
in the Detinet, are actions of property, but no man hath property by a 
breach of promise but must be repair'd in damages (83). 
We have seen that a grant had a force in itself; if it was executed 
then, unless there were appropriate legal words of condition in the ~rant, 
the actual estate granted could not be defeated (84). However, if the 
covenant, or grant as it was thought of, was of an executory nature (i.e. 
it had not been performed or was of a continuing nature) the expression of 
the consideration for the grant could be vital in the following situation. 
If A bound himself to perform X for B, in consideration for performance of 
Y but B did not bind himself to perform Y, it was thought from the earliest 
times that the performance of Y was a condition precedent to A's liability. 
This was explained in various ways. Thus, it was said on the one hand that 
if the consideration were expresse9, then it became part of the grant 
itself; the performance of the consideration formed the very foundation and 
commencement of the grant. On the other hand, it could be put in terms of 
intention; because the promiser had no remedy to compel performance by the 
promisee, it was his intention that the performance of the consideration 
was to be a condition precedent to his liability, and the courts were 
willing to take cognizance of this intention. 
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These two rationales are, of course, linked and it could easily be 
said that the second is but an example of practical interpretation by 
the courts; A expressed the consideration, but he knows he has no 
remedy for it and therefore he must have intended the performance of it 
to be a condition precedent to his liability. Nevertheless, we do find 
that the cases tended to be resolved with reference to one rationale or 
the other, rather than a combination of both. In the first class of 
cases, performance was viewed as part of the very grant itself~ the 
paradigm case of a condition precedent to the vesting of the grant. 
Thus Lord Coke, in his report of Ughtred's Case, observed: 
Suppose I retain a man to go with me to Rome for 40s. here by the 
going the cause of the duty first arises, in which case, if he brings 
an action of Debt for it, in his declaration he ought to declare, 
that he was there; otherwise the declaration shall abate. So it is 
if I retain one to serve me for 40s., by the years; for here by the 
consideration performed the duty arises, so that it is in the 
nature of an act precedent ... (85). 
The point is, that in these cases the reason for decision was not so 
much the lack of a remedy by the promisor, but the concept of grant; the 
performance was part of the grant and so the grant did not vest until 
the performance - the condition precedent - was performed. 
However, it is also quite clear from other cases that the lack of 
mutual remedies was regarded as of crucial importance from the earliest 
times, and came to be stressed more and more as the true reason for 
construing performance as a condition precedent in these cases. 
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This rationale was put succinctly and clearly in the following 
cases. 
In Cowper v. Andrews (1612) the position with regard to an executed 
grant was again distinguished from an executory grant, and this case is 
especially interesting because it demonstrates again that this concept of 
grants and the distinction between executed and executory was not 
narrowly limited to real estates but was of general application. There-
fore, before referring to the crucial passage, let us briefly state the 
facts. 
Tithes were usually payable to a vicar in kind, i.e. part of what the 
land produced, and originally this had been the case with the land in 
question. However, from time out of mind the land had been a park, and 
the farmers had paid two shillings a year and one shoulder of every third 
deer ki 11 ed. However, the 1 and \•Jas converted to arable land and no deer 
were left. The farmers therefore tendered two shillings only, but the 
vicar refused this, asserting a claim of tithes in kind. The argument 
against the vicar 1 s claim was that a composition or grant of tithes (i.e. 
deer and two shillings) had been executed in return for tithes in kind, and 
the latter could not now revive. The vicar argued that his consideration 
had failed and therefore the original tithes revived. The Court found 
against the vicar, because the grants were executed, and there were no 
legal words of condition. Thus Hobart J. held: 
Wherein first to remove that, that bleareth the eyes, which is, that 
because the tithe is supposed to be given originally for this re-
compence of money and venison, and therefore if the recompence be 
detained, the tithe must revive .... I must begin with the con-
sideration of the nature and operation of a grant of one thing for 
another. 
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Whereupon I lay this ground, that regularly this word (PRO) or in 
consideration doth not import a condition~ or make the grant 
defeasible, though the thing taken in lieu be either token away by 
the giver wrongfully, or by any other person upon a just tithe, so 
as the thing given be wholly lost. And therefore if I.S. give W 
acre to I.N. for B. Acre, and so E converso, without the word of 
exchange, it will be not defeasible; nay more, if they use the 
proper word of exchange, and t.hat be executed a wrongful entry of 
either party will do no hurt, but a rightful eviction will. But 
without the proper word of exchange, though perhaps it were meant 
in the nature of an exchange, it will not defeat. 
His Lordship then referred to the different position of executory 
grants which we are now considering: 
But it is true that the word (PRO) in ~ome cases hath the force of a 
condition, when the thing granted is executory, and the considerat-
ion of a grant is a service or some other like thing, for which 
there is no remedy but the stopping of the thing granted, as in the 
case of annuity granted for counsel, or for doing the office of a 
steward of a Court; or the service of a captain or keeper of a fort, 
Ughtred's Case, Co. 7 Lib (86). 
' Thus the availability of a remedy \'/as regarded as crucial to 
construction of executory grants. Grav's Case decided in 1594 affords 
another example. Without examining the form of action involved, it is 
sufficient to state that it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish 
a custom to have common of pasture. The jury found for him on this 
point, but also found that every commoner used to pay for the same one 
hen and five eggs annually. The crucial significance of the availability 
of remedies is pointed up in Lord Coke's formulation of the matter in 
issue: 
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And the doubt was what remedy the terre-tenant should have for the 
hens and eggs; for if the terre-tenant has no remedy for them, then 
the commoner should have his common sub modo, scil paying so 111Uch, 
etc. and then it would be against the plaintiff. But if the terre-
tenant has a good remedy for the hens and eggs, then as the verdict 
is found it is not modus cornrnuniae scil. a manner of commoning, 
now parcel of the issue as to the common, but a collateral recom-
pence to be paid for the common, whereof every one has equal 
remedy. 
Popham C.J., referred to an unreported Devonshire case which is well 
worth ~entioning for it again highlights the connection between condition 
and remedy. It was adjudged in that case that: 
(W)here a man prescribed to have pot-water out of the river, etc. 
and the jury found that he ought to have it paying 6d. yearly. 
And it was adjudged that he had failed of his prescription, for 
he had prescribed absolutely, and the jury had found it condit-
ionally, or sub modo. And there if he did not pay the money he 
ought not to take the water, and the terre-tenant in such case 
might disturb him, which is all the remedy that the terre-tenant 
had. 
However the instant case was different to that Devonshire decision 
because: 
(I)n the case at Bar, the terre-tenant may distrain the cattle of 
the commoner on his own land for the hens and eggs; and therewith 
agrees 26H 8. 5. But in the case at Bar, if the jury had found, 
that the plaintiff should have common paying so many hens and eggs, 
the issue had been found against him because it is parcel of the 
custom: but in the case at Bar, the custom as to the commoning is 
perfect without the sa1d payment, and the payment doth not limit 
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. or qualify the custom, but it is a recompense for the common, for 
which recompense the terre-tenant has remedy. But if the terre-
tenant had no remedy for the reco~pense, as in the case put by the 
Chief Justice, but only to 1make the said disturbance', and is 
aforesaid, then the said manner of payment (although it be found as 
it is in the case at Bar) is pµrcel of the custom {87). 
Now the reader may well wonder at this stage what is the point of 
quibbling over the precise rationale for the qualification of a uni-
lateral grant. What is the point of distinguishing between the factor 
of the nature of the grant as a whole and the factor of non-availability 
of mutual remedies when both factors are always present anyway? 
The point will soon become clear, however, when we move on to 
consider the position of bilateral contracts; i.e. the situation where 
both parties are bound and therefore each has a remedy. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE BILATERAL CONTRACT UNDER SEAL 
(A) THE ORIGINAL PRESUMPTION OF INDEPENDENCY OF COVENANTS 
When parties to a contract under seal covenant to perform certain 
things, they may intend such covenants to be absolute or they may intend 
them to be conditional on some event. 
Of course, if conditional, the intended condition might have absolute-
ly no connection with the other party's performance. We have previously 
noted that the concepts of condition, consideration and covenant are 
separate, and the facts may show them to be quite independent of one 
another. 
Now a man may make a covenant with no conditions and for no consider-
ation, and it may be enforced if it is under seal. Again, a man may make 
a covenant with a condition that has absolutely no connection with the 
matter at hand, (for example, I will pay you $2,000 for your car if the 
twentieth person that walks past that door is wearing a hat). More 
realistically, the condition may have no connection with the promisee's 
performance or obligations, but will have some relevance to the matter in 
hand for the promisor, (for example, a contract to buy a house provided 
that the sale of the purchaser's own house goes through by a certain date). 
But although we can thus separate the concepts it is far more likely 
that they will coincide with one another. This is because, in the great 
majority of cases, party A wishes to obtain a performance from party B and 
is willing to purchase it with his·own contractual performance; thus 
- 73 -
covenant and consideration merge. Furthermore, the parties may be 
concerned with order of performance (as a whole or of particular parts 
of the contract) and so A makes a condition requiring previous or 
concurrent performance by the other party before A is required to 
perform; thus condition merges with both covenant and consideration. 
Now, the discussion in the previous sections has been concerned with 
the general concept of a condition, and this will include a condition the 
subject matter of which is quite irrelevant to the contract, as in the 
hat example. 
We now turn to a slightly more narrow, but important, sphere of 
enquiry - the situation where it is alleged that the condition precedent 
to the promisor's liability to perform is the performance by the promisee. 
The problem to be discussed is the relation between conditions of 
enforceability of a promise and consideration for a promise. Is it 
possible to say that, in a bilateral contract under seal, the promise 
of one party furnishes the consideration for the promise of the other 
party and must therefore be performed before the other party's performance 
can be enforced? 
Perhaps the most simple way to formulate this problem is this: If 
A covenants to do X and B covenants to do Y, each making no reference to 
the other's covenant, can B enforce A's covenant irrespective of the 
performance of his own covenant? From the earliest times it was accepted 
that this problem was to be considered in this form: Was the promise(s) 
of the one party dependent on or independent of the promise of the other 
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party? In other words, did the performance of one party's promise 
constitute a condition precedent to the enforceability of the other's 
promise, or were they both independently enforceable? And from the earliest 
times it was accepted that such covenants were independently enforceable. 
Before exploring the reasons for and rationale of this doctrine, let us 
illustrate the basic doctrine's operation. Two cases will suffice to 
illustrate this basic doctrine, though many others might be referred to (88). 
In Ware v. Chappel (1649) the plaintiff covenanted in an indenture to 
bring 500 soldiers to a port and the defendant covenanted to provide 
shipping and victuals for them at the port. The plaintiff brought an 
action against the defendant for not providing the shipping and victuals, 
and the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had not raised the soldiers 
' 
at that time. The question therefore became, were the covenants dependent 
or independent? 
It was decided that they were independent; i.e. that the plaintiff 
could sue without showing performance of his own covenant. 
Roll C.J., with whom Ask and Nicholas JJ. concurred, held that: 
(T)here was no condition precedent but that they are distinct and 
mutual covenants, and that there may be several actions brought 
for them: and it is not necessary to give notice of the number of 
the men raised, for the number is known to be 500 and the time for 
the shipping to be ready, is also known by the covenants; and you 
have your remedy against him if he raises not the men, as he hath 
against you for not providing the shipping (89). 
- 75 -
The case of Trench v. Trewin (1696) affords a further example. 
Trench, the executor of Squire, brought an action of covenant for £30 
upon articles between Squire and the defendant, Trewin, that Squire should 
assign to the defendant his interest in a house and the defendant should pay 
Squire £30. The defendant pleaded that Squire had not assigned, to which the 
plaintiff demurred. The case was decided for the plaintiff because: 
(T)hese are mutual and independent covenants, and the parties may have 
reciprocal actions; and therefore the plaintiff may bring his action 
before the assignment of the house. And the defendant has a remedy 
after; if the other party does not perform his part (90). 
(B) AN EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENCY 
The doctrine of independent covenants has been attacked at various 
times for various reasons, among which are that the decisions 'outrage 
common sense', and that they are contrary to the partie~ 'true intention'. 
However, it is most important to put the doctrine into true historical 
perspective, and if we do so, we find that the doctrine is quite under-
standable and quite logical. 
Now it is true that to lawyers steeped in doctrines of 'breach going 
to the root of the contract' etc., a dependency/independency dichotomy may 
seem an artificial and too rigid way in which to formulate what is very 
often an extremely involved problem. And it is true that with respect to 
an executory oral contract it may well be artificial to try to list the 
promises and decide which are linked to which, but this is because the 
promises are not prima facie independently enforceable as they are in a deed, 
enforceability depending rather upon questions of consideration, and failure 
of consideration, doctrines which tend to depend on the substance of the 
contract as a whole rather than individual components of it. 
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But the rules pertaining to construction of bilateral deeds were 
developed many years before the advent of enforceability of ,executory 
contracts based on mutual promises. Furthermore, although personal 
actions could be enforced by other means such as Debt, it was settled 
that these actions were based on the fact that the consideration was 
executed - quid pro guo - or that the property was deemed to have 
passed. 
The action of Covenant sharply contrasted with such actions, and 
it was natural that the general principles of construction of bilateral 
deeds, and indeed the very concept of such a deed, should parallel not 
the modern all embracing 'law of contract' but rather the contemporary 
real property law. 
The point is that, as already submitted, the law of real property 
played a crucial and dominant part in the early law. It is in real 
property law that the original concept of condition was formulated and 
developed, and it was also in this 'field, and in the related field of the 
lease for years, that the condition/covenant dichotomy took shape and 
developed. And it is in the law of real property that we can find the 
seeds of the independent approach to the construction of bilateral deeds. 
There are several important factors in this early law that contributed 
to the adoption of this approach. 
(i) The Condition/Covenant Dichotomy 
l~e have already traced the story of the condition/covenant- dichotomy 
from the original insistence on a construction based on the words actually 
used in the deed toward a more flexible approach whereby other factors, 
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such as suitability and availability of remedies could be taken into 
account. And in Hayes v. Bickerstaffe (91) we saw the end of 
this process of development, the Court holding words which, 100 years 
before, would have been certainly conditional to be mere clausula 
clericorum. The co'nstruction in that case was against a condition 
because such a result would be too harsh, for 1 if the lessee broke a 
covenant of the value of a penny, H would excuse the lessor of the 
breach of a covenant of £1000 value• . 
. But Hayes v. Bickerstaffe represented a late stage in the develop-
ment of conditions and covenants, and it is to the very much earlier. 
stages that we must refer for an explanation of the matter with which we 
are now concerned, dependency and independency. 
As I have attempted to demonstrate, the concepts of condition and 
covenant were originally quite separate and in fact mutually exclusive. 
As was stated in Michell v. Dunton (1587) (already examined supra): 
(T)he will expressing that the first lessee should have the land 
observing the first covenants, it shall not be now taken to be a 
condition, by any intent that may be collected out of the will: 
for a covenant and condition are of several natures, the one 
giving action, the other entry ... (92). 
The point I wish to make is quite a simple one. In a deed stipulations 
were either viewed as covenants or conditions. If it was decided that 
parties had covenanted with each other, then these covenants were absolute; 
the covenant of the one party (or rather performance of that covenant) did 
not qualify the enforceability of the covenant of the other party, for they 
were covenants not conditions. This clear distinction was to change but it 
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did originally form a basis for the courts' approach to the problem of 
the relation between the covenants of the two parties to a bilateral 
deed. Covenants were prima facie absolute and conditions were odious. 
Therefore, although the requirement was not so rigorous as in the case 
of estates, 'proper' words of condition were deemed necessary. But the 
fact that the consideration for the giving of one covenant was the 
giving of a reciprocal covenant was not enough to establish a condition. 
Closely related to this idea of the condition/covenant dichotomy is 
a further important factor which goes to explain the early courts' 
attitude with regard to the independency of covenants. This is the very 
nature of the contract under seal itself. 
(ii) The Nature of the Contract Under Seal 
Chitty defined contracts under seal in the following way: 
Contracts under seal, or specialties, such as deeds and bonds, are 
instruments which are not merely in writing, but which are sealed 
by the party bound thereby, and delivered by him to or for the 
benefit of the person to whom the liability is incurred. In no 
other way than by the use of this form could validity be given 
to executory contracts in early times (93). 
Perhaps the most important point to note is that the basis of enforce-
ability of a deed was the formality and solemnity of executing a promise 
under seal and not any consideration for that promise. This point is so 
well established and fully dealt with by the treatises on contract that 
there is little point in pursuing the matter further. Perhaps, however, 
I might refer to an interesting contemporary exposition by counsel in 
Sharington v. Stratton (1564): 
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(W)hen a man passes a thing by deed, first there is the d~termination 
of the mind to do it, and upon that he causes it to be written, which 
is one part of deliberation, and afterwards he puts his seal to it, 
which is another part of deliberation, and lastly he delivers the 
writing as his deed, which is the consummation of his resolution; 
and by the delivery of the deed from him that makes it to him to whom 
it is made, he gives his assent to part with the thing that is con-
tained in the deed to him to whom he delivers the deed, and this 
delivery is as a ceremony in law, signifying fully his good-will that 
the thing in the deed should pass from him to the other. So that 
there is great deliberation used in the making of deeds, for which 
reason they are received as a lien final to the party, and are 
adjudged to bind the party without examining upon what cause or 
consideration they were made (94). 
As to the importance of the contract under seal, although all 
commentators recognise that there have always been important differences 
between contracts under seal and simple contracts (whether written or 
oral), most tend to denigrate the role of the contract under seal in the 
deve_l opment of our 1 aw of contract. 
For example, Pollock observed that: 
The writ of covenant remained a solitary and barren form of action, 
without influence on the later development of the law (95). 
And Sutton and Shannon stated: 
A promise under seal to do or to abstain from doing anything was the 
solemn act and deed of the party making it, and it was for this reason 
that the law enforced it, and the fact that it involved an agreement 
was not the important consideration; this writ, therefore, has not 
been the means of developing the law of contract (96). 
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Such statements may be correct in the sense that the actual number 
of contracts under seal has declined, but they are wrong if they suggest 
that the general law of contract developed separately and independently 
of the principles applicable to deeds. 
The action of covenant preceded a general theory of contract by 
hundreds of years, and we shall see that the principles applicable to 
deeds were in fact vital to later development (97). 
For now, the important point to note is that, even though a deed 
was bilateral, the Common Law took the view that each party had solemnly 
covenanted, and each was bound not just because of the other's entry into 
agreement but because of the very solemnity of covenanting under seal. 
Each party had made a covenant, or grant as it was still often termed, 
and prima faci e that was binding. In- the case of unil atera 1 grants we 
have seen that there were reasons for interpreting the expressed consider-
ation as part of the 9rant, or as a condition precedent to the enforce-
ability of the grant. In the present situation, however, these reasons 
did not exist. 
First of all, we are assuming that there is no reference in the one 
party's covenant to the consideration for that covenant, through 1t10rds such 
as Q.!:2_ etc., and therefore one could not say that there was an express 
condition precedent to the covenant. 
Secondly,due to the very nature of the bilateral deed, there are mutual 
remedies available and the possibility of interpreting the consideration as 
a condition precedent to the grant because there is no other remedy for it 
also disappears. 
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Now, given the background of real property law that we have reviewed, 
and the very nature of a contract under seal, it seems ~ost natural that 
the Courts should have viewed the matter in terms of a simple presumption: 
the covenant of each party was enforceable, unless this presumption was 
rebutted by the express intention of the parties to make enforceability 
dependent on the performance of another covenant. 
Nevertheless, although all this seems quite logical when viewed in 
its historical context, we are still faced with the fact that, as has 
already been stated, it is sometimes observed that these decisions are 
against the parties' true intention and outrage common sense. 
Once again our terms should be carefully defined. Suppose we wish 
to examine the present situation of A covenanting to do X and B cov,enant-
ing to do Y, (with no words of connection,) and to ignore all thoughts of 
judicial precedent and doctrine. We decide to proceeq directly to the 
true intention of the parties, but we still find that it is not necessarily 
the case that it was intended that the non-performance of one promise was 
intended to bar the performance of the other. It might be that there are 
a number of promises made by each side and that promise X is of quite 
insignificant importance to the contract as a whole, whereas promise Y is 
vital. Again, it might be that the promises are not connected at all, each 
being related to two quite separate transactions and each really in the 
nature of a deed poll executed by each party, but in the one bilateral 
deed. 
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(iii) The Intention of the Parties 
The ascertaining of the parties' intention and the very meaning of 
intention in the law present great difficulty, and we should briefly 
consider this problem before procee~ing further. When two parties 
decide that they wish to enter into a contract of some kind, they may 
advert to an infinite number of eventualities concerning that contract. 
If an eventuality occurs that causes the contract to be litigated upon 
in court, there are any number of possible facts situations but the 
cases may be divided into two broad categories. 
I· (1) First of all, the parties may have actually adverted to the 
eventuality in their contract. If so, the question then 
arises as to the meaning of words used by the parties and 
the legal consequences of the use of those words. Naturally, 
there are many other vital issues likely to arise such as 
mistake, rectification, the parole evidence rule and 
difficult questions of subjective and objective intention, 
but these issues are outside the province of this work, and 
we put them to one side. The question, as it is formulated 
in the majority of cases and textbooks, is: 1 What should the 
words used by the parties reasonably be taken to mean?' 
Words have no absolute meaning in themselves but are only 
useful when considered in conjunction with known objects and 
concepts. Words can d~scribe, modify and distinguish objects 
and concepts, but their meaning is always subject to the cir-
cumstances in which they are found. The allusion to Humpty 
Dumpty is hackneyed but at least it points up the fact that 
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to know what a word means we must first know how the parties 
used it. Even if such difficult problems as technical mean-
ings, local custom and usage etc., are not present in a case, 
and neither litigant has the initials H.D., the fact remains 
that the interpretation of, and effect placed upon, the words 
used may.radically differ from era to era, and from judge to 
judge. So, our first problem is, how do we decide what words 
mean and how do we determine their legal effect? 
(2) The difficulties multiply in our second situation. This is the 
case in which the parties have not expressed themselves upon 
the eventuality that occurs and it is therefore up to the 
court to decide the consequences to be attributed to it. 
These b1o·problems, in particular the second, involve construction of a 
contract and implication of terms, problems once again outside the scope of 
this work. But, in order to proceed, it is necessa,ry to say something about 
the two categories of fact situations outlined above and the terms to be 
used in relation to them. 
There are three important concepts to be considered: interpretation, 
implication and construction (98). 
Intepretation answers the first question: what do the words used 
actually mean? It is concerned with the language of a contract (though this 
may include symbols and acts) rather than the drawing of inferences and the 
ascertainment of legal consequences. 
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Construction is a far broader term; it means the determination of the 
legal effect of the contract. Thus Professor Corbin: 
By 'construction of the contract', as that term will be used here, 
we determine its legal operation - its effect upon the action of 
courts and administrative officials. If we make this distinction, 
then the construction of a contract starts with the interpretation of 
its language but does not end with it; while the process of interpretation 
stops wholly short of a determination of the iegal relations of the 
parties. 
He continues: 
When a court gives a construction to the contract as that is affected 
by events subsequent to its making and not foreseen by the parties, it 
is departing very far from mere interpretation of their symbols of 
expression, although even then it may claim somewhat erroneously to be 
giving effect to the 'intention' of the parties (99). 
So, construction involves a large measure of value decision: if the 
parties did not consider an eventuality, what legal result is to be reached? 
As we all know, the answer to that question is that it is a matter of 
construction of the legally admissible evidence and circumstances. 
Granted, this definition is hazy in the extreme, but perhaps the third 
concept will clarify it a little. 
Implication is distinguished by Corbin from the process of construction 
because he believes it most aptly describes the process of ascertaining what 
the parties actually intended (although they did not say it), as distinct 
from a policy of construction based on the courts' idea of fairness and 
social policy. As Corbin says, it is a 
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process of logical and factual inference and not a pure construction or 
creation by the court. An implied promise, therefore, is here treated 
as a promise implied in fact, a promise that the promisor himself made, 
but a promise that he did not put into promissory words with sufficient 
clearness to be called an express promise (100). 
Of course, this distinction between construction and implication only 
stands up if we recognize that in some situations the courts resolve problems 
in a manner quite independent of what the parties actually t~ought, or might 
have thought, about the eventuality. 
Naturally, this principle may be formulated in many ways and in differ-
ent degrees of boldness dependent on one's philosophy of the judicial process 
or, perhaps, merely one's degree of cynicism. But although we may be loath 
to endorse some of the sweeping statements made by those of the 'Realist' 
. 
persuasion, I think we can safely accept that a degree of social policy and 
justice enters into the resolution of contract cases. 
The result of this is not altogether happy. If we accept on the one 
hand that the true meaning of implication is the derivation of parties' 
actual, though unexpressed, intentions and on the other hand that terms 
may be imposed by the court through a separate process of construction, what 
is the correct word to describe this imposition of terms by law? 
The answer,and Professor Corbin would be the first to recognize it, is 
that the courts use the verb 'imply' to refer both to the ascertainment of 
what the parties actually intended and also to the process of imputing 
terms by law. Perhaps, therefore, we need a further term to describe this 
imputation process - and the logical choice might be 'imputed terms'. 
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Divisions and classifications are all very well, but the most important 
thing is what the courts actually do. Corbin points out that: 
Frequently, however, the holding of the court will be so stated as 
'to make it appear that it is based upon a 'presumed' intention or 
even upon actual intention that is discovered by some mysterious 
kind of interpretation or inference. In many cases, indeed, it 
may be difficult to determine whether the parties intended such a 
condition or not; and this need not be determined at all if the 
court is willing to hold that justice requires the condition 
whether the parties intended it or not (1). 
With respect this seems correct, although I would prefer to place 
less ·emphasis on the courts' deliberate dressing up of policy decisions 
in terms of intention, although this undoubtedly occurs, and more 
emphasis on the genuine dilemma faced by the courts in deciding how to 
decide what the parties should be taken to mean when they have not said 
anything. 
Now the point of all the foregoing is that it is rather meaningless 
to talk of a party's, or the parties', intention in the abstract. Even 
when the parties express their intention, the problem is by no means 
resolved; and when the parties do not express themselves, intention 
becomes very much at large. Indeed, intention is really a concept used by 
the law to implement justice, contracts in truth being built up by the 
courts through the medium of intention. The meaning of certain words may 
be strained and whole ter~s may be implied or imputed in the name of 
intention - and this is what is known as the process of construction. 
But there must be some guidelines for the courts to follow in order to 
construe a contract. There must be limits on how far the courts are to 
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inquire into the parties' true intention, but these may vary from very 
narrow limits to the widest possible discretion by the court. If very 
narrow limits are taken, e.g. confining the court to what the parties 
actually said, this does not mean that the courts are trying to ignore 
something called the true intention of the parties; it merely means that 
they are keeping to predefined guidelines for ascertaining that intention. 
Given the background of property law already adverted to, it seems 
logical, or at least understandable, that the early Common Lavi should 
have adopted a test of intention which depended on the actual words 
used by the parties. And, if there were no words of condition expressed 
in a promise, there was not thought to be a vacuum, but rather the 
intricate nature of the covenant under seal governed the construction. 
The covenant was prima facie enforceable per se and it was therefore 
up to the covenantor to manifest clearly his intention to limit this 
intrinsic nature. 
(iv) The Availability of Mutual Remedies 
Again, just as in the case of unilateral contracts, there is a further 
related factor to be considered, that of the availability of remedies. 
Just as performance was construed as a condition precedent in the case of 
a unilateral contract because there was no remedy, so it came to be often 
stated that the fact that mutual remedies were available on a deed meant 
that there was not a condition precedent. This conclusion does not necess-
arily follow, for while the absence of a remedy may be a positive reason 
for one construction, the presence of a remedy is not really a reason for 
an opposite construction. In truth, it merely negates the positive reason 
and returns us to a neutral position which is, as we have seen, resolved in 
favour of independency because of such factors as the intrinsically binding 
nature of covenants under seal and the mutually exclusive condition/covenant 
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dichotomy. At least, this would be the position if the factor of mutual 
remedies went no further than mere availability. However, there was 
another aspect of the availability of remedies which did furnish a 
positive reason for the doctrine of independency, and this was the possibil-
ity of inequality of damages, which may be explained thus. If party A 
covenants to perform things V, W, X and Y, and party B covenants to do Z 
(e.g. pay a sum of money to A), does the payment of the sum depend upon 
the performance of all of A's covenants? If it does, then although A may 
have performed V, Wand X, if he has neglected Y, he has no claim to B's 
performance; he is entitled to no payment at all. 
When faced with such a problem today, we immediately bring forth 
tests of 'importance of the term', or 'importance of the breach', or 
'frustration' etc. etc., but we must remember that this problem of partial 
performance predated these concepts by many years and originally had to be 
tackled within the framework and setting of the contemporary law of deeds. 
Given that problems were couched in the terms of dependency and 
independency, the solution adopted was that the covenants should be 
independent, and that each party should be relegated to his own remedy 
whereby the true damage could be ascertained. Thus, in the example above, 
A could recover the covenanted sum (say £50), and B could recover damages 
for non-performance of the covenant Y (say £ 10) rather than A losing all 
reimbursement as he would if a doctrine of dependency had been adopted. 
To take an example from the cases, in Cole v. Shallet (1681) the 
plaintiff brought covenant on a charterparty for the payment of freight and 
demurrage. The defendant attempted to plead in bar that the plaintiff 
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had breached certain of his own covenants in relation to the freight and 
demurrage, but this was not allowed by the court: 
per totam curiam judgement was given for the plaintiff; for th~ 
covenants are mutual and reciprocal, whereupon each hath his action 
against the other; and can not plead the breach of one covenant in 
bar of the other and perhaps the damage of the one side and the 
other was not equal, and therefore the one not pleadable in bar of 
the other; but each party is by his action to recover against the 
other the certain damage he sustained, and so was adjudged Hill 13 
Car. 2, B.R. inter Thompson and Noel (2). 
Despite the foregoing, the modern reader might still object that the 
doctrine produced ludicrous results. Thus in Ware v. Chappel supra, it 
seems ridiculous that the plaintiff could sue for damages for not providing 
food and transportation when the plaintiff himself had not provided the men 
for which they were intended. However, a partial answer is that in some 
circumstances the non-performance of the plaintiff's own part of the 
contract could be taken into account in assessing the quantum of damages. 
As counsel for the plaintiff said in Ware v. Chappel: 
(T)he defendant ought to have provided the shipping and victuals against 
the time, though the soldiers were not raised; for the not raising the 
soldiers can only be urged by way of mitigation of damages, and not 
pleaded in discharge of the breach assigned (3). 
But the main point is that the doctrine of independency did aim to 
compute exactly the true quantum of damage, and achieved this by leaving 
each party to his own separate cause of action. If the covenant was to pay 
a certain sum of money, for example, ~00, then that was an end of the 
matter; the plaintiff recovered and the defendant was left to institute 
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his own action to establish damages. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff's 
damages were at large the action of the defendant could be taken into 
account, not to bar the action but to compute the amount of the plaintiff's loss. 
It is therefore submitted that, despite much criticism, the substance of 
the doctrine was basically sound for it theoretically produced logically 
correct results. A valid criticism may, however, be levelled not so much at 
the substance of the doctrine, but at the related procedure by which it was 
administered. The rule was that, s.ince each party was relegated to his own 
action, these actions could and should be brought at different times. This 
of course meant that a man of straw could recover £ 500 on a defendant's 
covenant and then abscond, leaving the defendant with a worthless cause of 
action only. Furthermore, even if a party did not abscond, it was obviously 
inconvenient to have to engage in two separate actions which involved the 
same facts and parties; and, for a defendant who had to raise the amount of 
the judgment and pay it over, it must have been cold comfort to be told 
that he could recover it all back when he brought his own action, which 
might get to court in another two or three years! 
It was considerations such as these that were to bring about changes 
in the law. However, the transition to the modern law wi 11 be dealt with 
in later chapters. For now, let us examine this presumption of independency 
a little more deeply. 
(C) THE EXPANSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENCY OF COVENANTS 
I have tried to show that the doctrine of independency, far from being 
a pernicious and capricious frustrater of the parties' true intent, was 
really a genuine attempt by the courts to establish guidelines whereby that 
intent might uniformly be ascertained. Because of the nature of covenants 
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under seal the presumption was in favour of independent enforceability. 
But ex hypothesi a presumption may be rebutted, in our case by showing 
that there was a condition to what seemed prima facie enforceable. We 
have seen that in the case of real property estates mere manifestation 
of intention was not sufficient but legal and formal words were necessary 
to make an estate conditional. We have also seen that the interpretation 
of leases for years, while based on the same framework, was slightly 
more flexible in that some factors other than the strict words used 
might be taken into account. In the case of pure contract law the courts 
always professed to base their decisions on the parties• intention. To 
give an early example, Saunders J., 4n Throckmerton v. Tracy (1554), 
stated that: 
(D)eeds ought to have a reasonable exposition, which shall be without 
wrong to the grantor, and with the greatest advantage to the grantee ... 
And he said he was of the like opinion that Brudmel (C.J.) seemed to be 
of in 14 H. 8 (22A) that contracts shall be as it is concluded and 
agreed between the parties according as their intent may be gathered. 
And to cavil about the words in subversion of the plain intent of the 
parties, as Tully says in his Book of Offices, est calumnia guaedam et 
nemis callida sed malitiosa juris interpretatio, ex guo illud, summum 
jus summa injuria ... (4). 
But once again I wish to emphasise that although the courts could 
justifiably express this as their position with regard to contracts in 
contradistinction to estatesin fee, the means of ascertaining this 
intention were far more narrow than those to which we are now accustomed. 
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Indeed, the true position was really this: there were certain rules 
of law laid down, the foundation of which was the rationale of ascertain-
ment of intention; this being so, these rules of construction should not 
be interfered with purely in the name of the 'true intention' in a 
specific case, for such notion was just too vague. Thus the courts wished 
to ascertain intention, but that intention must be consonant with the 
rules of law. Thus in Knight's Case (1587), after the problem at issue 
there had been resolved, the following comment was made: 
And such construction agrees also with the true intent of the 
parties, which is always to be observed, when it may by reasonable 
construction consist with the rule and reason of the law (5). 
The logical manner to proceed to examine the problem, therefore, is 
to ask, first, how the presumption of independency might be expressly 
rebutted and secondly whether it might be impliedly rebutted. 
(i) Rebuttal of the Presumption by Express Condition Precedent 
We have seen that a condition precedent in contract law was thought 
of in narrow and precise terms: something to be performed before a cause 
of action accrued. 
This was particularly apparent in the action of debt where the perform-
ance furnished the very foundation for the action but it was nonetheless 
true in the action of covenant. If a condition to a covenant demonstrated 
that a thing was to be performed before performance of the covenant, then 
that thing was a condition precedent. 
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To take an interesting example, in Slater v. Stone (1621) the lessor 
of a house sued the lessee in covenant for allowing part of the premises 
to fall into ruin. The lessor succeeded at the trial, but the lessee 
moved in arrest of judgement that the lessor had not complied with an 
express condition precedent. The defendant had covenanted, guod ab et 
post emendationem et reparationem dicti messuagi by the lessor, the 
lessee would repair etc.; so the objection was that the lessor had not 
averred that he had first put the house into repair, and this argument 
was accepted: 
(F)or the court held, that the covenant being 'quad ab et post 
reparationem by the plaintiff, then he would sustain, etc.' it is 
conditional, that the plaintiff ought first to repair it: so 
although it were in good reparation at the beginning, if it after-
wards happen to decay, the plaintiff is first to repair it before 
the defendant is bound thereto (6). 
So one act by the promisee (the lessor) was specifically made a 
condition to the liability of the promisor (lessee) to perform another 
act under a continuing contract (a lease) containing many stipulations 
on either side. 
Similarly, the whole performance by one party could be required 
before the other party was to perform at all. Brocas' Case in 1587 
furni.shes a convenient example, and the decision of the Court of King's 
Bench was thus: 
Brocas, lord of a manor, covenanted with his copy holder, to assure 
to him and his heirs, the freehold and inheritance of his copyhold, 
and the said copyholder in consideration of the same performed, 
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covenanted to pay such a sum: it was the op1n1on of the whole court, 
that the said copyholder is not tyed to pay the said sum, before the 
assurance made, and the covenant performed: but if the words had been, 
In consideration of the said covenants to be performed, then he is 
bounden to pay the money presently; and to have his remedy over by 
covenant (7). 
Although the practical determination of such cases might seem to us 
to turn on rather fine distinctions, the actual basis of their resolution 
is clear. One looks to the actual words that are alleged to express a 
condition and, if one decides that they do constitute a condition, there 
is no question but that it must be performed to entitle the grantee to 
performance of the grant. The grant and the condition are quite insep-
arable; the condition forms part of the definition or delineation of the 
grant, and without fulfilment, the grant does not start to work. 
In other cases, the decision turned not on the precise wording of 
the defendant's covenant, as in Slater v. Stone and Brocas 1 Case, but 
on the question of the precise status that was to be attributed to 
another phrase found in the document. The easiest way to explain is to 
give an example. In Thomas v. Cadwallader (1744) the facts were, very 
simply, that a lessee covenanted to repair, but the deed went on to 
state (the plaintiff) 'finding allowing and assigning timber sufficient 
for such reparations during the said term ... 1 The plaintiff brought an 
action of covenant against the defendant for not repairing to which the 
defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had not supplied timber. 
Now the problem, once more, was as to the status of certain words 
(finding, allowing etc.) Did the phrase constitute a condition or a 
covenant? The plairitiff argued that it was a covenant and therefore not 
a condition. Serjeant Bootle insisted: 
That the finding of timber by the plaintiff was not a condition 
precedent, but a mutual or reciprocal covenant; and consequently 
that the breach of it cannot be pleaded to an action brought on 
the covenant of the lessee (8). 
The defendant, naturally, insisted that the words were properly to 
be construed as a condition, or qualification of the plaintiff's covenant, 
and the court agreed with this construction. The words did constitute a 
condition precedent because 'this finding of timber was a thing in its 
nature necessary to be done first, and therefore must be considered as 
a qualification of the lessee's covenant'. 
It is to be noted, however, that the important point was that the 
words were found to be a condition, or qualification, of the defendant's 
covenant, and not merely a reciprocal covenant by the plaintiff to supply 
timber. As Willes L.C.J. observed: 
I expressed my dislike of those cases, though they are too many to be 
now over-ruled, where it is determined that the breach of one 
covenant, though plainly relative to the other, cannot be pleaded in 
bar to an action brought for the breach of the other, but the other 
party must be left to bring his action for the breach of the other; 
' 
as where there are two covenants in a deed, the one for repairing and 
the other for finding timber for the reparations; this notion plainly 
tending to make two actions instead of one, and to a circuity of 
action and multiplying actions, both of which the law so much abhors. 
If therefore this were a new point I should be inclined to be of 
opinion that, though where there are mutual covenants relative to one 
another in the same deed a plaintiff is not obliged in an action 
brought for the breach of them to aver the performance of the covenant 
which is to be·performed on his part, yet that the defendant in such 
action may in his plea insist on the non-performance of the coven~nt 
to be performed on the part of the plaintiff: but this has been so 
often determined otherwise that it is too late now to alter the law 
·in this respect. 
here: 
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However, as Willes L.C.J. went on to say, the case was different 
But where words make a condition precedent or a qualification of a 
covenant, as the present case plainly is, all the cases agree 
that the plaintiff in his declaration must aver the performance of 
such condition or qualification (9). 
We now proceed to examine this very point that Willes L.C.J. 
adverted to in Thomas v. Cadwallader. If each party has positively 
covenanted, then can the performance of one party's covenant be alleged 
to be a condition precedent to the performance of the other party's 
covenant? 
(ii) Performance of Consideration as an Implied Condition 
We have seen that, as in Slater v. Stone (guod ab et post emendationem 
et reparationem dicti messuagi), the parties may specifically refer to the 
question of performance of consideration as a condition precedent to 
liability to perform, and in such cases the question becomes one of inter-
pretation of the language actually used. But what of the situation where 
there is no such express condition precedent, but there are merely promises 
expressed by both parties? For example, if A promises X and B promises Y, 
can A enforce B1 s performance without himself performing X, even though X 
is plainly the consideration for Y? 
In the case of real property estates we have seen that conditions were 
viewed with disfavour and that specific legal words of condition were 
required rather than a mere manifestation of intention. But this 
doctrine was based on the independent entity of the real property estate 
and the need for ~ertainty and finality. 
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We have also seen that there was also a presumption in favour of 
enforceability of promises under seal, but that this presumption was 
based on rather different grounds. 
·Now in the case where there is no reference in the covenant of 
party A to the covenant of party B, both covenants will be independently 
enforceable. And in the case where the performance of covenant B is 
expressly made a condition precedent to the performance of covenant A, 
covenant A will not be independently enforceable. 
We now move on to consider the situation where reference is made to 
the other party's covenant, but it is not made an express condition 
precedent. For example, this occurs when covenant A is expressed to 
be 'for' covenant B, and brings into sharp focus the relation between 
condition and consideration. 
We have already examined the position with respect to 'unilateral' 
contracts and noted that while the expression of consideration did 
constitute a condition precedent, there were two possible rationales. 
The first was the concept of a grant, the expressed consideration being 
a part and hence a condition of the grant, and the second was the absence 
of mutual remedies. 
The choice of which rationale to apply to bilateral contracts will be 
crucial. The first rationale would tend to make covenants linked by such 
words as Q.!'.'.Q_ dependent, for deeds were thought of as grants by both sides, 
and hence the consideration is part of the grant to be enforced. But the 
second rationale would mean that £!:..Q_ should be ignored, for mutual remedies 
were available and this fact, coupled with the considerations of inequality 
of damage and the presumption of enforceability of deeds outlined abov~, 
would strongly favour independency. 
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The courts were therefore placed in something of a dilemma with 
respect to bilateral contracts and therefore it is not surprising that, 
initially, the decisions were not consistent. 
In one of the earliest cases available, a doctrine of dependency, 
with relation to deeds in which words of consideration were expressed, 
was favoured. 
In Anonymous (1499) Fineux C.J. noted: 
If one covenant with me to serve me for a year, and I covenant with 
him to give him £20, if I do not say for said cause, he shall have 
an action for the £20 although he never serves me; otherwise, if I 
say he shall have £20 for the said cause. So if I covenant with a 
man that I will marry his daughter, and he covenants with me to make 
an estate to me and his daughter, and to the heirs of our two bodies 
begotten; though I afterwards marry another woman, or his daughter 
marry another man; yet I shall have an action of covenant against 
him to compel him to make this estate; but if the covenant be that 
he will make the estate to us two for said cause, then he shall not 
make the estate until we are married. And such was the opinion of 
the court. And Rede J. said it was so without doubt (10). 
Yet despite the seeming clarity and certainty of such a statement in 
favour of dependency, the seeds of a doctrine in favour of independency, 
based on the availability of mutual remedies, were readily to be found. 
Thus in Ughtred 1 s Case (1591) the court treated the earliest known 
case on this subject, Pool v. Tolchester (1374) as establishing a broad 
doctrine of independency. After stating the position with respect to 
unilateral grants, Lord Coke contrasts the position of bilateral contracts 
by reference to Pool v. Tolchester: 
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But the case in 48 E III 3 & 4 was affirmed for good law where 
it appears, that indentures were made bet\'Jeen Sir R. Pool, 
Knight of thP. one part and Sir R. Tolcelser of the other part, 
by which Sir Ralph did covenent with Sir Richard to serve him 
with three esquires of arms in the wars of France, and Sir 
Richard covenant therefore to oay him 42 marks: in the case 
each party had equal remedy, one for the service, and the 
other for the money; and therefore in debt for the 42 marks 
he may choose either to declare in general, or specially at his 
pleasure, by the rule of the court (11). 
For a time, then, the position was far from clear, but in 1639 we 
find a clear adoption of the rationale of mutual remedies in oreference 
to the gra~t concept. 
In Caton v. Dixon (1639) the court held: 
If by articles of agreement made between A (in behalf of B) and C, 
A covenants that B, for the consideration afterwards in said deed 
expressed, shall convey certain land to C in fee, and afterwards C 
covenants on his part pro considerationibus praedictis to pay to B 
£160 etc.; in this case, though B do not assure the land to C, yet 
C is bound to pay the money; for the assurance of the land is not 
a condition precedent, but these are distinct and mutual covenants. 
Adjudged upon demurrer (12). 
And in 1669 the famous case of Pordage v. Cole was decided. Though 
later thought to be a leading case on the doctrine of independency of 
covenants, the case was, in fact, at its time of decision regarded as 
only one of the relevant authorities, its later fame being almost entirely 
attributable to the action of Serjeant Williams in appending his famous 
notes to the case. 
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The essential facts of the case are reasonably simple. The defendant 
had covenanted, in a deed, to give the plaintiff £775 for his lands and 
the plaintiff brought debt for this sum, less 5 shillings earnest money 
paid. The chief defence was that the plaintiff had not performed or 
offered to perform the consideration for this covenant, namely the 
conveyance of the land. The court rejected this argument on the specific 
ground that both parties had a remedy on the deed and therefore the 
covenants were independent in the absence of an express manifestation of 
dependency. Indeed, it seems that the major point at issue was not this 
doctrine of independency but whether there were or were not mutual remedies 
available. Thus counsel for the defendant clearly based his argument not on 
the invalidity of such a doctrine but on its inapplicability to the facts 
in issue: 
The great exception was, that the plaintiff in his declaration has not 
averred that he had conveyed the lands, or at least tendered a 
conveyance of them, for the defendant has no remedy to obtain the 
lands, and therefore the plaintiff ought to have conveyed them for 
' 
the money. And it was argued by l~ithins, that if by one single deed 
two things are to be performed, namely, one by the plaintiff and the 
other by the defendant, if there be no mutual remedy, the plaintiff 
ought to aver performance of his part ... 
The report in Saunders makes it clear that the judges and counsel 
were agreed on these matters but judgement went for the plaintiff because 
it was found that the defendant did have a remedy, for it was decided that 
he was a party to the deed in question and that there was a covenant by 
the plaintiff to assign: 
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But it was adjudged by t~e court, that the action was well brought 
without an averment of the conveyance of the land; because it shall 
be intended that both parties have sealed the specialty. And if 
the plaintiff has not conveyed the land to the defendant, he has 
also an action of covenant against the plaintiff upon the agreement 
contained in the deed, which amounts to a covenant on the part of 
the plaintiff to convey the land; and so each party has mutual 
remedy against the other. But it might be otherwise if the 
specialty had been the words of the defendant only, and not the 
words of both parties by way of agreement as it is here. And by the 
conclusion of the deed it is said, that both parties had sealed it; 
and therefore judgement was given for the plaintiff, which was 
afterwards affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, Trin. 22 of King 
Charles the Second (13). 
This doctrine of independency was treated as settled law by an 
important group of cases in the early eighteenth century involving contracts 
to transfer stock. In these cases, of which Blachrnll v. Nash (1722) (14), 
~Jilkinson v. Myer (1722) (15), Hyvil v. Stapleton (1723) (16) and Dawson v. 
Myer (172~) (17) are examples, the plaintiff covenanted to transfer and the 
defendant covenanted to pay . 
. Although the plaintiff was willing to perform, defendants in these cases 
were able to raise nunerous objections about the sufficiency of the 
plaintiff's performance or offer to perform (18) and the question therefore 
arose whether any such averment of performance was necessary. It was 
decided that it was not, for each party had a mutual remedy. Thus in one 
case it was stated: 
(T)here were mutual covenants, viz. an express covenant from the 
defendant to pay the plaintiff£ 730-10-0 and then a distinct covenant 
from the plaintiff to transfer the produce of the annuities to the 
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defendant, and the covenants therefore being mutual, they held that 
the tender was not of the case, and the plaintiff was not obliged 
to answer it; for if the plaintiff did not tender, the defendant 
had his remedy against him for not doing it (19). 
At this point we must pause momentarily. We have thus far been 
considering only the position with regard to contracts under seal, but 
we have now co~e to, and proceeded beyond, that point in history when the 
simple or parol contract was born. We now turn, therefore, to examine 
the development of the parol contract. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SIMPLE OR PAROL CONTRACT 
(A) HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
We have thus far been concerned to examine the position with respect 
to contracts under seal only. This approach is justifiable in the light 
of the fact that the problems of performance with which we are concerned 
could not occur while the action of Debt and, of course, Assumpsit in its 
early stages of development, required that the consideration be executed. 
In other words, the question of order or dependency of performance could 
not arise when these matters went not to construction but to the cause of 
action itself. 
However, it is clear that from sometime near the middle of the 
sixteenth century it came to be recognised that an executory promise made 
by the defendant could be enforced by a plaintiff who had given a promise 
in return for it, the basis of enforceability being the giving of the 
reciprocal promise. 
Although a case in 1555 is sometimes cited as the first reported 
decision on the topic (20), the first clear statement is usually said to 
be the note of the case of Strangborough v. Warner in 1588: 
Note, that a promise against a promise will maintain an action upon 
the case, as in consideration that you do give me £10 on such a day, 
I promise to give you £10 such a day after (21). 
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And it became well established in a number of cases soon after 
Strangborough v. Warner that 'a promise against a promise is a sufficient 
ground for an action' and this, of course, is one of the very foundations 
of modern contract law (22). 
However, although this innovation is hailed by connnentators as a 
decisive step forward by the law, a related development has been much 
criticised. This development was that the courts, having decided that 
executory promises were enforceable also held that they were independent 
of each other or, in other words, the enforceability of a defendant's 
promise was not related to the performance of a plaintiff's own 
promise. 
Some examples will make this clearer. 
In Bettisworth v. Campion (1608) the plaintiff sued for arrears of 
payment under an agreement whereby the defendant was to have all the iron 
produced by a certain blast f~rnace and to pay so much per ton for it. 
The plaintiff averred that the defendant had received a certain number 
of tons and therefore claimed remuneration at the contract rate, but 
the defendant objected that he had not had all the iron so produced and 
therefore the performance of the plaintiff was defective. However, the 
court made it clear that this sort of argument was irrelevant, for the 
consideration - the basis of enforceability - was not the giving of the 
iron, or all the iron, but the giving of an enforceable promise. Thus 
the court stated that: 
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(T)he consideration ex parte guerentis was not, that the defendant 
should have all the iron; but that the testator promised that the 
defendant should h~ve all the iron, so that the consideration of 
each part was the mutual promise the one to the other (23). 
Similarly, in the case of Beany v. Turner the defendant objected, 
after a verdict had been found for the plaintiff, that the plaintiff 
had not sufficiently averred his own performance, but the court quickly 
disposed of this objection: 
But by the whole court, here being mutual promises, there needs 
no averment at all of the performance, and therefore an ill 
averment of that which needs no averment, shall not hurt, and 
thereupon they all affirmed the judgement (24). 
The popular argument is, of course, that this was not the correct way 
to approach a matter of construction, for the results were quite contrary 
to what we would consider the intention of the parties to have been. 
The well known, though scantily reported, case of Nichols v. Raynbred 
(1641) is often cited as a typical illustration of this strange doctrine 
adopted by the courts and, as the report is short, it is here reproduced: 
Assumpsit. Nichols brought an Assumpsit against Raynbred, declaring 
that in consideration that Nichols promised to deliver the defendant 
to his own use a cow, the defendant promised to deliver him 50 
shillings: adjudged for the plaintiff in both courts, that the 
plaintiff need not to aver the delivery of the cow; because it 
is a promise for promise. Note here the promises must be at one 
instant, or else they will be both nuda pacta (25). 
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Now, at first sight, this does seem strange for one would think 
that the defendant bargained for a cow rather than a lawsuit; if the 
plaintiff did not deliver the cow it would seem reasonable that the 
defendant should retain the fifty shillings rather than be forced to 
pay it and then sue for the detention of the cow! And the usual 
explanation for such a state of affairs is that the judges were con-
fused about this point. The position advanced by a number of learned 
commentators is that there were two distinct issues, that of enforce-
ability and that of construction but, in deciding the first issue, 
the courts became confused and jumped to an unnecessary and erroneous 
conclusion with regard to the second. This point is well made by 
Dr. S.J. Stoljar, and it certainly merits close examination. He 
states: 
When mutual promises became enforceable in the later sixteenth 
century, the concomitant shift of emphasis from formal covenants 
to informal agreements brought forward a whole range of simple 
and indeed the most ordinary types of bargains. Yet there were 
no precise rules to meet and resolve the disputes arising from 
them. Left to improvisation, the courts transferred to mutual promises 
the ideas applied to covenants. This was to create incredible confusion. 
For mutual promises began to be treated as presumptively independent; 
like covenants they were seen as two separate undertakings. But since 
mutual promises were enforceable because they were consideration 1 for 1 
each other, a promise 1 for 1 a promise was much more similar to mutual 
covenants linked by words of dependency or condition. The courts, in 
other words, turned our doctrine upside-down, with results that were 
correspondingly peculiar (26). 
And later he poses, and answers, the following question: 
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(W)hy did the courts show this preference for independency when a 
rule of dependency could at any rate in some cases have yielded 
better results? In the first place. to hold mutual promisP.s 
independent may have appeared like a powerful re-affirmation of the 
enforceability of the bilateral 'consensual' contract: to say that 
both parties had separate 'remedies over' was, in a sense, to 
confirm the perhaps still unsettling truth that mutual considerat-
ion had an effect equal to that of mutual and sealed covenants. 
This led, particularly in the case of simple contracts, to great 
confusion between contractual formation and contractual perform-
ance, or rather between those rules making promises enforceable 
or irrevocable and those rules becoming increasingly necessary 
to guide the parties' performatory relations ... (27). 
This argument is certainly persuasive and, indeed, the statement 
that the two issues of enforceability and construction are separate and 
distinct sounds almost tautologous. However, it is submitted that that 
is because such a statement is in line with what we now regard as 
settled and fundamental principles of contract law. We do not now 
argue with such a statement, for we cannot. But it is a rather different 
matter to take such a premise and then state that the courts of an earlier 
time must have been confused, because they did not deliver judgements in 
accordance with this premise. Rather, what we must do is put ourselves 
into the shoes of the lawyers of the period and gaze about us at the 
historical and contemporary background. 
Of course, an examination of the history of Assumpsit is quite 
beyond the scope of this work, and I will not even refer to any of the 
major cases, for they have been admirably dealt with in any number of 
learned works. Merely for the sake of coherence, the briefest of 
summaries would seem to be this. 
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Assumpsit was originally an ingredient in the development of the 
action of Case, a process whereby the original requirement of force and 
violence in trespass was gradually ameliorated. Assumpsit meant that 
the defendant undertook to do something, and the plaintiff placed trust 
in this undertaking. If, then, the defendant performed badly, the 
plaintiff could have an action on his case based on the defendant's 
conduct in inducing reliance and then betraying that reliance by 
misfeasance. In short, the action was in what we would now call tort 
rather than contract, and at first assumpsit for nonfeasance as distinct 
from misfeasance was not allowed. However, during the fifteenth century 
it became established that if a plaintiff had performed his own promise 
but the defendant had positively put it out of his power to perform 
himself (for example, P pays D for a manor, but D conveys it to a third 
party) then an action could lie, even though this was nonfeasance rather 
than misfeasance if we analyse it in a technical fashion. 
The next stage of development was that, by the early seventeenth 
century, an action had come to lie for the mere nonperformance of a 
promise even though the defendant had not positively put it out of his 
power to perform, provided that the plaintiff had himself performed in 
reliance on the defendant's promise. 
The final stage of development with which we are concerned occurred 
when, in the late sixteenth century, it was held that the mere giving of 
an executory promise would support the enforcement of a reciprocal 
promise. But how was this last result achieved? Though a detailed 
examination of this question is outside the scope of this work, some 
answer is nevertheless important for it may help to explain much that 
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seems strange concerning the construction of these parol executory 
contracts. The answer would seem to be that it is not possible 
to trace a logical progression or evolution of the law here. for what 
really occurred was a conceptual jump between two different bases of 
enforceability. Assumpsit had previously been based on what we would 
call tort, the gravamen of the complaint being positive damage due to a 
detrimental reliance on the defendant's positive undertaking. Some 
positive detriment to the plaintiff was more than crucial to his 
complaint; it was his complaint. However, when we reach the stage at 
which mutual executory promises are enforceable, we find that our 
actual basis of enforceability has changed; the claim is no longer 
that the defendant has tortiously caused damage, but that the defendant 
has not kept his promise, damage being the result rather than the 
foundation of the cause of action. 
It has been pointed out by a number of commentators that there were 
several compelling reasons why it should have been wished to establish 
a contractual remedy, other than Covenant, at Common Law (28). Professor 
Milsom, for example, has noted not only the issues of wager of law (29), 
technicality of pleading and competition with Chancery but has also 
explained in an impeccable fashion the relation between the local 
jurisdictions and the Common Law courts. 
It will be remembered that actions involving more than 40 shillings 
had to be brought in the royal courts and that those courts, for historical 
reasons with which Professor Milsom has also dealt, required a deed to 
enforce contractual claims. Many claims, therefore, that were enforceable 
in the local courts were not allowed at Common Law. With the fall in the 
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value of money (which meant more claims had to be brought in the royal 
courts) and the actual decline of the local jurisdictions themselves, 
large substantive gaps were found to exist in the Common Law. Some-
thing besides the limited remedies of Covenant and Debt was needed, and 
the expansion of Assumpsit was destined to provide this remedy. As 
Professor Milsom states: 
As a matter of social history, therefore, the rise of Assumpsit is 
another transfer from local jurisdictions, and the transfer is of 
cases there remedied directly on the basis of promise. Even some 
of the formulae of Assumpsit actions seem to echo earlier claims in 
London and elsewhere. Conceptually, it is not as was once thought 
the dawn of the idea of enforcing promises: it is the difficulty of 
accommodating that idea within the framework already established (30). 
Of course, it is one thing to explain why litigants should have 
sought a remedy or why the courts should have been favourably disposed 
to an extension of the law, but quite another thing to explain how the 
extension came about. Indeed, perhaps we cannot explain in a logical 
fashion how this occurred for, as stated above, what is really involved 
is a jump between two different concepts, or, as Mr. Fifoot put it, 
'between the tortious and the contractual aspects of assumpsit a gulf is 
fixed across which no logical bridge can be built'. 
Naturally, some ropes had to be utilised to span the abyss and, as 
Professor Milsom has pointed out, the main concept pressed into service 
seems to have been 1 deceit 1 • For many years a central element in the 
development of the action on the case, deceit was now used to place the 
appearance of a tortious claim upon the breach of the defendant's promise. 
Thus, because the defendant has craftily broken his promise the plaintiff 
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alleges that he has lost the profit he would have made from connected 
transactions or that he has lost commercial reputation due to his not 
being able to honour his own obligations, and so on. But, as 
Professor Milsom again points out, these machinations are scarcely 
enough to justify or explain the deep change that the law was 
undoubtedly undergoing: 
The more regularly deceit is alleged, in short, the more various 
do its particular manifestations become, and the more vague, and 
the pleadings descend into that solemn abuse supposed, wrongly, 
to be characteristic of the middle ages. The common law lacks a 
convincing argument and is beginning to shout (31). 
Thus once again we come back to our logical abyss. It is submitted 
that, as usual, the formulation of an answer is facilitated if we look 
a little beyond our immediate problem and consider a wider background. 
In this instance, I refer to the development of indebitatus assumpsit, 
the well known process culminating in Slade 1 s Case, whereby indebitatus 
assumpsit virtually became an alternative to the action of Debt. 
There are, however, two views as to the relation between the 
development of assumpsit (Special) that we have been considering, and 
the history of indebitatus assumpsit. One view is that the two 
developments were intimately connected, and Professor Holdsworth 
propounded this theory. After outlining the history of both he grasped 
each branch and formulated the following question and answer. 
(I)f payment would give rise to an action when the promise on the 
faith of which the payment was made was not fulfilled; and if the 
fulfilment of the promise for which payment was expected would 
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give rise to an action on a special promise to pay - why should 
not any promise be actionable if given for a promise? 
The cases would seem to show that it was the growth of indebitatus 
assumpsit, in which the idea of promise was the gist of the action, 
which brought this idea to the front. 
He then outlines the development which was noted as established law 
in Strangborough v. l~arner (32), and then says of that case: 
This case was quickly followed by other cases in which the same 
point was adjudged; and it was finally sanctioned and justified 
by all the judges in Slade's Case ... Slade's Case, then, marks 
the culmination of these two developments of the action of 
assumpsit which had been going on throughout the sixteenth century, 
and the terms of the resolution in that case which has just been 
cited show clearly the interdependence of these two develop-
ments ... ( 33). 
Before making any comment, let us briefly advert to the contrasting 
view which is that the developments of Special and indebitatus assumpsit 
should be kept entirely distinct. Mr. A.W.B. Simpson took this view. 
After pointing out that in Slade's Case itself the declaration was not 
founded on mutual promises but rather on a consideration of an executed 
bargain and sale, he states: 
Once this is appreciated the famous statement that 'every contract 
executory imports in itself an assumpsit 1 (34) can be given an 
intelligible meaning. Contract in the sixteenth century and early 
seventeenth is not synonymous with agreement; it means (inter alia) 
'a situation where debt lies• - for example a bargain and sale or a 
loan of money is a contract. The dictum, translated out of the 
contemporary jargon, means that whenever a situation has arisen 
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where the writ of debt sur contract would lie against a person 
and that person has not paid the debt ( 1 executory 1 ) an assumpsit 
to pay the money wi 11 be impl ted (_35). 
Mr. Simpson concludes: 
The rule that mutual promises are considerations for each other 
belongs wholly to the sphere of Special assumpsit and has no 
relevance to the indebitatus action, conversely Slade's Case has 
no relevance to Special assumpsit. 
With respect, the article written by Mr. Simpson is of great 
technical excellence, and the learned writer is quite correct in stating 
that the issues of Special assumpsit and indebitatus assumpsit are 
logically distinct. However, my point is that we are not here dealing 
with a matter of strict logical development but rather with a change in 
conceptual thinking of a more abrupt nature than is usually experienced in 
the Common Law. But it is possible to discern a basic line of development 
and this was that,at a stage when the remedy was still grounded in tort, 
the fact of the assumpsit nevertheless started to be emphasised. As this 
idea of assumpsit was utilised and talked about in more and more fact 
situations, it was only natural that lawyers would start to think of the 
assumpsit giving a remedy per se - because of the assumpsit alone - rather 
than as merely the way by which a cause of action was described in certain 
situations. 
It would seem fair to say that the talk about indebitatus assumpsit 
would have been one of these factors in this somewhat illogical 
transition. Lawyers talked of such issues as when Debt barred the 
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availability of assumpsit, when an assumpsit could be implied; and of 
course the idea of consideration - what was a sufficient promise to 
ground an assumpsit was also being discussed. Given this background, 
it would seem natural that a shift of emphasis should take place toward 
the assumpsit itself, and away from the tortiws concept of which it had 
hitherto constituted a part. 
Thus it was that assumpsit came to be applied to mutual executory 
promises. Jt is true, of course, that Debt was not applicable and, 
therefore, whatever the true nature and extent of the doctrine of the 
excl_usiveness of remedies and the disputes between the Courts of Common 
Pleas and Queen 1 s Bench, there was no such problem here (36). But to say 
so much is not, as Mr. Simpson thought, to establish that Slade's Case 
decided nothing about mutual executory promises. The true view would 
seem to be that the case did much to consolidate a doctrine that was 
still in its incipient stages and was not yet supported by any great 
number of decided cases. 
It is undoubtedly true that some accounts given of these developments 
prove. in the light of Mr. Simpson's research, to be perhaps a little 
oversimplified in the face of strict analysis and logic. In particular, 
Mr. Simpson's analysis of the statement in Noniood v. Norwood and Read 
(37) that 'every contract executory imports in itself an assumpsit' is 
certainly justified by the historical background and concepts of contract 
and grant that went to make up the Action of Debt. Furthermore, it is 
quite true, as Mr. Simpson points out, that the doctrine traceable to the 
reign of Henry VI that, on a parol bargain to sell specific goods, the 
buyer could bring Detinue and the seller bring Debt before any delivery 
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had taken place, was not based on the giving of mutual promises but 
rather on the concept of mutual grants of remedies (38). 
However, it is submitted that this analysis, albeit quite correct, 
does not conclude the matter, for it would seem that a proposition 
concerning the enforceability of mutual promises was laid down in 
Slade's Case and that these two points were treated as factors justifying 
the following important resolution: 
It was resolved, that every contract executory imports in itself an 
assumpsit, for when one agrees to pay money, or to deliver any thing, 
thereby he assures or promises to pay, or deliver it, and therefore 
when one sells any goods to another and agrees to deliver them at a 
day to come and the other in consideration thereof agrees to pay so 
I • 
much money at such a day, in that case both parties may have an 
action of debt, or an action on the case on assumpsit, for the mutual 
executory agreement of both parties imports in itself reciprocal 
actions upon the case, as well as actions of debt, and therewith 
agrees the judgement in Read and Norwood 1 s Case, Pl. Comm. 128. (39). 
It is submitted that, whatever the original rationale, such doctrines 
were now used to justify a much wider statement, and a statement which is 
in terms of mutual agreement rather than of grants or of executed quid pro 
9.!!.Q_ (40). With Slade's Case, then, the enforceability of mutual executory 
promises was established. Of course, our main concern is not the history 
just outlined but rather the problem of construction of the parties• 
promises adverted to by Dr. Stoljar and certain other commentators. 
However, the point of all this discussion has been to establish that the 
very distinction between enforceability and construction at this time in 
history is a little artificial. It is submitted that although the idea 
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of contract was now rapidly developing and that the enforcement of 
executory promises was due to the fact that the promises rather than 
deceit were now being focussed upon and stressed, it is vital to bear 
in mind the historical background to this development. 
The point is that the development of the idea of contract had been 
long and devious, growing originally from trespass and tort. And putting 
aside the local jurisdictions and the law merchant, there was no a priori 
Common Law concept of contract - that is the regulation and enforcement of 
arrangements between parties on the basis that they had each contracted 
together; rather, the courts sought to establish a party 1 s cause of 
action, the foundation of which was the other party 1 s conduct and damage 
caused by it. In other words, the courts did not seek to regulate the 
performatory conduct of both parties to a 1 contract 1 but rather looked to 
the plaintiff and asked whether he had a cause of action. 
Although the law had gradually developed towards an idea of contract 
founded upon promise rather than tort, it was most natural that this mode 
of analysis should continue. The courts had always approached the cases 
in this way and there was, as yet, no compelling reason why they should 
drastically alter their ways. It is true, and we shall later discuss 
the point, that a change of approach did later take place in the law 
but, it is submitted, this does not mean that the judges of an earlier 
time were confused as Dr. Stoljar has suggested. The law was destined 
to change because performatory problems, previously not known to the law, 
arose because of this concept of enforceability of mutual promises or, 
more correctly, because of the general ascendancy of assumpsit over 
Debt. It is a mistake to say that the judges concerned with specific 
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stages of development of the enforceability of mutual promises should have 
foreseen the later vast changes that were to take place because of the 
general ascendancy gained by the remedy and were confused because they 
did not immediately make such changes themselves. 
However, although this historical review might help to explain, or 
provide a rationale for, the broad statements to be found in such cases 
as Bettisworth v. Campion and Beany v. Turner, the position may not be as 
simple as this. Before proceeding further we must examine the problems 
of procedure and the relation between procedural matters and substantive 
law, and it is to these issues that we now turn. 
(B) THE RELATIOM BETWEEN PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
Professor H.R. Lucke prefaced his definitive work on Slade's Case -
Slade's Case and the Origin of the Common Counts, (41) with the observat-
ion that it is 'necessary to attribute to problems of procedure and of 
pleading the overriding importance which they must have had in the minds 
of Elizabethan and Jacobean lawyers; to focus attention exclusively on 
the substantive principles, which were merely by products of procedural 
rulings, would inevitably lead to a distorted account of the historical 
facts'. One of the major theses of his work is that much of the history 
of contract law up until Slade's Case is explicable only if we remember 
that a major obstacle to the availability of assumpsit was the doctrine 
of exclusiveness of remedies; if the facts pleaded disclosed a cause of 
action in, say, Debt this was a bar to the availability of a different 
remedy, for there could, so the old law said, be only one remedy for one 
set of facts. Professor Lucke therefore submits that many innovations in 
the law at this time are attributable to the machinations of pleaders in 
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disguising the true substantive facts and putting them into a form that 
would be immune from the objection - either on demurrer or after verdict -
that Debt was the true remedy. 
For our purposes, the important point is that Professor Lucke 
convincingly argues that the initial development of the enforceability 
of mutual promises was one facet of this practice of the pleaders. 
After noting some early decisions concerning wagers and advance payments 
which do seem to have been examples of the direct application of the 
doctrine to the true facts in issue, he makes the following 
observation: 
Statements which treat the advent of the 'promise for promise' 
formula as the dawn of our modern law of contract must be treated 
with some reserve. This formula nowadays supports actions such as 
the action for anticipatory breach, and is therefore of wide 
general significance. Its general application in the late sixteenth 
century, however, was limited to special situations, such as 
contracts of wager and contracts providing for advance payment. It 
is true that, towards the close of the sixteenth century, when 
assumpsit in lieu of Debt had become an unsafe form of pleading, the 
'reciprocal promises' doctrine was carried by pleaders into 
ordinary synal'lagmatic contracts, but when thus used, assumpsit on 
mutual promises possessed all the characteristics of an evasive 
pleading device, designed to overcome the objection that Debt was 
available on the facts stated in the declaration (42). 
The example with which Professor Lucke illustrated this proposition 
is Wicals v. Johns decided in 1599. The declaration is briefly reported 
as follows: 
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And declares that in consideration that the plaintiff at the 
instance of the defendant, had promised to pay £120 to one 
Rogers, wherein the defendant was indebted to the said Rogers; 
that the defendant assumed he would pay to the plaintiff this 
£120 when he should be required. 
One of the objections, after a verdict for the plaintiff, was that 
'it is not alleged that he paid it to Rogers•, but the court gave 
judgement for the plaintiff: 
Popham and Clench held it to be well enough; for there is a mutual 
promise, the one to the other; so that if the plaintiff doth not 
pay it to Rogers, the defendant may have his action against him: 
and so also the defendant shall be charged as to him; and a promise 
against a promise is a good consideration (43). 
Professor Lucke concludes: 
The possibility that the plaintiff had the audacity to bring this action 
without having in fact paid the money to Rogers in accordance with 
his promise, and that the jury gave a verdict in his favour despite 
this, can be discarded as fantastic (44). 
Vlith respect, this is a most convincing theory and while it is, of 
course, largely supposition it certainly has the ring of truth. The only 
problem, however, is that it is rather difficult to find other early 
cases that follow the same pattern. Indeed, the usual fact situation in 
these early cases seems to be that the plaintiff did aver performance 
in the declaration but that, after a verdict for the plaintiff, the 
defendant objects that the performance as proved at the trial did not 
fully correspond with that set out in the declaration. 
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This was the position in the two cases outlined earlier, Bettis-
worth v. Campi on ( 45) and Beany v. Turner ( 46). In Betti sviorth v. 
Campion the plaintiff alleged delivery of iron and asked for payment 
at the contract rate but the defendant objected that not all the iron 
from the blast furnace had been delivered. In Beany v. Turner, the 
plaintiff did surrender his copyhold land in performance, for which he 
claimed payment, but the defendant alleged that there was a defect in 
the mode of the plaintiff's performance. 
Similarly, in an Anonymous case decided in 1662 the plaintiff 
brought an action on an agreement whereby he was to take the defendant's 
son as apprentice and the plaintiff was to give a bond to pay £40. The 
defendant did not give this bond and the plaintiff, having declared that 
he had accepted the son into his service as apprentice, recovered a 
verdict from the jury. The defendant now moved in arrest of judgement 
on the ground that 'it is not said that the son was bound apprentice, 
but (only) that he had received him into his service as apprentice, and 
this he might do and turn him out of doors the next day'. There was, of 
course, a possibility that this allegation was true but, on the other 
hand, the plaintiff alleged some perfor~ance and the jury had found a 
verdict for the plaintiff. To hold that each party had mutual remedies 
does seem the best solution to such a case. If the complaint of the 
defendant after verdict was a real one - that is that the plaintiff really 
had not fulfilled his bargain as distinct from not correctly averring 
performance in the declaration - he was free to bring his own action. 
But, the plaintiff having recovered a verdict, the onus was on the 
defendant to prove this in his own action rather than to set up now a 
technical and unproved objection to the plaintiff's declaration. Thus 
the judgement was that: 
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(T)he agreement to take him apprentice, is a promise whereon the 
defendant might have his action; and so it is a promise against a 
promise, and needs no averment (47). 
Indeed, on further investigation, it becomes apparent that almost 
all of these early cases which lay down this type of rule as to the 
enforceability of mutual promises in fact involved an allegation by the 
plaintiff that he had performed. The defendant then objects that he has 
not made a technically precise averment, and the court solves the 
difficulty by stating that this is no objection, for the plaintiff had 
no need to make any averment of performance (48). 
The significance of this pattern will be discussed a little later. 
For now, it is respectfully submitted that Professor Lucke is correct 
in drawing his distinction between substantive law and procedural matters, 
and in stating that these early cases on mutual promises had a procedural 
aspect that must be considered. And he does not stop there, for, although 
he does not fully develop the point, he suggests the significant part that 
these procedural machinations were to play in the development of the 
substantive 1 aw: 
Elizabethan lawyers, eager to achieve their procedural objects, 
tended to enunciate substantive propositions in particular rules 
of construction, in a way which was little better than frivolous. 
The unsound construction inherent in the mutual promises doctrine 
remained part of the law until Lord Mansfield, in a case where the 
application of the doctrine would have been no less absurd than it 
\'/as in Hicals v. Johns, freed the substanti.ve law from the 
contortions into which the exigencies of sixteenth-century procedure 
had forced it (49). 
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And so the theory is that what started in life as a device of 
pleaders later invaded the substantive law, there to remain until it 
was rooted out by Lord Mansfield. I respectfully agree with this basic 
proposition, but a number of difficult questions now appear. Just how 
did this transition take place? And when did it occur? To put the 
problem in a form more conducive to analysis, what do we really mean by 
this distinction between pleadings and substantive law? A tentative 
answer might be that we cross from the realm of mere pleading devices 
into substantive law when we find parties actually winning their 
causes - that is proceeding to judgement - even though they themselves 
had not complied with the true intent of the contract as to their own 
performance. However, even in these terms, it is still difficult to 
tackle our basic problem, because the bulk of the available reported 
decisions concern objections taken by a defendant after a verdict had 
been found for the plaintiff by a jury. Now, as Professor Lucke has 
stated, it is quite likely in such cases that the jury did find that 
the plaintiff had performed, or they would not have found for him a 
verdict, and therefore it is unwise to use a case such as Wicals v. 
Johns as indicative of substantive law. Furthermore , it has already 
been pointed o~t t~at in the majority of these early decisions, it is 
clear that the jury did find for the plaintiff on the basis that he had 
performed, for he had averred performance in his declaration, the 
defendant now objecting to the mode or precision of that averment. 
Will cases decided on demurrer help us any more than those concerning 
objections after verdict? Unfortunately, not a great deal. If a defend-
ant demurred on the basis that the plaintiff had not sufficiently averred 
performance, he would lose because, as we have seen, the doctrine of 
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mutual promises was certainly well enough established to support a 
declaration in law; but, again, we do not know what the true relevance 
and importance of the doctrine was when the parties proceeded to the 
trial stage. At least this division of demurrer and trial stage of the 
proceedings highlights and puts into focus the problem with which we 
are faced. This is: just what is substantive law in such a situation, 
and of what, if any, significance is a distinction between substantive 
law and procedural matters? 
It appears that some commentators do not place a great deal of 
stress on the importance of this distinction in the development of the 
law. Dr. Stoljar, for example, saw the problem rather as one of 
confusion in the substantive law and its consequent remedial evolution. 
In his excellent articles in the Sydney Law Review he traced this 
evolution from the beginnings in the condition/covenant dichotomy, 
through a period of total confusion, a struggle for concurrency of 
performance and, finally, towards a synthesis and conclusion, and I have 
already attempted to explain some of the difficulties which Dr. Stoljar 
points out by adverting to the development of the action of assumpsit 
and the development of the mutual promises doctrine. However, I think 
Professor Lucke is correct when he submits that there is something more 
here than the normal process of evolution of legal concepts that we 
encounter and make use of every day. On the other hand, it may be that 
Professor Lucke goes a little too far when he states that the true 
substantive law was limited to very restricted fact situations, the great 
maj~ri~ of the early instances of statements concerning mutual promises 
being attributable to matters of pleading. 
' ~ 
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My submission, then, is that we cannot look either to the realm of 
procedure or to a pure process of evolution of legal concepts alone and 
say, 'This is how the law moved from position A to position B'. Nor can 
we wholeheartedly adopt the slightly more sophisticated theory that what 
started life as a creature of procedure later influenced and eventually 
dominated the substantive law. The true position is more complicated, 
for considerations of pleading, procedure and structure of the court 
system on the one hand and concepts of substantive law on the other 
really interacted on each other, each developing separately but each 
gaining spasmodic impetus injected by ideas from the other sphere. 
Perhaps this idea of interreaction will become clearer as I proceed 
with discussion of more specific matters. 
Let us begin this discussion by an examination of those cases 
Professor Lucke concedes to be true examples of the early application 
of the mutual promises doctrine, betting cases and cases involving 
advance payment. 
In the case of West v. Stowel (1577) the plaintiff bet the 
defendant £10 that a third party, Lord Effingham, would beat the 
defendant in a shooting match. The plaintiff and defendant each gave 
reciprocal promises as to the payment of the £10 and, as it happened, 
the defendant lost the shooting contest. However, counsel for the 
defendant urged that the promise was not enforceable. The submission 
was that although such a bet would be enforceable between competitors 
for the reason that they had undertaken labour in actually participating 
in the match, the plaintiff had done nothing of the kind and had therefore 
furnished no consideration. The issue of enforceability of mutual 
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executory promises was thus squarely raised and, although we cannot be 
sure of the judgement, Mounson J. thought the action sustainable: 
(T)he consideration is sufficient, for here this counter promise 
is a reciprocal promise, and so a good consideration, for all 
the communication ought to be taken together (50). 
The case of Strangborough v. Warner (1589) is a further example of 
the application of a substantive doctrine. As will be remembered, it 
was noted in that case that the following facts constituted an enforce-
able contract: ' ... in consideration that you do give me £10 on such a 
day, I promise to give you £10 such a day after'. As Professor Lucke 
observed, 'If in this case the first promise is to be enforced, it can 
only be done· on the strength of the counterpromise, not the counter-
performance, since that, under the terms of the contract, is to be 
rendered at a later date' (51). As we have seen, Professor Lucke gave a 
restricted interpretation to such cases, stating that these were special 
situations to which the genuine application of the doctrine was limited 
and that the vast majority of the early cases were explicable on the 
basis of procedural matters. 
However, it is submitted, with respect, that cases involving wagers 
and advance payments were not really isolated examples but were, in 
fact, manifestations of a broader principle of enforceability of mutual 
executory promises. The problem is, of course, to decide what is and 
what is not a genuine application of such a principle. However, it 
seems reasonably clear that we may equate this principle with the idea 
of the true intention of the parties; did the parties really intend 
performance of one to be enforceable without prior performance of the 
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other? But within such a formulation are at least two factors of great 
uncertainty. First, what do we mean by intention and secondly what do 
we mean by performance. Let us examine these two considerations in this 
order. 
In cases involving wagers or advance payments we say that the 
performance of the defendant is enforceable purely on the basis that he 
has given his promise because ex hypothesi, the performance is to be 
rendered without a previous performance by the defendant. But this is 
really only another way of saying that this was the intention of the 
contracting parties and, if we remember this, it then becomes reasonable 
that the courts should decide, in some circumstances, that the 
intention of the parties to a given synallagmatic contract is that each 
should perform irrespective of the other's performance. We have already 
noticed that this word intention may mean many things, and it has been 
submitted that intention is really a concept or tool used by the courts to 
reach reasonable conclusions. Thus, there is a certain amount of 
flexibility built into the concept but there are always guidelines laid 
down by which the intention is to be ascertained in a particular case. 
We have also seen that these guidelines were originally fairly narrow, 
the actual words used by the contracting parties being of paramount 
importance. 
Before proceeding with discussion of the early courts• use of the 
intention concept, it wi 11 be useful briefly to advert to a somewhat 
different approach to these problems adopted by modern courts. Today, 
we are accustomed to something of an ex post facto approach to the 
problems of contractual breach and breakdown. By this I mean that the 
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nature and seriousness of the breach or repudiation that has actually 
occurred is taken into account in deciding the nature of the available 
cause or causes of action. It is, indeed, appropriate to think of this 
approach in terms of regulation of the parties• contractual relations 
for, where some questions as discharge, rescission etc. occur, we are 
equally concerned with the conduct of both the plaintiff and the 
defendant. 
However, we have seen that this was certainly not the approach 
originally taken with respect to contracts under seal. Because of the 
intrinsically binding nature of the covenant under seal the plaintifff 
had a good cause of action once he had established a breach of covenant, 
unless there was a condition precedent to that cause of action. Of 
course, the covenantee 1 s own performance could be made the condition 
precedent, but we have seen that, after some vacillation, it came to be 
established that express words were needed to do this where mutual 
remedies were available. 
With regard to simple or parol contracts, we have briefly traced 
the evolution of assumpsit and have noted that, due to its derivation 
from tort, the courts were once again primarily concerned with the 
establishment of the plaintiff 1 s cause of action rather than a 
regulation of the relations between the parties based on a general 
theory of contract. Now, when the question of enforceability of mutual 
promises had been decided, it was natural that the courts should decide 
that the plaintiff's cause of acti,on was established when the promise 
of the other party was established. It is therefore understandable that, 
when a defendant objected that his promise should not be enforced because 
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the plaintiff had not himself performed, the obvious way for the courts 
to approach the matter was via the dependent/independent test applicable 
to contracts under seal. In other words, was there an express condition 
precedent to the plaintiff's cause of action? It mai be thought that we 
have strayed from the present natter under discussion, the idea of 
intention, back toward another issue, the problem of enforceability. 
However, it has already been submitted that it is not really possible to 
separate these issuesof enforceability and construction, and we shall 
now see that the concept of intention perhaps provides the best approach 
to this problem of interaction between these concepts. 
In the case of deeds, the possibility of inequality of damage was a 
powerful factor in the triumph of the doctrine of independency of 
covenants. If, as in Cole v. Shallet (52), the plaintiff was to do a 
number of things in return for a money payment by the defendant, it was 
decided that the defendant could not insist on the performance of each 
covenant as a condition precedent to the plaintiff's cause of action, for 
to do so would be to deprive the plaintiff of any payment for what he had 
actually done. In other words, the damages suffered by the parties would 
then be unequal and therefore, to avoid this, each party was limited to 
his own independent action of covenant. The parties had stipulated in 
express words, and these words were to be taken as manifesting their 
intention; thus the guidelines for ascertaining intention were narrow, 
and one reason for this was that this independent result produced 
satisfactory practical solutions. 
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Once we remember that there was not yet any concept of a breach 
going to the root of a contract etc., we realise that similar perform-
atory problems would arise in the case of parol contracts, and it was 
natural that the courts should substantively solve them in a similar 
fashion. And so it is that \\le find the very wide statements in 
favour of the enforcement of executory promises without reference to 
the performance of the promisee. Of course, such a doctrine seems to 
suit the case of partly executed contracts in which, if all performances 
by the plaintiff were held to be a condition orecedent to his cause of 
action, the plaintiff could not recover anything if he had committed a 
single breach. This, it wi 11 be renembered, was the fact situation 
presented in Bettisworth v. Campion (53) in which the plaintiff sued for 
payment for the iron he had actually delivered, the defendant objecting 
that he had not had the whole produced of that blast furnace. An independ-
ent construction in this, and other similar cases noted above, meant that 
the plaintiff could recover his payment and the defendant was relegated 
to a cross-action to establish his damage, if indeed he had suffered any. 
However, in different fact situations such as the 'pure' executory 
situations exemplified in the oft cited case of Nichols v. P:_~nbred (54) 
the doctrine does seem to work strange results. The doctrine is stated 
in exactly the same way but, as applied to these different facts it see~s 
quite out of place. This phenomenon is due to the history of the growth of 
assumpsit. Despite deserved praise for the introduction of a general 
theory of contract law, the advent of this general theory presented a 
number of problems. One of these problems was that this new action of 
assumpsit covered a variety of fact situations which were previously 
governed by other 'formed' actions, and these actions governed the rules 
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not only as to enforceability but also as to construction. 
In the action of Debt, the fact that the quid pro guo was executed 
was the very essence of the action; if the plaintiff had not performed 
he could have no action at all. Thus the question of construction with 
which we are concerned did not arise. 
In the action of Covenant, of course, executory promises were 
enforceable but the respective promises were clearly set out in the 
deed and the rule of construction was reasonably simple. Was the 
performance of one specific covenant intended to be dependent on the 
performance of another - and this was to be answered by reference to 
the words actually used in the deed. But the important point is that 
deeds were formal documents, solemnly and carefully executed. Rules of 
construction and the legal effect of various phrases were known to the 
contemporary lawyers who were no doubt often consulted, and it seems 
understandable that the courts should refuse to imply conditions that 
were not expressly stated. Each party was thought to be making a solemn 
grant and therefore each had a remedy as to the other's grant, quite 
apart from the question of his own performance. 
The advent of a doctrine of enforceable mutual promises meant that, 
in the executed situation, precise performance of the quid pro guo was 
no longer needed to get an action off the ground and, as explained above, 
this seems all to the good. But it also meant that purely executory 
promises, not expressed in a deed, were also enforceable and, without the 
formal words of a deed and the attendant well known rules of construction, 
this was to create difficulties. The suggestion has been made that one of 
the reasons an independent approach was applied to executory contracts was 
that the judges had 'found that it worked well in the context of executed 
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contracts and therefore thought that it was uniformly applicable. Thus 
Dr. Stoljar stated that since 'independency had worked entirely satis-
factorily in executed contracts, this again strengthened the belief that 
it was uniformly valid' (55), and he then mentions the case of Beany v. 
Turner (56). One cannot say that this may not have been one factor in 
producing some of the sweeping statements that we find but I think the 
major reason is that outlined above. The courts now saw the promise as 
the basis of enforceability and so the executed/executory distinction 
hitherto governed by the rules applicable to the earlier formed actions 
now became obsolete. The problem was not that the court consciously 
applied rules applicable to an executed situation to an executory one, 
but that the one rule was applied to all cases of assumpsit, the 
executed/executory distinction being quite foreign to the rule. 
This conclusion brings us back to the heart of the matter. Ne 
began discussion with the facts of a case such as Nichols v. Raynbred, 
and posed the question whether the defendant really intended to buy a 
cow or a law suit, for he seems to have been saddled with the latter. 
But such a fact situation seems cofllmonplace enough. How had the law 
originally dealt with it? Let us trace briefly the history of the 
simple and personal sale of goods. We have already noted (57) that 
there had grown up, by the reign of Henry VI, a doctrine that was some-
what exceptional to the usual quid oro guo requirement in the action of 
Debt. Bas i ea lly, on the sa 1 e of a specific chatte 1, the buyer was now 
allowed to sue in Detinue and the seller in Debt before any delivery had 
taken place. As Professor Ames and others have rightly pointed out, 
this doctrine was not originally conceived of as being based upon a 
theory of mutual enforceability of promises but rather on a grant by 
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both parties of the property in the things to be exchanged, and there-
fore each had a proprietary action to gain possession of that in which 
he had property. However, ciuite apart frorn its rationale, the actual 
extent of the doctrine is perhaps a matter of some doubt. From some 
formulations we might easily gain the impression that the doctrine was 
of very wide ambit indeed, and applied to almost any agreement concern-
ing a specific chattel. For example, Professor Holdsworth, after 
' tracing the more usual requirements of actual execution, stated: 
In Henry VI 1 s reign, however, it was said that upon an agreement 
to sell a specific chattel the vendor could sue in Debt, and the 
purchaser in Detinue. The right to get the chattel gave a right 
to sue in Detinue, and this applied both to the case of the 
purchaser in an agreement to sell, and to a third person to who~ 
goods were to be handed by a bailee of the owner ... (58). 
However, if we look to the cases, we find that such broad statements 
are to be accepted with some reservation. In truth, the riqht to 
possession, and hence the right to sue for possession, only passed if the 
parties intended it to pass. In many simple cases of sale of specific 
chattels there would be no such intention. Thus in an Anonymous case (59) 
decided in 1478, Littleton J. noted: 
(I)f I come to a draper and ask him how much I shall pay him for 
such a piece of coth and he says so much, and I say that I will 
have it, .but I do not pay him any ready money and yet take the 
cloth, here he shall have a good action of Trespass against me, 
and it wi 11 be no plea for me to say that I have bought it from 
him, unless I show that I have paid him. 
And further: 
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I cannot agree that the property is in him who buys by such words 
without payment; for it is not a clear bargain, but is subject to 
a condition in law, that is to say, if he pays me it .shall be good, 
and if not it shall be void. 
Similarly, Choke J. pointed out: 
A contract cannot be perfect without the agreement of each party. 
For if you ask me in Smithfield how much you will give me for my 
horse and I say so much, and you say that you will have him and 
do not pay the money, do you believe that, for all this, it is 
my wi 11 that you should have him without paying the money? I say 
no; but I may at once sell him to another and you shall have no 
remedy against me. For otherwise I shall be compelled to keep my 
horse for ever against my ·will, if the property is in you, and 
you would be able to take him when you pleased, which would be 
against reason. 
Mr. Fifoot thought that Choke J. was here confusing three separate 
questions of contractual rights, the passing of property and the right 
to possession. An examination of these topics would take us far beyond 
the matter under discussion. It seems fair to say, however, that Choke 
J. was concerned to show that the parties would not mean their contract to 
bestow such proprietary rights in such a simple market situation. In other 
words, he construes the contract with the aid of proprietary considerations. 
As to confusion between the passing of property and the right to possession, 
it is true that Brian C.J. in that case seems to have taken a different view. 
However, the ~ain concern of Choke J. was to state that, in such a casual 
situation, the contracting oarties intended nothing to pass until payment, 
and with this proposition Littleton J. agreed. 
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The following exchange from the earlier case of Veer v. York, in 
which Choke J. also figured may illustrate the position more clearly. 
A priest brought Debt on a unilateral contract whereby he was retained 
by the defendant to chant for the soul of a dear departed friend for 
one year, for the sum of ten marks. The rlaintiff gave up the task 
before the year expired and one question was whether he was entitled to 
pro rata payment. Choke J. was concerned to distinguish this situation 
from that of the possibility of suing on the executory sale of a specific 
chattel: 
Choke J.: This duty is entire, and he must serve for a year or 
otherwise he will have no salary, and he cannot demand his salary 
until he has served his term; and it is not the same where I buy 
a horse from a man for twenty shillings, for there the twenty 
shillings are due to the seller immediately, because by the 
purchase the property in the horse has passed to Me, and I can 
have possession (60). 
Now although the facts and first part of this judgement are not 
strictly relevant to the matter in hand, their inclusion is important 
for it shows, once again, that judicial statements which are quoted in 
support of broad propositions should always be read in the light of 
their context. For instance, here we see that Choke J. was concerned to 
resolve the matter in issue and used the debt/detinue doctrine as a 
useful contrast; he was not concerned to formulate a precise statement 
of that doctrine. And the interchange amongst counsel and the bench 
immediately following shows that the position was, indeed, fairly complex: 
Cates by: If I buy a horse of you for twenty shillings, you can 
keep the horse until I pay you. 
Choke J.: 
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I did not speak to that intent; but I say that the 
property is vested in me by the purchase, so that 
if a stranger take him I will have an action of 
trespass. 
Brian, to Catesby: Sir, in your case, if you give hi~ a day of 
payment, you cannot keep the horse (61). 
Without going further, we can at least state that the early law did 
go a long way toward implementing what may be called the true commercial 
intention in such a situation. If there was a firm bargain, sufficient 
proprietary right in the chattel passed to ground an action of trespass 
by the purchaser against a third party. l~hether the purchaser was 
entitled to possession as against the vendor before payment was a further 
question and was to be answered with reference to the facts in issue; 
thus, if a certain date of payment \'Jas stipulated, this \'/Oulrl indicate a 
credit sale was intended and therefore an action would lie before 
payment. 
This approach, despite the triumph of the independent construction 
in the case of contracts under seal, remained the same and perhaps even 
strengthened in favour of dependency. Thus in an Anonymous case in 1526 
the Court of King's Bench decided thus: 
And this diversity was taken, when the day of payment is limited, 
and when not: in the first case, the contract is good immediately, 
and an action lies upon it without payment, but in the other not 
so: as if a man buy of a draper twenty yards of cloth, the bargain 
is void, if he does not pay the money at the price agreed upon 
immediately, but if the day of payment be appointed by agreement 
of the parties, in that case, one shall have his action of debt, 
the other an action of detinue (62). 
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A dependent approach was again emphasised in 1552 in the important 
case of Andrews v. Baughey. In this case the plaintiff declared that 
the defendant undertook (assumpsit) for twenty marks (the moiety of which 
was in hand, paid, and the residue agreed between them to be paid within 
a certain time), that he would deliver goods and merchantable ware. 
After alleging various complaints of deceit, loss of reputation etc. 
(which are immediately understandable in the light of the history of the 
action of assumpsit to which he have already adverted), the complaint was 
that the ware was bad. The plaintiff lost his action. The defendant was 
able successfully to plead an accord and satisfaction and this disposed 
of the complaint that the ware was not as the plaintiff had undertaken it 
would be. The second contention of the plaintiff that he had a cause of 
action on a warranty or the deceit of the defendant was also rejected 
because first, the accord also covered this element, in the circumstances 
of the case, and secondly, the warranty was alleged to have been given 
after the formation of the contract, and therefore the plaintiff could 
not have relied on it {63). 
But the court expressed obiter yet another reason why the plaintiff 
could not succeed and it is with this reason that we are concerned. The 
point was that the assumpsit had been expressed to be for twenty marks, 
but the plaintiff had not averred either that this had all been paid or 
that the time at which the residue was agreed between the parties had not 
yet arrived: 
(I)f it appear to the court, that the plaintiff in any action had 
not good cause to have his action, the court will never give judge-
ment for him; here it appears in the beginning of the count that 
for twenty marks, the moiety of which was paid, and the other 
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moiety was to be paid at a certain time agreed on between them; 
non constat whether that time was past, or to come, at the time 
of this action brought, and if it was past, as it shall be 
intended most strongly against the plaintiff, and the money not 
paid or legally tendered, then the contract and undertaking is 
void, for this word (for) makes the contract conditional ... 
(underlining in judgement). 
After adverting to the case of unilateral grants, the court 
stated: 
(S)o it is in contracts; as if for an hawk to be delivered to me 
on such a day, you shall have my horse at Christmas, if the hawk 
be not delivered at the day you shall not have the action for 
the horse, etc. (64). 
The contracts here mentioned are, of course, the traditional 
proprietary contracts of Debt as distinct from the new action of assumpsit 
and the proposition being stated is simply that the defendant must truly 
have what was intended to be the quid pro qua before he could be sued for 
his own failure to perform. 
~Je have already examined Cowper v. Andrews (1612) (65) in which Hobart 
J. was concerned to show that words such as £!:Q_ did not make a condition in 
a grant, but he did recognise some exceptions to this. The principal one 
was the case where the thing granted was executory, and the grantor had no 
remedy for the consideration other than stopping the thing granted. But 
there was another exception: 
In another case it works by condition precedent, as in all personal 
contracts, as I sell you my horse for ten pounds, you shall not take 
my horse except you pay me ten pounds, 18 E. 4. 5. and 14 H. 8. 22 
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except I do expressly give you day, and yet in this case you may 
let your horse go, and have an action of debt for your money, 
and so may the taylor retain the garment till he be paid for 
the making, by a condition in law (66). 
Now it is to be noted that, although the doctrine of dependency 
is still couched in terms applicable to Debt and Detinue, the date of 
this pronouncement is 1612, well after Slade's Case. Just as Slade's 
Case blurred the barriers between Debt and assumpsit, it is logical to 
assume that this rule of dependency applicable to the sale of personal 
chattels also entered this new general law of contract. It has already 
been stated that the word 'contract' as used in a case such as Andrews v. 
Baughey (67) referred to the contract of Debt, but it is logical to 
assume that such pronouncements, by their very apoearance of general 
applicability, soon were thought to be ap~licable to assumpsit. 
Thus it is that in 1675, when the doctrine of independency of 
covenants and promises was at its peak we find the remarkable case of 
Smith v. Shelbury decided. i~e shall return to examine this case more 
fully later, (68) but for now it is enough to say that it concerned the 
transfer of a lease, and was decided on the doctrine of independent 
mutual remedies. Its present importance, however, is that the court 
contrasted the position concerning such formal matters with that of the 
simple sale of goods: 
And in this case it was agreed, that in all personal contracts the 
party is not bound to deliver his goods till he have the money unless 
there be a day expressly agreed upon for the payment of the money 
. . . ( 69). 
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Now the point of all the foregoing is this. Simple transfers and 
sales of goods are as old as mankind, and contracts with respect to 
such transactions were enforceable long before the advent of assumnsit 
But although assumpsit may have changed the conceptual basis of enforce-
ability, it goes without saying that the everyday life and the intention 
of the common people who made such bargains were in no way affected by 
such a sophisticated process occurring in the law courts. While this 
change in the basis of enforceability resulted in broad statements of 
principle being laid down by courts concerned with the technical matters 
of demurrer and challenges after verdict, we must accept them with a 
certain degree of restraint. Indeed, our examination has shown that the 
true position was nowhere near as stark as we might at first think .. 
First of all, we have seen that most cases actually involved a 
plaintiff who had attempted to fulfil his side of the bargain, the 
defendant objecting about the quantum or mode of performance on rather 
technical grounds. In these cases an independent construction seems 
to achieve fair results: the defendant is relegated to a cross action 
if he wishes to pursue his complaint about the plaintiff's performance, 
and the plaintiff is not deprived of remuneration for what he has 
undoubtedly done under the contract. 
Secondly, it may well be that, as Professor LUcke has pointed out, 
some of the declarations which seem to involve a purely executory 
contract may in fact have involved an executed contract, but were 
intentionally framed in this way to escape the objection that Debt was 
the correct, and hence the only, remedy available. 
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And thirdly, in the sphere of purely personal executory contracts, 
it is highly doubtful if a cause of action was even technically con-
stituted by the mere promises on both sides. True, one can point to 
Nichols v. Raynbred, but that case is so sparsely reported that, in 
itself, it is virtually meaningless. Hitherto, its citation has been 
used as an obvious and stark illustration of what was thought to be a 
clear and well established principle of substantive law. I have, I 
hope, thrown some doubt on this premise. 
The truth, then, seems to be that there was no flood of charlatans 
suddenly using the courts as a means of cheating honest men out of their 
expected consideration for a promise, and enforcing contracts in a way 
manifestly contrary to the expectation of the parties and of society as 
a whole. Consider the situation in the late sixteenth century. Could 
a man of straw come to a court and say that he had promised to deliver 
to the defendant a flock of sheep and the defendant had promised to pay 
a certain sum and therefore he claimed the sum, though he had not even 
attempted to deliver the sheep? 
First of all, no lawyer would take the case, for it would be 
obvious that he would be laughed out of court. Just' as some cases, 
such as cases of advance payment or cases where the plaintiff had 
really performed the substance of his bargain, would succeed before a 
jury - because the action was obviously in accord with the parties• 
intention - a case such as this would obviously fail, because it was 
completely divorced from commercial reality. 
Secondly, if the case did somehow come to court, it would be most 
likely that the trial judge would direct a verdict for the defendant, 
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and even if he did not, the jury would certainly decide for him. 
Perhaps in these factors of 'commercial reality• we have at last 
grasped the true meaning of a distinction between procedural and 
substantive law. With all this in mind, something of an outline of this 
process of interaction between substantive law and procedure adverted to 
above may now be attempted. 
With the advent of the action of assumpsit, the giving of the promise 
was seen as the basis of enforceability, and very wide statements were 
laid down by the courts as to the irrelevance of performance etc. 
It may be that some judges thought this was really the law. But, 
despite the wide nature of such statements, they did not in fact lead 
to obviously incorrect results, and such an approach was in line with 
both the history of the development of assumpsit and the rules applicable 
to deeds. Furthermore, the vast majority of cases in which these wide 
statements are to be found involved contracts partly or wholly performed 
by the plaintiff. Now, no doubt Professor Llicke was right in attributing 
some cases such as Wicals v. Johns to the cunning tricks of the pleaders, 
but it may be that in the cases where execution was expressly oleaded 
we are dealing not so much with counsel 1 s technical sophistication but 
with much more human attributes, such as mediocrity in pleading, unfore-
seen difficulties of proof or just plain bad luck. It may well be that 
it was the judges, in some of these cases, who were prepared to aid a 
meritorious case with a somewhat technical doctrine. Perhaps it was they 
who were prepared to lay down broad rules as to the nature of enforce-
ability of promises in what was really an attempt to manipulate a technical 
doctrine to reach a substantive end (70). But whatever the reason was, the 
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result was that we start to find reported statements by the courts to the 
effect that mutual promises are enforceable in much the say way as 
covenants under seal, and this was to produce a sharp interaction between 
technical and substantive law. 
It may well be that, for a period, it was really the practical lawyers 
and the juries, rather than the broad pronouncements of courts concerned 
with demurrers and objections after verdict, to whom we should look for the 
real administration of the law. As already stated, the lawyer would not 
take a case if it were likely to be laughed out of court, and the jury would 
not give a verdict for a plaintiff if his case was quite out of touch with 
their ideas of fairness and commercial reality. 
However, as we find this buildup of broad, general statements by the 
appellate courts, it seems inevitable that something of a change must take 
place at the trial level. Perhaps the psyche of juries would not change, 
but two other things would. 
First of all, lawyers would begin to think that such statements did 
constitute the law, and that an action could be brought without performance -
and thus these actions might start to come to court. 
Secondly, although juries are at times independent, they do pay respect 
to the directions of the presiding judge. And the judge would, like the 
lawyers, be familiar with these statements - indeed he may have made them 
himself while sitting in another place - and would tend to direct juries 
accordingly. 
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The conclusion is that sooner or later abstract statements of law 
will permeate through to the level of practical administration. It is 
true that juries could still give verdicts in the teeth of counsel's 
argument and the trial Judges directions, but that is not really the 
point. The point is that such a verdict, apart from being rather 
exceptional, would now rightly be regarded as being contrary to substant-
ive law itself. By this stage our distinction between technical matters 
and substantive law - always of the most nebulous nature anyway - has 
blurred and merged to such a degree that we must say that such a 
verdict would be against the law. 
Perhaps the case of Smith v. Shelbury, already briefly adverted to 
(71), best exemplifies the end result of this process. The plaintiff 
and defendant agreed that the plaintiff should assign a certain lease to 
the defendant, who proiFJCle would pay £250. Each then mutually promised 
to perform the agreement. The plaintiff attempted to perform, but the 
defendant did not co-operate and the question, on demurrer, was whether 
the plaintiff could recover the £250. Quite naturally, counsel for the 
defendant argued that the assignment of the lease was a condition 
precedent to payment, but: 
Pemberton, Serjeant, for the plaintiff, held the declaration good, 
and that it was a mutual promise, and that the plaintiff need not 
aver the performance, for in such cases each has his remedy against 
the other; and it is as reasonable that the plaintiff should have 
his money before he makes the assignment, as that the defendant 
should have the term assigned before he paid the money (72). 
The court accepted this argument and gave judgement for the plaintiff, 
only Atkins J. doubting. 
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Now it is to be noted that cases such as this involved a rather 
difficult problem or set of problems - cooperation of both parties in 
contracts or transfer and the concepts of tender and refusal and so on. 
These matters will be dealt with in the next section, but for now the 
important point is that the matter was now being treated as if it were a 
general principle that plaintiffs could actually sue, and recover, on 
the promises alone without reference to the true nature of the transaction. 
Thus the force of the word proinde, which would seem to indicate a 
condition precedent in the performance of the agreement, was brushed aside 
in Smit_b_ v. Shelbury; the court looked only to the promises to perform the 
agreement and did not ask the logica·lly prior question, 'What was the 
agreement promised to be performed?' 
Furthermore, the older cases were now seen as bearing out a rigid 
theory of independency of promises, without reference to the possible 
distinctions outlined above between statements as to sufficiency of a 
cause of action and real administration by juries, or without reference 
to the fact that such cases often involved deeds to which more formal 
rules of construction were better suited. 
Thus Ellis J. in Smith v. Shelbury cited, in support of the court's 
judgement, the case of Ware v. Chapple (73): 
Ellis J. cited a case adjudged in the King's Bench which was, as he 
thought, very hard, viz. an assignment was made between A and B 
that A should raise soldiers, and that B should transport them beyond 
sea, and reciprocal promises were made for the performance (as in this 
case): that A who never raised any soldiers may yet bring his action 
upon this promise against B for not transporting them, which is a far 
stronger case than this at Bar (74). 
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It is submitted, with respect, that the general observation made by 
Professor Lucke is sound indeed and bears repeating: 
Elizabethan lawyers, eager to achieve their procedural objects, 
tended to enunciate substantive propositions, in particular rules of 
construction, in a way which was little better than frivolous. The 
unsound construction inherent in the mutual promises doctrine remained 
part of the law until Lord Mansfield, in a case where the application 
of the doctrine would have been no less absurd than it was in Wical v. 
Johns, freed the substantive law from the contortions into which the 
exigencies of sixteenth century-procedure had forced it (75). 
We turn now to the developments leading up to this liberation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW APPROACH 
By the end of the seventeenth century a formidable body of case law 
could be collected in support of a strict doctrine of independency. 
However, it has already been submitted that the real extent of this 
doctrine, and the depth of its roots can easily be exaggerated. In the 
case of the parol contract, we have seen that a number of factors 
besides general statements extracted from a few of the cases should be 
considered, and in the case of the contract under seal, we have seen that 
the early decisions were not at all consistent as to the true extent of 
the doctrine of independency when words such as E!:.Q_ etc. were present. 
Furthermore, although a rigid doctrine in favour of mutual remedies seems 
to have been adopted in the majority of cases for a short period after 
Pordage v. Cole, there are certainly exceptions to be found. For example, 
in the book of Levinz is to be found the surprising case of Johnson v. Carre 
decided in 1664, the report of which is as follows: 
Debt, for rent on a lease for years, the defendant pleads in bar a 
covenant by the lessor, that the lessee might deduct so much for 
charges: and upon demurrer it was adjudged, that the covenant being 
in the same deed, is well pleadable in bar, the thing being executory; 
and the party shall not be put to a circuity of action, viz. to bring 
an action on the covenant (76). 
Of course, it is unsafe to rely too much on such a scantily reported 
decision, but a case decided in 1671 is much better reported. Peeters v. 
Opie, the plaintiff brought assumpsit on an agreement whereby the plaintiff 
was to perform certain ~uilding tasks and the defendant was to pay him £8 
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1 for his work 1 • After a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant moved 
in arrest of judgement that the plaintiff had not averred the perform-
ance of the work, this being a condition precedent. Naturally, the 
plaintiff argued that the promises were independent, each having his own 
remedy, but the court agreed with the defendant on this point. Hale 
C.J. stated: 
(T)he words for his labour make a condition precedent, so that the 
plaintiff ought of necessity to have shewn the work done, or at 
least that he was hindered from doing it by the plaintiff, before 
he can demand the money. And he further said that if the said 
agreement had been put into writing under the seals of the parties, 
it had been clear that the plaintiff could not maintain an action 
of covenant for the £8 without such an averment; and no more can he 
do so here; and although there were mutual promises in the case, yet 
the defendant's promise was on the performance of the agreement, which 
in itself was only conditional on the defendant's part, namely, that 
if the plaintiff performed the work, then the defendant was to pay 
him £8 for his labour, but otherwise not; and here it appears that 
the plaintiff has not performed the work. 
Hale C.J. then made a comment which makes it absolutely clear that he 
did not agree with the broad statements ·that are to be found in the cases 
in favour of strict independency, but rather viewed the matter as a question 
of construction: 
But he said that if by the agreement it had been that the £g should be 
paid on any certain day, perhaps the law would be otherwise, because 
then it might be construed that the defendant relied on the plaintiff's 
mutual promise for his security; but here no certain time being 
limited when the money should be paid, the law makes a construction that 
it shall be paid when the work will be finished and not before, unless 
the defendant himself was the cause why it was not finished, which does 
not appear here in this record (77). 
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Of course, this approach is perfectly sensible and, to the modern 
mind, it is remarkable only for the fact that it appears to be in 
conflict with the general view concerning performance of simple 
contracts at this period in history. As has been submitted, the 
answer would seem to be that the true position was not quite as stark 
as some commentators suggest. While it seems that broad statements 
were made in some cases, either through a certain confusion caused by 
the relation of procedure to substantive law or because attention was 
only being paid to the facts of the instant case under review, other 
judges did not lose sight of commercial reality, of the real intention 
of parties to simple contracts for labour, sale of goods etc. Never-
theless, it is fair to say that there was a certain amount of confusion 
in the law at this time, but in 1701 a case was decided which did much 
to alleviate the problem, Thorpe v. Thorpe (78). The facts in essence 
are these. The plaintiff had mortgaged land to the defendant, and later 
agreed to release his equity of redemption, in consideration of which 
the defendant agreed to pay£7 to the plaintiff. The plaintiff executed 
the desired release to the defendant of 'all manner of actions, suits, 
debts, duties, sum and sums of money etc. 1 , but the defendant did not 
pay the £7. At the trial the plaintiff was given judgement by the Court 
of Common Pleas, but on error the defendant boldly argued that the 
release which had been executed also covered the claim for the £7 and 
therefore he should have judgement. As counsel put it, 
(T)he payment of the money does not arise from the release, but 
from the promise; and the promise, and not the release, being 
the consideration of the debt, action lies upon the mutual 
promises before the release. Ergo the release comes after 
the cause of action, and consequently destroys it (79). 
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Counsel then cited such cases as Nichols v. Raynbred to establish 
that there was a cause of action without any performance being under-
taken, a cause of action therefore perfect before the release and 
destroyed by it. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly the Court of King's 
Bench accepted the framework of this argument. Holt C.J. agreed with 
counsel to the following extent: 
It was urged at the Bar by Mr. Cowper, that if the plaintiff might 
have founded an action upon the mutual promise and agreement before 
any performance on his part, that certainly this release would have 
barred him; and the consequence is very true and necessary, if that 
were the case. And by the same reason, if he could not bring an 
action before such time as he had made a release, there is no 
colour for the release to bar him; for till he makes the release in 
this case, if he has no title to the seven pounds, then till release 
there is no right of action; and then they do not lie in demand till 
release; and that a release of 'all demands' will not release a thing 
that does not lie in demand at that time ... (80). 
An investigation of this preliminary matter would be outside the 
province of this work, but it seems to me to be a matter of speculation 
whether, if there were no other points in the case, the court would have 
found this preliminary stage in counsel 1 s argument either compelling or 
conclusive. Is it not possible that, by accepting it, the court seized 
the opportunity to examine the confused maze of precedents concerning 
dependency and independency and to inject some certainty into the law? 
As Holt C.J. stated, the result of accepting counsel's framework was that 
the question of whether or not there was a condition precedent here 
became vital to the decision, his honour later observing, perhaps somewhat 
optimistically, 'And whereas there seems to be a variance in the books 
upon this learning it will be fit on this occasion to settle it ... • 
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Whether or not this decision should be regarded as a 'test case', 
the remarks of Holt C.J. were of great importance (81). First of all, 
he firmly based the matter on the true intention of the parties. A 
promise could constitute a good cause of action by itself, but only if 
it were so intended. If it was the performance that was bargained for, 
then it was performance that was necessary: 
(I)t has been urged, that in this case there were mutual promises, 
and the one promise is the consideration of the other; and that 
then he that brings the action needs not aver any performance of 
his side; and this ... would be a true and necessary consequence, 
if the promises were true. But where the one promise is the 
consideration of the other, and wher~ the performance, and not the 
promise, is it, is to be gathered from the words and nature of the 
agreement, and depends entirely thereupon; for if in this case there 
were a positive promise that one should release his equity of 
redemption, and on the other side that the other would pay seven 
pounds, then the one might bring his action without any averment of 
performance; but this agreement is not so, but that the plaintiff 
should release his equity of redemption, in consideration whereof 
the defendant was to pay him seven pounds; so that the release is 
the consideration and therefore being executory is a condition 
orecedent; which must be averred (82). 
Thus it was a question of construction, words such as 'for' being 
quite appropriate to constitute a condition precedent. The case of 
Nichols v. Raynbred was explained on the rather doubtful basis that there 
were two positive undertakings, the one to transfer the cow and the other 
to pay the money, and therefore no condition precedent was intended. 
Other cases were to be explained on the basis of certain rules of 
construction for ascertaining the contracting parties' intention which 
Holt C.J. derived from the cases. These rules were to the effect that 
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if the day for perfor~ance of the consideration for the defendant's promise 
was to, or did, occur after a fixed day set for the defendant's performance, 
then the plaintiff could sue irmnediately after that stipulated day was past, 
for a condition precedent, even though 1 for 1 or 'in consideration' were used, 
would be repugnant to the nature of the agreement. Conversely, if the fixed 
date was to occur after the plaintiff's performance, then the latter was a 
condition precedent (83). 
Naturally, some parts of the judgement seem somewhat stilted, even a 
little doubtful, in the light of precedent, but this is because of the very 
nature of the judgement. It is an attempted rationalization of a number of 
decisions which were not based on consistent principles and therefore defy 
the application of one clear rule to them, and Holt C.J. seems ruefully to 
admit that there are a number of 'scattered authorities in the books' which 
are rather awkward. 
But we should make allowances for these shortcomings and accept the 
judgement for what it is, a clear endorsement of a method of resolution of 
contractual problems based on the true intent of the transaction rather than 
a rigid rule of independency: 
But let us now see the reason of the thing. What is the reason that 
mutual promises shall bear an action without performance? One's bargain 
is to be performed according as he makes it. If he make a bargain, and 
rely on the other's covenant or promise to have what he would have done 
to him, it is his own fault. If the agreement be, that A shall have the 
horse of B and A agree that B shall have his money, they may make it so; 
and then there needs no averment of performance to maintain an action on 
either side; b4t if it appear by the agreement that the plain intent of 
either party was to have the thing to be done to him performed, before 
his doing what he undertakes of his side, it must be then averred: as 
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where a man agrees to give so much money for a horse, it is plain 
he meant to have the horse first, and therefore he says the money 
shall be given for the horse (84). 
As for the plaintiff in Thorpe v. Thorpe, it was decided that his 
judgement should be affirmed. The execution of the release being a 
condition precedent to his cause of action, the cause of action was not 
affected by the release. Since such execution was held to be a condition 
precedent, an allegation of performance was, of course, necessary, but in 
the circumstances this was found to be satisfied (85). 
Naturally, it is possible, as some learned commentators do, to 
criticise this decision on the basis that it is couched in stilted and 
artificial language and that a doctrine more in line with direct ascer-
tainment of the so called parties' 'true intention' should have been 
stated. From what has already been discussed, it will be apparent that 
I do not agree with such an approach. The idea of intention and the way 
in which it is to be ascertained are far from simple concepts and, as has 
been submitted, necessarily somewhat artificial. It seems a great deal to 
expect of the contemporary judge that he should cut through the maze of 
precedent confronting him and adopt, in one masterly stroke, an approach 
that we now adopt today. Rather, it seems to me that Lord Holt produced a 
substantial achievement. Faced with a doctrine of independency that had, 
for various reasons, gone to seemingly extravagant lengths, he was able to 
put the law on a sensible and understandable basis once again. It became 
clear that the nature of the transaction and the parties' intention were 
important and words which manifested this intention, such as pro etc., were 
sufficient to rebut a presumption of independency. 
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Lord Holt was quick to consolidate his advance. In 1701, in the 
case of Atkinson v. Morrice, he decided that the particular covenants 
involved were independent, but it was clear that such a result was to 
be reached through an analysis of all the circumstances rather than a 
rigid reliance on a doctrine of mutual remedies. The defendant had 
agreed to give the plaintiff a sum of money for the use of a coach and 
horses for a year, and the plaintiff agreed further that he would keep 
the coach in repair. In the declaration it was averred that the coach 
and horses were delivered to the defendant, but nothing was said as to 
repair. The question was, could the defendant rely upon the agreement 
to repair as a condition precedent to his liability to pay the price? 
It was decided that he could not. 
And Holt C.J. held upon this evidence, that repairing was not a 
condition precedent, and therefore need not be averred: but if 
the agreement had been, that A had agreed to give M a coach and 
horses for a year, and to repair the coach, and that for that M 
promised so much money, then the repairing had been a condition 
precedent necessary to be averred ... (86). 
And in 1703, in the case of Callonel v. Briggs, Lord Holt reiterated 
his credo. The facts of the case are sparsely reported, but the agreement 
itself seems to have been of the simplest nature. The defendant promised 
to pay a sum of money over, the plaintiff transferring certain stock to him 
and in turn the plaintiff promised to transfer stock, the defendant paying 
etc. Lord Holt again stated the basic tenet that one such promise could not 
be enforced quite independently of the corresponding promise: 
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If either party would sue upon this ~greement, the plaintiff for not 
paying or the defendant for not transferring, the one must aver and 
prove a transfer or a tender, and the other a payment or a tender, 
for transferring in the first bargain was a condition precedent; 
and though there be mutual promises, yet if one thing be the consid-
eration of the other, there a performance is necessary to be averred, 
unless a certain day be appointed for performance: 1 Saund. 319. If 
I sell you my horse for £10 if you will have the horse I must have 
the money; or, if I will have the money, you must have the horse; 
therefore he obliged the plaintiff either to prove a transfer, or a 
tender and refusal within the six months (87). 
The result was that these cases, of which Thorpe v. Thorpe was the 
first and perhaps the most important, established a foundation 
on which a new approach to contract law could be built (88). We have seen 
that there were understandable reasons for a strict doctrine of independency 
and, further, these were not inconsistent with an attempt to implement 
intention when we bear in mind the complexities of the concept of 'the 
parties' intention'. Nevertheless, the doctrine had become both ossified 
and confused and it was past time for a new analysis of the problem. What 
I have submitted to be the beginnings of this new analysis were to culminate 
in the celebrated decision of Lord Mansfield in the case of Kingston v. 
Preston, decided in the latter part of the eighteenth century (89). But 
before we examine that decision we must first look to a different, though 
related, problem. 
At the time when the pendulum of the law was thus swinging to this new 
doctrine of dependency, agreements of an executory nature requiring perform-
ance by both parties, at roughly the same time, were becoming increasingly 
common. As Doctor Stoljar has pointed out (90), one important illustration 
of this development was afforded by the purchase and transfer of stock and 
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shares in the corporations proliferating at this time. If parties agreed 
to buy and sell stock, the position now seemed to be that the transfer and 
payment were somehow connected. But if so, could a party simply escape his 
contractual obligations by refusing to accept a transfer (or payment), and 
then, when sued, set up the other party's performance as a condition 
precedent to his liability. In essence, this is the problem of concurrency 
of performance and it is to this development that we now turn. 
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P A R T I I I 
THE CONDITION CONCURRENT 
- 157 -
CHAPTER 1 
THE HISTORY OF CONCURRENT PERFORMANCE 
(A) INTRODUCTION 
We have already considered the concept of a condition, and have 
examined its early development with regard to conditions of estates and 
conditions in contracts. We have seen that conditions were considered 
to be either precedent or subsequent, and the logical question, 
'precedent or subsequent to what?' found a ready answer. Conditions 
were precedent or subsequent to legal rights. In the case of land, the 
right was the legal estate itself. In the case of contract, .the right 
was a cause of action on the contract; the condition was precedent to 
the completion of a right to sue the other party for non-performance, or 
to compel him to perform. In other words, the law took an a priori 
approach to the solution of contractual problems; the terms of the, 
contract as at formation were crucial, and these were to be construed 
and applied to the circumstances in question to see if there was a good 
cause of action. We have also noted that, for various reasons, the law 
had come to construe contractual undertakings in a literal and legalistic 
manner and that, as was to be expected, there came to be a reaction against 
this tendency. 
But there was more than a change in canons of construction of 
individual contracts. A basic change in the very foundation of contract 
law and the ways in which problems were formulated and solved had occurred 
when conditions could be classified as precedent, subsequent and concurrent, 
because a clear concept of a concurrent condition was quite unknown to the 
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early law. This was because the concept of a condition concurrent necessarily in-
volves an analysis and approach different from that of conditions precedent and 
subsequent, for the question 1 concurrent to what? 1 can only be answered in 
terms of the other party 1 s performance rather than the cause of action to 
which the condition precedent and subsequent relate. 
The point is that our modern concept of a concurrent condition belongs 
to a comparatively recent period of the law's development. The modern 
approach may be said to be concerned with something that can be termed an 
ex post facto approach. By this I mean that contractual problems are 
examined and resolved in the light of developments subsequent to contractual 
formation, actual damage suffered, or likely to be suffered, and so on. 
This approach contrasts with the earlier approach of the law which we have 
been concerned to examine, i.e. an interpretation of the words of the 
contract themselves, more or less in vacua, and a consequent fairly strict 
application of fixed canons of construction to the facts in question. I 
have termed this approach a priori. 
One important effect of these differences in analysis is the attitude 
taken to the problem of order of performance and extension of credit in 
bilateral contracts. We have seen that in many situations, the presumption 
was in favour of complete independency so that either party could sue the 
other party without regard to his own performance, but there were other 
situations where the promises were dependent, the categories of which had 
become clearer after Thorpe v. Thorpe. 
The enquiry, then, in these cases consisted of two levels or tiers. 
The first tier concerned the issue of dependency and independency. If 
the covenants were independent, the enquiry was at an end, for the 
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plaintiff's cause of action was established. But if the covenants were 
adjudged to be dependent, then the courts passed on to the second tier. 
Here the question was, what will constitute performance of a dependent 
stipulation? In other words, 'what will suffice to discharge the 
condition precedent to a plaintiff's cause of action constituted by the 
dependent stipulation?' 
In the previous sections of this work we have been concerned with 
the first mentioned tier, and have traced its development up to those 
cases, headed by Thorpe v. Thorpe, which injected a measure of certainty 
and rationalization into the law, and which arrested the trend toward 
independency. But although a strict doctrine of independency could 
seemingly produce strange results, an insistence on the strict performance 
of conditions precedent was soon revealed to be equally mischievous. 
There are at least two distinct problems that must be examined. 
(i) Performance of Dependent Stipulations 
First of all, let us assume that in a contract where there are depend-
ent promises A demands performance by B, and B pleads that his performance 
is dependent on A's performance. A wishes to reply that he has performed 
and the question then becomes, 'what degree of excellence of performance 
must be shown to satisfy the court that the condition precedent to A's 
cause of action is discharged?' From the earliest times, the answer to this 
question was that strict performance was required. 
For example, in the case of Raynay v. Alexander (1605) the parties 
contracted to transfer 15 of 17 tods of wool owned by the defendent to 
the plaintiff, the defendant promising to deliver the praedictas 15 tods 
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of wool. The plaintiff alleged that he was ready on the day arranged to 
pay the agreed sum but the defendant did not deliver 15 tods of wool, 
and judgement was given for the plaintiff. However, this judgement was 
arrested when it was shown that the plaintiff had not elected which 15 
tods (of the 17) he wished to have: 
And the matter aforesaid is much enforced by the word praedictas 
in the declaration; for that can be referred to nothing but the 
communication, by which the plaintiff of his own showing ought 
to make election: then the plaintiff omitting it in his declar-
ation shews the fault is in himself which ought to be removed 
before he can charge the defendent ... (91). 
This requirement of complete performance of all conditions 
precedent was often expressed in terms of pleading, in that the 
plaintiff was required not only to allege performance, but to aver how 
he had performed. So in Thornton v. Kemp (1595) the plaintiff brought 
an assumpsit, the plaintiff 1 s consideration being that he would abate 
part of a debt. He averred that he had done this, but the court held 
that this allegation was not sufficient: 
Upon this plea the plaintiff demurred. - First, because he 
alledgeth that he abated £10 and doth not shew how; so as the 
Court might take conusance, whether it were a sufficient 
discharge. And of that opinion was the whole Court (92). 
Thus some degree of precision in pleading was required to enable 
the court to see if the dependent stipulation had been strictly 
performed (93). But the matter was one of substance and not merely 
pleading, by which I mean that strict performance was required in fact 
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as well as in allegation. Holt C.J. put the matter clearly in 
Armit v. Bream: 
Where a man has obliged himself to make a deed, and is sued for not 
doing it, it is not enough to say, that he made the deed, viz. lease, 
bond etc. but he must set it forth, that the court may judge of its 
sufficiency; for it ought to be a good deed, but if it be to deliver, 
or shew or produce a deed, that is, a deed already made, there it is 
enough to say, that he delivered, or shewed, or produced it (94). 
Thus if the performance in question was a simple act, e.g. delivery 
of a deed in esse, it was enough to aver that delivery. In the case of a 
complex act, such as the making of a deed, one had to show how one 
performed so that the court could judge if it was a sufficient performance. 
And, of course, in either situation the complete performance had to be 
proved at the trial. 
(ii) Performance Requiring Co-operation by Both Parties 
The second situation occurs when the performance of the plaintiff 
depends on the conduct of the defendant for fulfilment. For example, if 
the condition precedent to the plaintiff's payment be a transfer to the 
defendant, can the defendant avoid payment merely by refusing transfer 
and then setting up the transfer as a condition precedent? Such a result 
would appear shocking, and even in the time of Lark Coke it was rejected. 
Thus Lord Coke stated:-
If a man make a feoffment in fee upon condition that the feoffee 
shall re-enfeoffe him before such a day, and before the day the 
feoffor disseise the feoffee, and hold him out by force until the 
day be past, the state of the feoffee is absolute, for the feoffor 
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is the cause wherefore the condition cannot be performed and 
therefore shall never take advantage for non-performance 
thereof (95). 
To give a further simple example of this general principle, let us 
again look at the case of Raynay v. Alexander. It will be remembered 
that in that case the plaintiff was held unable to recover because he 
had not elected which 15 tods of wool he would take. However, if he had 
been in any way hindered by the defendant in his election, the result 
would have been different. Thus Popham C.J. there observed: 
(I)f the defendant had sold one of the tods of wool before election 
made by the plaintiff, that had destroyed the election, and made 
the promise absolute, and had been the breach of it: the same law 
if the defendant would not have permitted the plaintiff to fee 
[see] the wool that he might make election, for that had excused 
the act to be done by the plaintiff, and had been a default in the 
defendant (96). 
Similarly in the case of bonds, if the obligee was responsible for 
the impossibility of performance of the condition, the obligation became 
void as against the obligor. Thus in an Anonymous case in 1537, the 
condition of the defendant's obligation was that he should surrender a 
certain copyhold to the plaintiff and should suffer the plaintiff to 
enjoy possession without interruption from anyone. The lord subsequently 
re-entered, and the plaintiff sued on the bond, but it was held to be a 
good defence that the lord re-entered, because the obligee had not paid 
the rent to the lord for which he was liable: 
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And this was holden a good plea. And the law is the same if the 
obligee were tenant at Common Law, and determined the tenancy the 
obligation is saved, because it was the act of the plaintiff 
himself (97). 
Similarly, in Sir Anthony Maynie v. Scot (1593) the plaintiff 
brought Debt on a bond for the performance of a covenant that the 
defendant would, if the plaintiff surrendered a lease, grant a new one. 
The defendant replied that the plaintiff had never surrendered his 
lease, but the plaintiff replied that the defendant had accepted a fine 
and granted to a third party for 80 years. 
Naturally, the defendant's counsel argued that 'there ought a 
promptness to appear in him to do that on his part that is to be performed', 
but the court found for the plaintiff, on the ground that since the 
defendant had disabled himself from performing, the plaintiff was not 
obliged to surrender his lease, for that surrender was only necessary in 
case he wanted a new lease, and the granting of a new lease was now 
impossible: 
(I)t would therefore be in vain for him to offer his surrender: 
but the covenant is broken of itself (98). 
Thus, if the plaintiff made the performance physically or legally 
impossible, that was an excuse without more. It is perhaps sufficient 
to mention the illustrations collected by Bacon to make this point clear: 
Bro. Coven. 31 
Rolle Abr. 453 
9 H. 6. 44b. 
Rolle Abr. 
453 
3 H. 6. 37 
Roll e. Abr. 
453, 4. 
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If a man be bound to build a house, etc., he is 
excused if the obligee will not suffer him to 
build it; for he cannot come upon the land against 
his will. 
So, if a condition be to repair a house, he is 
excused thereof, if a stranger, by the command of 
the obligee himself, disturbs him, and will not 
suffer him to do it. 
If the condition be to erect a mill, and the 
obligor comes to the obligee, and says all is 
ready for the erecting thereof, and demands of 
him when he shall come with the mill to erect it; 
if the obligee says he will not have the mill, and 
entirely discharges him of the mill, this shall 
excuse him of the performance (99). 
Yet while these illustrations are to be found, one must be careful 
not to derive too broad a principle from them. They do not form a basis 
for a broad theory of 'frustration of commercial purpose' etc. but stand 
for a rather narrow principle that, if the co-operation of the defendant 
is required in the performance of the plaintiff's condition precedent 
and he actively refused to co-operate or prevents performance, the per-
formance of the condition precedent by the plaintiff will be excused. 
It should be noted that there are two ingredients here. First there 
is the question of whether the participation of the defendant was 
necessary at all to the plaintiff's performance of his condition precedent. 
Consonant with the general requirement of strict performance of-conditions 
precedent, the courts did not look so much at the usefulness of the 
performance actually rendered to the defendant as whether or not the 
performance could be rendered without his co-operation. Thus Comyns sets 
down the following principles from Rolle's Abridgement: 
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So the performance of a condition shall be excused by the absence 
of the feoffee or obligee, when his presence was necessary for the 
performance; as, if a condition be that he enfeoffe the obligee, 
and he, having notice of the time is absent. 1. Rol. 457 1. 30. 
32. 
If a condition be to pay rent, and the lessee is ready, but nobody 
comes to receive it for the lessor. 1 Rol. 459 1. 35. 
But if his presence is not necessary, his absence shall not excuse, 
though the act is to be done to him, as if a condition be to sing 
matins at such a day, in his manor, for A and his family though 
they be absent, he ought to sing. 1 Rol. 457. 1. 45. (100). 
Secondly, if the plaintiff alleges interference by the defendant, he 
must show that he himself has done all in his own power to perform the 
condition precedent. Thus in Blanford v. Andrews (1598) the plaintiff 
brought Debtm an obligation of £80, the condition of which was that if 
the defendant procured the plaintiff's marriage with a certain lady, the 
obligation to be void, etc. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff 
himself had hindered his performance of the condition, (by calling the 
lady in question a whore, threatening to tie her to a post if they were 
married etc.), but to no avail: 
Williams, Serjeant, moved that this was not any plea; for he hath 
not shewn that he used his endeavour to procure the marriage; for 
it may be that, notwithstanding these words they would have inter-
married. - And of that opinion was all the court; for the defend-
ant ought to shew that there was not any default in him, and that 
he did as much as in him lay to procure it ... (1). 
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Austin v. Jervoyse (1614) furnishes a further example of this 
doctrine. In this case Austin, who was under age, declared by his 
next friend that he had bought a horse from Jervoyse for 22 shillings 
paid, and £11 more to be paid at his death or marriage for which he 
should become bound with sufficient surety by their writing obligatory. 
The defendant, in consideration thereof, promised to deliver the horse. 
The plaintiff declared that he had offered to become bound and provide 
a sufficient surety, but the defendant refused to deliver the horse. 
Despite this, judgement went against the plaintiff: 
(H)e could not have judgement, for he should have tendered the 
obligation sealed, he should set down the sum, that the Court 
might judge if it were sufficient for the £11, the surety should 
have been named (2). 
A final illustration is to be found in Fraunces's Case (1609) (3), 
which is best summarised in the words of Lord Holt C.J. in a later case, 
thus: 
Upon this reason of law is the case in 8 Co. 92. One makes a feoff-
ment. upon condition that the feoffee should re-infeoff the feoffor; 
or one binds himself in a bond to infeoff obligee by such a day, and 
before the day the feoffee, or obliger, is disseised by him that was 
to be infeoffed, and then the bond is put in suit, it is not a good 
plea to say that you were always ready to infeoff him, but that he 
himself before the day ousted you, but you must proceed farther and 
say, that he kept you out of the possession till after the day, with 
force; for though he had interrupted you, perhaps you might have 
come upon the land afterwards and performed the agreement, or make a 
tender, which if he refused would have been tantamount; for you 
ought not only to show a disturbance by him, but also such contin-
uance of that disturbance as made it impossible for you to perform on 
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your side; and in that case he ought to shew, that he came to 
endeavour to make a feoffment, but could not do it by reason 
of the force he met with from the plaintiff; and that had been 
a good excuse; for if he, to whom a thing is to be done, hinder 
the other that is to do it ever so much; yet the other must use 
his utmost endeavour on his side to perform; and shew that he has 
done it, or else he forfeits his bond, or breaks his agreement (4). 
Now it may at first appear to the reader that there is no consistent 
principle at work here, for while it is understandable that strict 
performance should be insisted upon in the basic case of a dependent 
covenant, how can this apply when the performance of that covenant 
necessarily involves the participation of the covenantee, and he refused 
to co-operate? Furthermore, it might at first appear that the decisions 
on this point are irreconcilable in themselves, for on the one hand we 
have cases such as Sir Anthony Maynie v. Scot and the cases collected by 
Bacon, referred to supra, which seem to decide that a refusal by the 
defendant is enough to excuse the plaintiff, while on the other hand we 
have cases such as Blanford v. Andrews which seem to decide that the 
plaintiff must make every endeavour, no matter how obviously hopeless and 
absurd in the circumstances, in the teeth of the defendant's obstruction. 
It is submitted however, that the contradiction is only apparent and its 
resolution actually illustrates some very basic and important concepts 
of the period. 
The group of cases outlined are to be distinguished on this basis. 
In the first group, the performance was quite obviously made impossible 
by the other party's refusal to co-operate; if the obligee refuse the 
obligor entry to build the mill, that is per se an end of the matter, for 
the obligor can do no more. If the defendant has disposed of an estate, as 
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in Sir Anthony Maynie's Case, the plaintiff may immediately sue for refusal 
to convey, for conveyance is once and for all impossible. In the second 
class, however, while the defendant does not co-operate, the plaintiff's 
performance is not impossible and it is therefore possible that the 
defendant might alter his mind and perform once the plaintiff has completely 
performed his part of the agreement. It is therefore up to the plaintiff 
to do all possible on his side, so as to show there is no default in him. 
Now to modern minds this may sound quite illogical; if a man refuses to 
accept a deed of release which is prepared with wax affixed, he will 
surely refuse to accept it if the defendant, in addition, affixed his own 
seal to it. Similarly, if a man calls a lady a whore etc., and makes it 
clear he has no wish to marry her, it would seem pointless for a person to 
continue making exhortations to the lady to marry the man. But the reason 
modern lawyers would tend to make these objections is that \'Je now think in 
terms of performance of the essence of the contract, by both parties, terms 
which promote consideration of substance, and an examination via the ex oost 
facto approach outlined previously. However, as also stated previously, the 
law originally viewed bilateral deeds as a collection of grants by both 
parties; the grant of the one party being prima facie enforceable without 
regard to the other party's. [3ecause of this approach the law, for hundreds 
of years, focussed on the individual's cause of action. Was it absolute or 
was there a condition precedent to it that had to be fulfilled? Once it was 
decided in a particular case that there was such a condition precedent, 
this condition had strictly to be performed and the focus of examination was 
on the plaintiff himself and his actions, rather than what the defendant 
happened to be doing at the time. This approach meant that prima facie the 
plaintiff had fully to perform his part of the agreement before he could 
enforce the other party's performance - and so the plaintiff had to make 
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overtures to the reluctant lady, had to affix his seal as well as the wax 
to a deed, because these things were to be performed by him. It was only 
if the defendant actually made it physically or legally impossible for the 
plaintiff to perform the condition precedent that he was excused without 
more - and this is the explanation of the cases outlined above. 
(B) THE CONCEPT OF TENDER 
The concept of tender, properly understood, was originally nothing 
more than the application of the ideas and principles just discussed to 
one particular fact situation, a contract involving an exchange of some 
sort. If the condition precedent to A1 s cause of action was that he was 
to deliver something to B, we have seen that B could not frustrate A1 s 
rights by merely refusing acceptance. But A had to do all on his part that 
was stipulated under the contract, and in the exchange situation this 
requirement could be expressed in the terms of the need for a valid tender. 
The essence of tender, then, is that the plaintiff must give the defendant 
every opportunity of accepting the plaintiff's complete performance; if the 
defendant still refuses this formal tender of performance, the tender may be 
treated as performance for the purpose of the plaintiff's condition precedent 
to his cause of action. 
Discussion resolves itself into two questions: 
(i) When must a party make a tender? 
(ii) What constitutes a valid tender? 
(i) When Must a Party Make a Tender 
Just as in the other areas of law which we have been examining, much 
of the early discussion relating to tenders concerned land. Usually the 
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question arose in the context of the feoffor 1 s (or lessor's) right to 
re-enter or distrain for nonpayment of rent, the tenant objecting that 
he had been ready and willing to pay and that therefore the landlord's 
act was unjustified. Much of this learning is dry and technical, 
concerning the place at which the rent should be demanded (and where 
and when the tenant should attend to establish a tender), distinctions 
between rent-seeks and rent-services, distinctions between rents and 
sums in gross (5). 
Perhaps of more immediate interest is the question, discussed 
from the earliest times, as to which party is to move first in the 
performance of a bilateral contract when the order of performance is 
not made explicit. Or, in other words, who must make the first tender 
of performance? Again, the early resolution of this issue often turned 
on nice distinctions concerning real property law or, quite often, accord-
ing to the mundane practicalities of the fact situation before the court. 
Thus Lord Coke, after observing that in one situation it was up to the 
feoffor to tender money, then observed: 
But if a condition of a bond or feoffment be to deliver 20 quarters 
of wheat, or twenty load of timber, or such like, the obligor or 
feoffor is not bound to carry the same about and seek the feoffee, 
but the obligor or feoffor before the day must go to the feoffee, 
and know where he will appoint to receive it, and there it must be 
delivered. So note a diversitie between money and things ponder-
ous, or of great weight (6). 
Again, where the parties were to execute a deed, for example a 
release, it was often a nice question who was to prepare and tender it. 
Again this was resolved in an ad hoe fashion according to what seemed 
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the logical chronological sequence involved on the facts. To give one 
example, in Halling's Case (1595) the plaintiff brought Debt on a bond 
for the performance of covenants one of which was that the defendant 
should make an estate in fee before a certain feast. Making an estate 
was a complicated business and the question was who should move first? 
It was held that the obligor (i.e. the covenantor) had to move first, 
and was therefore liable on his bond, the court holding that: 
(T)he covenantor ought to do the first act, Seil. notify to the 
covenantee what manner of estate he would have, so that the 
covenantee might know what sum of money to tender .... if nothing 
can be done before the day, the covenant is broken, because the 
covenantor ought to have done the first act, and so the default 
is in him (7). 
(ii) The Nature and Effect of a Tender 
It is discernible from the earliest cases that, provided the strict 
requirements of time, place and degree of performance by the plaintiff 
are fulfilled, a tender is equivalent to performance. This is by no means 
a startling proposition or, indeed, a new and distinct proposition at all, 
for it logically follows from the ancient rule that if one party has done 
all possible to perform a condition precedent to his cause of action, the 
other party cannot take advantage of that condition precedent if its non-
performance is occasioned by his own act (8). It is vital to remember that 
the concept of tender was thought of in terms of performance rather than in 
such modern terms as repudiation or failure of consideration etc., and 
therefore the requirements of a valid tender were stringent. 
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The case of Lea v. Exelby (1601) provides a convenient example of 
the contemporary requirements of tender in a contractual context. The 
parties there agreed that in consideration that the plaintiff promised 
to pay the defendant a certain sum of money at a certain time and place, 
the defendant promised super solutionem inde to surrender to him a lease. 
The plaintiff alleged that he had tendered the money at the time and 
place, but that the defendant had not surrendered the lease. The 
plaintiff succeeded at the trial, but it was moved in arrest of judgement 
that the words super solutionem inde constituted an express condition 
precedent to transfer, and that either payment or an express tender and 
refusal was required. The court accepted this contention, for while the 
plaintiff had alleged an offer on his part, he had not mentioned any 
refusal by the defendant: 
And when he saith quad obtulit,and saith not that the other accepted 
it or refused it, his allegation of the tender is not to any purpose, 
for he shall never say quad obtulit only, but he ought to plead 
further that none was there to receive it, or that he refused; or he 
ought to alledge payment; and here it is matter of substance, for 
want whereof the declaration is not good (9). 
This approach appears to have been consistently adopted by the courts 
(10), though it is fair to say that some cases at first seem to 
suggest some discord. One of these cases that apparently presents some 
difficulty is Shales v. Seignoret (1699). In this case the plaintiff 
covenanted to transfer to the defendant £1000 of Bank-stock before or 
on the 19th of November 1695, and the defendant covenanted to accept it, 
upon three days• notice, and to pay the plaintiff £940 for it. The 
plaintiff averred that Bank-stock was only transferable by law in the 
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office of the Bank of England, in the presence of both parties. Further, 
that he had given the defendant three days' notice that he would transfer 
on the 19th and that he had attended all that day at the office, but the 
defendant did not appear. He therefore brought an action of Covenant for the 
£940. Despite all this, the court found against the plaintiff. The transfer 
was, according to the words of the deed, a condition precedent to payment, 
and the court held the consequence of this to be: 
That this action will not lie for the plaintiff in this case, because 
it appears that the plaintiff has not transferred; and without trans-
fer to the defendant, the defendant is not bound to pay the money, 
for the money was to be paid upon the transfer; and therefore no 
transfer, no money (11). 
This may seem rather odd, for it would appear that the plaintiff had 
done all in his power only to be frustrated by the defendant. Thus Dr. 
Stoljar makes the following comment: 
The Court purported to return to the old rules of dependency, but 
they went beyond its previous limits. For whereas before even an 
express dependency had generally been thought to be excusable by 
a buyer's own obstruction, the present dependency gave the buyer 
almost complete freedom to thwart the completion of the contract (12). 
In fact, however, we find that the case is consistent with the 
earlier decisions if we refer to the second resolution of the court: 
2. The Court held, that it did not appear to the Court but that the 
Bank-stock was transferable at another place than at the office of 
the bank; for though the Act says, that no transfer shall be but as 
the King shall appoint, and the King has appointed it to be at the 
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office of the bank, and not in any other place, yet that ought to 
have been pleaded, or otherwise the Court cannot take notice of it; 
and therefore notwithstanding anything that appears here to the 
contrary, the transfer might have been in any other place, and then 
a tender ought to have been made to the person (13). 
Dr. Stoljar, referring to this passage comments: 
The Court curiously insisted that his patient attendance at the bank 
should have been specially pleaded by the plaintiff, for 'otherwise 
the Court cannot take notice of it' (14). 
With the greatest respect, it is submitted that this is not quite 
right. What the court was insisting on was the pleading that stock could 
only be transferred in the bank, and nowhere else. The case was decided on 
a demurrer and therefore, without this special pleading, the matter stood 
as if the transfer might have taken place anywhere. And if this were the 
case, a tender needed to be actually made to the defendant's person, which 
had not been done (15). 
While this result was rather technical, it is understandable, I hope, 
in the light of the material previously examined. First of all, pleading, 
as we know, was of great importance in the early law of contract and if, 
on demurrer at least, a matter essential to a cause of action was not 
pleaded the court could not assume judicial knowledge of it. Secondly, 
and more particularly, in the light of the rather technical way in which 
the problem of which party was to make the first move had always been 
resolved, it is understandable that the court should have held that it 
was up to the plaintiff to make the first move in discharging his condition 
precedent, and therefore a personal tender was required in the absence 
of the special pleading above. 
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However, it must be admitted that this state of affairs was somewhat 
unsatisfactory in that the result in this type of case does appear to have 
turned on rather technical distinctions. 
The situation was clarified, if not liberalised, in the next case of 
importance, Lancashire v. Killingworth decided in 1700. Again, the 
defendant had covenanted to accept shares and to pay upon the transfer, 
but did not attend when the plaintiff had given notice to do so. Holt 
C.J. first of all definitively stated the role and status of tender: 
It does appear that the money was to be paid upon transfer of the 
stock; and it is to be admitted, that when the money was to be 
paid upon the transferring of the stock, or doing any other thing, 
if he that is to make the transfer, or do such other thing, make 
tender, and the other refuse, then he is as much entitled to the 
money, as if the transfer, or other thing, had been actually done; 
for though the words be, that the money shall be paid upon the 
transfer, yet if the party does all that lies in him, he is there-
upon as much entitled to the money, as if he had done all effect-
ually (16). 
However, although the concept of tender might have been set on a 
clearer footing, it was by no means extended in favour of plaintiffs. 
Thus in the instant case it was found against the plaintiff, because he 
did not aver that the defendant refused to accept or alternatively, that 
the plaintiff made tender at the proper time appointed by law and no one 
came to receive it. The stringent requirement of performance had not 
changed: 
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(W)hen a man has covenanted and agreed to do a thing, in excuse of 
himself, for not doing thereof according to agreement, he ought to 
shew that he has done his utmost endeavour to perform it, and shew 
how it came to pass that he did not, or could not do it. And here 
was an agreement by the plaintiff to transfer his stock, and here-
upon the money was to be paid: the plaintiff indeed says he tender-
ed the transfer, and so shews he did whatever he could towards the 
performance of his agreement, but that is not enough, for he ought 
likewise to shew how it came to pass that it was not performed, as 
that the defendant was there and refused to accept, or was not 
there at all, or on the last convenient time of the day which the 
law appoints for doing the matter. And all this the plaintiff 
ought to shew to entitle himself to this action (17). 
Thus once again we see that performance of a party's condition 
precedent was stringently insisted upon, and the absence of such averment 
could be fatal on demurrer (18). Moreover, while the concept of a tender 
was now clearly recognised (19), the solution to particular cases was still 
formulated in terms of dependent and independent promises, or conditions 
precedent, the tender being equal to performance of dependent stipulations 
or conditions, and was definitely not a new concept which per se discharged 
a party's obligations. 
We now, however, proceed to investigate a change in the very structure 
of contract law, the advent of the concurrent condition. 
(iii) The Beginnings of Concurrency 
In Turner v. Goodwin (1714) (20) the facts were as follows. The 
plaintiff had recovered judgement on a bond against a third party, Dibble, 
but Goodwin, upon consideration that Turner would forbear from suing out 
execution upon Dibble, had promised to pay the money to Turner on request, 
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he assigning over to him the judgement against Dibble. Turner brought 
Debt on a bond to this effect, but Goodwin pleaded that Turner had not 
assigned the judgement, to which the plaintiff replied that he had al-
\'Jays been ready so to do, and th~ parties then joined in Demurrer. The 
traditional way in which a problem like this was solved was to ask 
whether the clause pertaining to the assignment was a condition or a 
covenant and, if a condition, was it precedent or subsequent to the 
plaintiff's cause of action? 
Indeed, the defendant's counsel founded upon this supposition and 
their argument proceeded in the following stages. ' First, the phrase 
'he assigning over to him' could not be said to be merely an independent 
covenant to assign the judgement, because there is no covenant at all on 
the plaintiff's part to do so. Thus cases such as Pordage v. Cole (21) 
did not apply, for they turned on the very point that both parties did 
have mutual remedies. Secondly, was it a condition? The defendant's 
counsel argued that it was, but found a little difficulty here because 
the words were not express words of condition, such as sub conditione 
etc. Counsel for the defendant therefore argued that it is the intention 
of the parties that is most important, and the lack of mutual remedies 
means that the intention should be taken to be to impose a condition. As 
Serjeant Pratt stated: 
The law lays such a stress upon supporting the intention of the 
parties, that it will interpret words not at all proper to amount 
to a condition, rather than the intention of the parties should 
be violated; as the common case in Co. Litt. 204, of the grant of 
an annuity pro concilio impendendo (22). 
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t~Je have already discussed two possible rationales for the conditional 
status of the performance of consideration in unilateral contracts, namely, 
the condition is a part of the grant because of the very words oro etc. or, 
because there is no mutual remedy, the law implies a condition. We also 
saw how the adoption of one or other of these rationales would be crucial 
in the sphere of bilateral contracts, and how the adoption of the latter 
rationale led to the triumph of the doctrine of independency. 
Here again, in the instant case, we see the clash between these two 
rationales, a clash that involved not just theory but substance. Although 
either rationale would originally have yielded a similar result in this 
situation, a rationale based on the performance of the consideration being 
part of the grant because of the words used was now unsafe for the defend-
ant. As we have already seen, words such as 'paying and performing' etc., 
originally went to estate in the case of lands but, by the complex process 
culminating in Hayes v. Bickerstaffe outlined above, a wide range of such 
phrases had acquired a non-conditional interpretation and this was likely 
to be fo 11 owed. 
Counsel for the defendant therefore preferred to base themselves upon 
the broad principle of the parties' intention via mutual remedies rather 
than via the words actually used in the contract. Salkeld formulated this 
dichotomy most clearly when he stated: 
That in law, proper and formal words of conditions are not required, 
either in wills, grants or contracts. Nor in wills. Nor in grants, 
as in the grant of an annuity pro concilio impendendo: but the 
reason assigned by Coke (is) not a good one; for the true reason is, 
that the law implies a condition, because else there would be no 
remedy ( 23). 
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The next stage of the argument was t~at, assuming the words 
constituted a condition, the condition must be precedent to the 
plaintiff's cause of action according to the following analysis. 
First, there were only two kinds of conditions known to law, 
conditions precedent and subsequent: 
Conditions are either precedent or subse~uent, and acts cannot 
be done uno flatu at the self-same time, but there must be some 
precedency (24). 
Secondly, it was precedent rather than subsequent because, once 
again, there would be no remedy for enforcement of a subsequent 
condition: 
It cannot be taken as a condition subsequent, for then it would 
not-be effectual but void, for the money being once oaid would 
not be brought back again, in the case of non-performance (25). 
This, then, was the traditional approach and foundation of argument, 
and the counsel for the plaintiff, while naturally ooposing the above 
arguments on the facts, did not attempt to challenge the essential frame-
work and classification of conditions. 
First of all, counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the words were 
not fitting to make a condition precedent oer se (26). Of course, as much 
had been virtually admitted by the defendant and, therefore, the second 
submission was that there was no condition precedent to be derived from the 
intention of the parties or the nature of the transaction, but rather that 
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it was purely a question of order of performance, and because of the 
nature of the transaction it was the defendant who should have moved 
first (27). Thirdly, it was submitted that even if the assignment were 
originally a condition nrecedent to the plaintiff's cause of action, it 
was excused by the defendant's conduct as stated in the pleading: 
Serjeant Chesshyre for the plaintiff relied much upon the replication 
of the plaintiff, which, the defendant having demurred to it, must be 
admitted as true. In this replication the plaintiff says, that he 
was ready to assign etc. and requested the defendant to pay the money, 
which the defendant refused. This refusal the serjeant insisted to be 
an absolute refusal, and not a conditional one, viz. unless the judge-
ment was assigned. And this absolute refusal of the defendant to pay 
the money he insisted upon to be a sufficient discharge to the olain-
tiff from preparing the assignment (28). 
Perhaps this outline of the arguments has been rather tedious, but I 
think it demonstrates well the framework within which both sides conceived 
the law to function. Thus, one first asked, was there a condition to a 
cause of action? If so, was it precedent or subsequent? If it was 
precedent, was it excused by the defendant's own conduct? However, no 
doubt to the surprise of all, the court delivered a judgement that broke 
completely new ground. Parker C.J. first succinctly outlined the problem 
in these cases thus: 
The question is, whether the plaintiff's assignment be the first act 
to be done or not. This differs from the other cases, where the time 
and the consideration were mentioned. Here are no words that express-
ly show the priority of the act. The defendant would have assigning 
to be first assigning, and the nlaintiff would have it assigning 
thereupon, that is, after payment. 
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This is supplying words supposed to be understood, for here are 
no express words (29). 
Mow this, of course, presents a keen dilemma for: 
If the plaintiff is to do the first act, then assigning implies a 
deed, he must not only seal it but deliver it too. Fitz-Herb. Action 
79, 3 Cro. 143, Noy 18, Hob. 69. And if he must deliver it, he must 
find the defendant out, so 'tis not in his own power to make it have 
a certain effect: on the other side, if the defendant ~ust do the 
first act, after he has paid the money, he has no remedy to get an 
assignment (30). 
This was the old problem, but the solution now proposed was new. l~e 
have seen that previously a party's performance of his condition precedent 
could be excused by proof that his own complete performance was prevented by 
the defendant, but the solution now was that this process could be short-
circuited, for now neither party's performance need necessarily be prima 
facie precedent or subsequent: 
(W)e are all of opinion, that there is one way that will solve all 
these difficulties and that is, that this assignment shall neither 
precede nor wait, but shall accompany the payment, and both to be done 
at the same time. 
The defendant ought to find out the plaintiff, to tender him the 
money, and at the same time to demand an assignment; and then if the 
plaintiff refuse, the defendant 1t1ill be excused. He is not to tender 
the money absolutely, because he is not bound to pay it absolutely, but 
he is to tender it sub modo, on the same ter~s he is to pay it (31). 
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The argument of the 9efendant that the assignment was a condition 
precedent, because otherwise he would have no remedy, could now be 
convincingly rejected: 
(H)e has the remedy in his own hand, and the money is here his 
security till the assignment; tho' the money be told over by the 
defendant and plaintiff yet it remains still the defendant's 
money, and the plaintiff cannot justify the taking it tho' laid 
on the table (32). 
A shaky foundation was thus laid for the substantive doctrine of 
concurrent conditions, and was somewhat consolidated by two decisions 
following soon after, namely Merrit v. Rane (1721) (33) and Anvert v. 
Ennover (1732) (34) which, though adding little beyond that stated in 
Turner v. Goodwin did add support to that authority and to the concept 
of a concurrent condition by virtue of merely applying the decision (35). 
And yet, while reported by three reporters and apparently of great 
significance, the case of Turner v. Goodwin was not to prove to be a truly 
decisive turning point in the law. Soon after the case was decided, a 
number of similar cases arose which also involved covenants to transfer 
shares. In these cases, the courts again reverted to the condition precedent/ 
independent covenant dichotomy, although it must be admitted that the choice 
between the two seems at times to have been motivated by a desire to do 
justice rather than a strict application of ancient principle. 
For example, in Blackwell v. Nash (1723) (36) the defendant covenanted 
to accept certain shares and pay for the shares, the plaintiff averring a 
personal tender of the shares and a refusal to accept. It would seem that, 
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on the pleadings, the tests in Lancashire v. Killingworth (37) and 
Shales v. Seignoret (38) would have been satisfied and, indeed, the 
court observed that if there were a condition precedent here, it would 
have been satisfied by the tender and refusal. Nevertheless, the court 
now based its decision on an independent interpretation of the covenants. 
The covenant of the plaintiff was given for the covenant of the defendant 
rather than its performance; each had mutual remedies and therefore there 
was no condition precedent. This, of course, was contrary to several 
previous decisions, but the court was prepared to go even further: 
(I)n all these cases the great question is, who is to do the first 
act: but when the transfer is to be upon payment, there is no 
colour to make the transfer a condition precedent (39). 
An independent approach was again adopted by the court in Dawson v. 
Myer three years later, in 1725. In this case the plaintiff brought an 
action of covenant to enforce the covenanted payment of£730-10-0 the 
defendant having covenanted to transfer the produce of £634-7-6 in lottery 
annuities. The company allowed £173-16-0 stock on these annuities and 
when the plaintiff made a tender of this to the defendant in pursuance 
of the agreement, the defendant, perhaps not surprisinyly, refused to 
accept it. The defendant argued that there was no such tender, or at 
least it was insufficient, but the court avoided this by holding, once 
again, that no tender at all was necessary because the covenants were 
mutual and independent. Upon joinder in dumurrer, the Court of King's 
Bench found for the plaintiff: 
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(T)here were mutual covenants, viz. an express covenant from the 
defendant to pay the plaintiff£730-10-0 and then a distinct 
covenant from the plaintiff to transfer the produce of the 
annuities to the defendant; and the covenants therefore being 
mutual, they held that the tender was out of the case and the 
plaintiff was not alleged to answer it, for if the plaintiff did 
not tender, the defendant had his remedy against him for not doing 
it (40). 
Given the existence of the authorities since 1700 that we have been 
examining, this type of approach might well cause some surprise. However, 
the explanation seems fairly simple. The courts were becoming increasing-
ly aware of the performatory proble~s of this type of mutual exchange 
executory contract, and were seeking ways to effect a sens i b 1 e result. It 
seemed incredible that a transferee could escape his contract by refusing 
to accept, and then insisting that such acceptance was a condition 
precedent. True, there was always the possibility of the plaintiff 
proving a tender and refusal, but we have seen that the requirements of 
such proof were so stringent that such a path, at least in the early 
eighteenth century, was fraught with danger. The obvious answer still 
seemed to be to destroy the defendant's contention at the outset by holding 
that there was no such condition precedent, because the covenants were 
independent. One final example will perhaps illustrate this approach. 
In Wyvil v. Stapleton (Shelburne v. Eundem) the defendant covenanted 
to accept shares and pay for them. The defendant did not attend at the 
appointed time, and so the plaintiff sold them to a third party, as he 
had a right to do under the contract, and sued the defendant for the 
deficiency. The defendant objected that his acceptance was a condition 
precedent to the payment. Naturally, this was a defence without merit, 
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since it was he who had caused the non-acceptance. The problem was, 
however, that the plaintiff had not ~roperly pleaded a tender on his 
part. He have seen that in cases such as Shales v. Seignoret (41) 
this had been fatal, but the Court of King's Bench in Hyvil v. Staoleton 
neatly circumvented these problems by holding that the covenants were 
independent: 
The construction the defendant puts upon this covenant is a very 
strange one, for it is no less than to discharge himself of one 
covenant by the breach of the other: it is true, says he, I did 
not accept the stock as I ought to have done, and therefore I am 
discharged from the payment of the money. This is so harsh, that 
if any fairer construction can be made of it, I am sure it 
ought. Now I think the natural import of it to be, that then (i.e. 
the word 1 then 1 ) should not relate to the actual acceptance, but 
only to the time at which he covenants to accept. If so, then as -
there are mutual covenants, the breach is well alleged in non-
payment of the money, and if the plaintiff has failed on his part, 
it will be no excuse here, because the defendant has his action to 
right himself (42). 
To sum up this period of development, we may say this. The courts 
were becoming increasingly burdened with two problems, the solutions to 
each of which were proving to produce inconsistencies in the law when 
viewed as a whole. 
On the one hand, there was the feeling that one party to a contract 
should not usually be able to enforce the performance of the other party 
quite independently of his own performance. If a horse was to be sold 
for £10, the mqney could not be demanded without givin~ up the horse. 
This was the problem reviewed in Thorne v. Thorne and the answer was 
thought to be dependency. 
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On the other hand, there was the problem that if promises were 
dependent it would seem that one party could easily avoid his contract 
by refusing to let the other party perform his condition precedent. 
The approach by the courts to this second problem was not consistent, 
and it is from the differences that most of the confusion emanates. 
One solution was to fall back on the notion of tender, but although 
the equivalence of tender to performance was clearly and convincingly 
established in cases such as Lancashire v. Killingworth (43), the 
requirements to satisfy the notion of tender were of the most stringent· 
nature, and therefore a plaintiff who relied on the doctrine of tender 
was liable to suffer defeat through the most technical of pleading 
points. 
A second possibility was the adoption of a middle way, stipulations 
that were not either dependent or independent in the old categories, but 
nevertheless could be said to be conditions in that the performance of 
one party did depend on the co-operation and requisite degree of con-
current performance by the other. This was the new approach that, as we 
have seen, began to be canvassed in Turner v. Goodwin. 
The point is that such solutions to particular problems were not 
part of one cohesive theory of law, but viere rather a number of disparate 
attempts to deal with a difficult problem. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that despite the learning in such cases as Thorpe v. Thorpe, the courts also 
attempted to use the old doctrine of independency to regulate these 
problems of performance - and thus we have such cases as Blackwell v. Nash 
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and Dawson v. Myer. The problem was, of course, just how to deal with a 
contract the real intent of which was that the parties should perform 
concurrently. But although the beginnings of a solution to this problem 
were in the air, the precise analysis of developments that now is 
possible was, at the time, not clear. And thus we find courts realising 
that there should be 'no colour to make the transfer a condition precedent• 
and yet, by framing this conclusion in the old context of the condition 
precedent/independent covenant dichotomy, all certainty was being lost 
and precedents were becoming increasingly confused and inconsistent. 
With this background in mind, it is not surprising that a new and 
definitive approach should be adopted, and it is to this development 
that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER I I 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF CONCURRENCY 
(A) THE CASE OF KINGSTON v. PRESTO~ 
Kingston v. Preston (44), which was decided in 1773 but did not achieve 
prominence until a manuscri·pt note of it was used by counsel in the subse-
quent case of Jones v. Barkley (45), rerbaps best exemplifies the contrast 
between the old doctrines and the new doctrine of concurrent conditions. 
The facts were that Preston had a large amount of stock in trade and 
covenanted with Kingston to assign it to him and a nominee of Preston at the 
end of one and a quarter years, when deeds of partnership were to be executed 
between Kingston and Preston's nominee. Kingston covenanted that he would 
procure security for the value of the stock before the execution of these 
deeds of partnership but, at the end of the one and a quarter years and 
without doing so, he brought an action of Debt against Preston for not 
transferring the stock. 
It ~muld seem that the question was simply one of dependency or 
independency of covenants and counsel argued along these lines, the 
plaintiff contending that the covenant as to this security was purely 
independent, the defendant replying that it was derendent and hence a 
condition precedent. But Lord r1ansfield seized this opportunity to state, 
(or perhaps, in the light of Turner v. Goodwin, to emphasise and clarify) 
a threefold, rather than a twofold, classification: 
There are three kinds of covenants: 
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(1) Such as are called mutual and independent where either party may 
recover damages from the other, for the injury he may 1ave 
received by a breach of the covenants in his favour, and where 
it is no excuse for the defendant, to allege a breach of the 
covenants on the part of the plaintiff. 
(2) There are covenants which are conditions and dependent, in which 
the performance of one depends on the prior performance of 
another, and, therefore, till this prior condition is performed, 
the other party is not liable to an action on his covenant. 
(3) There is also a third sort of covenants, which are mutual 
conditions to be performed at the same time; and, in these if 
one party was ready, and offered to perform his part, and the 
other neglected, or refused, to perform his, he who \'Jas ready, 
and offered, has fulfilled his engagement, and may maintain an 
action for the default of the other; though it is not certain 
that either is alleged to do the first act (46). 
After making this lucid division, Lord Mansfield stated that the 
classification of covenants depended on the intention of the parties rather 
than a strict construction of the words used, and that in t~e instant case 
the stipulation as to security was a condition precedent,, for it was the 
intention of the parties that the defendant should have security before he 
parted with his stock to a man of straw. 
The precise status and importance of Kingston v. Preston in the develop-
ment of the law has been the subject of some disoute. Some commentators have 
credited the case with great significance while others, notably Dr. Stoljar, 
in his article 11 Dependent and Independent Promises 11 in the Sydney Law Review 
have rather denigrated its importance in the light of other earlier develop-
ments. There is certainly much in what Dr. Stoljar says for, as I hope I have 
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shown, Kingston v. Preston was the logical product or conclusion of a number 
of pressures and developments within the old system. Nevertheless, I think 
it a misplacement of emphasis to say that 1 In view of its actual decision, it 
is curious why Kingston v. Preston should have been credited with a 
revolutionary innovation•, and again 1 All in all, Kingston v. Preston has far 
less analytical merit than has been believed 1 (47). 
l~ith respect, it is my submission that, while the case \'/as not revolution-
ary in the sense that it did not suddenly overturn settled and entrenched 
principles, it nevertheless was of great importance in that it gathered together 
a number of strands of development in the law and fastened them together in a 
clear and cohesive judgement. Certainly we can point to cases and dicta before 
Kingston v. Preston that, if they had been emphasised, could have played a 
decisive role in development, but the point is that it was Lord Mansfield and it 
was Kingston v. Preston that clearly enunciated these principles and furnished 
a clear authority on which, as we shall see, later courts could found a new 
and clear method of interpretation. 
There were actually two important doctrines involved in the case. First, 
the clear threefold classification of conditions and the emphasis on the 
separate status of the concurrent condition. Secondly, the actual result of the 
case was that there was a condition precedent to the defendant 1 s obligation -
the covenants were dependent. The important point here is that there were no 
•words of dependency• present at all with regard to this covenant to provide 
security, not even the much discussed phrases 1 in consideration•, 1EI:.Q_ 1 etc. 
Hitherto, therefore, the case would almost certainly have been decided on the 
basis of mutual remedies and an independent construction adopted, but the 
decision now was that a condition precedent could be implied. 
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Perhaps of even more interest is the subsequent case of Jones v. 
Barkley (1781) where the old and new doctrines are superbly outlined and 
contrasted in the arguments of opposing counsel, the new doctrine of 
concurrent conditions as enunciated by Lord Mansfield being adopted by 
the judges. The defendant promised that, on the plaintiff assigning to 
him an equity of redemption he would pay the plaintiff a certain sum of 
money. The plaintiff tendered a draft of the necessary documents to the 
defendant, who refused to accept them, and the plaintiff brought a 
special action on the case for non-performance of the agreement. Counsel 
for the defendant insisted that the words 1 on 1 or 'upon' made the assign-
ment a condition precedent and, while the performance of a condition 
precedent could in some cases be excused, the plaintiff had not done all 
in his power to perform (he had tendered only drafts, not the actual 
executed documents) relying on such cases as Austin v. Jervoyse (48) and 
Blanford v; Andrews (49). Counsel for the plaintiff presented a twofold 
submission. First, if it were a condition precedent, performance was 
excused by the absolute discharge by the defendant. Secondly, and more 
radically, that there was not a condition precedent here, nor was it a 
purely independent promise, but it was a member of the third class of terms 
propounded in Turner v. Goodwin and Kingston v. Preston, whereupon counsel 
read his manuscript report of Kingston v. Preston. The court found for the 
plaintiff. For example, Buller J. tersely noted: 
In Kingston v. Preston the principle is clearly laid down, that, 
where something is to be performed by each party at the same time, 
he who was ready, and offered to do his part, may sue the other 
for not performing his (50). 
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That this is truly a departure from the old cases is emphasised if we 
briefly advert to the point concerning discharge of conditions. Counsel 
for the defendant relied on such cases as Blandford v. Andrews to show that 
there was not a sufficient performance by the plaintiff here for him to 
rely on a discharge by the defendant. To this Lord Mansfield now replied: 
Take it on th~ reason of the thing. The party must shew he was ready; 
but if the other stops him on the ground of an intention not to per-
form his part, it is not necessary for the first to go farther, and do 
a nugatory act (51). 
This, of course, is not the old doctrine, for hitherto it was necessary 
for the plaintiff to continue to perform, unless the defendant made it 
physically or legally impossible to do so. This statement of Lord Mansfield 
is part and parcel of the new doctrine of concurrent conditions. This is 
made the more stark in the following passage from the judgement of Buller J.: 
The questions on tenders are very different from this. They have arisen, 
not upon what shall excuse, but on what is, a tender. If the party 
pleads a tender, he must prove one. But the decision would have been 
very different in the case of that sort, if there had been any act of 
the one party stated on the record, which had prevented the other from 
making a compleat tender (52). 
This is perhaps one of the most penetrating analyses that I have thus 
far cited in this work. The point is that in those situations in which one 
needed to prove a tender, it must be a complete tender, and hence cases such 
as Blandford v. Andrews were so decided because the tender was incomplete. 
But the position now was that those cases were no longer relevant because it 
is not necessary to prove a tender, for the.decision now was that there may 
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be concurrent conditions rather than the condition precedent upon which the 
requirement of a tender depended. In other words, this new doctrine of 
concurrent conditions did not require actual performance and therefore did 
not require an actual tender, for the concept of a tender had hitherto 
been a mere substitute for performance. 
(B) THE DEVELOPING NATURE OF THE CONCURRENT CONDITION 
We have so far examined the process whereby the interpretation of 
contracts came to depend on what the courts thought was the true intent of 
the transaction rather than an a priori interpretation of the actual words 
used. 
We have also examined the evolution of a new substantive concept, the 
concurrent condition, and the definitive classification of contractual terms 
into the categories of independent promises, conditions precedent and concurrent 
conditions. But this last concept was something quite new and foreign to the 
traditional patterns of contractual thinking, and we have not, as yet, 
examined exactly what the concept of the concurrent condition involved. 
Indeed, despite what might appear to have been a measure of certainty 
introduced by such cases as Kingston v. Preston, within the new framework 
previously examined there was great latitude for skilful counsel to mould 
and shape this new idea (53). 
Such an opportunity soon arose in the case of Phillips v. Fielding, 
decided in 1792, or eleven years after Jones v. Barklev. A copyhold estate 
was sold by auction, and it was stipulated that the purchaser should pay a 
deposit, and sign an agreement for payment of the remainder at a certain time, 
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on having a good title, and that he should have a proper surrender of the 
estate on payment of the remainder of the purchase-money. The vendor 
brought assumpsit for non-performance of this agreement, averring that he 
was ready and willing to make a good title, and frequently offered to do 
so, and to make a proper surrender on payment of the purchase money. 
The traditional defence would have been to argue that the making of 
the estate was a condition precedent to payment, but this would have been 
a bad course for counsel to take in view of the fuen recent decisions in 
favour of concurrent conditions. Nor did counsel for the defendant make 
this mistake. He immediately conceded that the conditions were concurrent, 
but then proceeded to contend that the plaintiff had not sufficiently 
performed his condition (which was ex hypothesi also concurrent) to entitle 
him to his action: 
The promises are to be fulfilled at the same time, each being the 
condition upon which the other is to be performed; and though it is 
not certain that either party is bound to do the first act, yet if 
either would have a remedy at law for the non-performance of the 
other, he must perform his own part; for unless he can shew a 
performance of his part, or an offer to perform and a refusal by 
the other party, he cannot support an action. Instead of this, the 
plaintiff in the present case brings an action against the defendant 
for not doing the first act: he says he has been always ready and 
willing, and frequently offered to 'make out a good title to the 
estate and a proper surrender, on payment of the purchase money'; 
so that the allegation imports that if the defendant had previously 
paid him the money, he would· afterwards have made out a good title, 
thus making payment a condition precedent (54). 
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This argument is brilliant, a fine example of the skill and forensic 
ability often displayed by the Serjeants of the day. The argument admits 
the new status of concurrent conditions, but then emphasises that a con-
current condition is, after all, a condition and, says Serjeant Marshall, 
that must mean a condition to the plaintiff's cause of action, which can 
only be fulfilled by his own performance, or discharge by the defendant. 
Whenever faced with the word 'condition' we must ask, 'condition of what?' 
The answer to this question had been, 'condition of a legal right' - an 
estate or a good cause of action. With the introduction of the concept 
of a concurrent condition, however, came uncertainty, for this was a 
new concept and seemed more related to the regulation of continuing per-
formance under a contract rather than the definition of the point at 
which a party's performance entitled him to a good cause of action. Thus 
the answer seemed now to be, 'condition of each party's performance' 
rather than condition of one party's cause of action. 
This distinction was later to coincide with that between the a priori and 
ex post facto approaches outlined above, but at the time the distinction was 
hazy and unclear. But it is this very lack of clarity that made the Serjeant's 
argument possible, for he now deftly defined concurrent conditions with 
reference to the old system of conditions precedent to a cause of action. 
The conditions were concurrent, said he, but only in the sense that it was 
not defined who was compelled to move first. But if either wished to sue 
the other, then the condition applied to that plaintiff's cause of action, 
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becoming a condition precedent. Thus he had to aver actual performance, or 
at least a tender and discharge. Having laid this foundation, he could 
then skirt completely (in effect) the new doctrine of concurrent conditions 
and get back to the old, strict, doctrine of performance of dependent 
stipulations. Thus: 
The general rule laid down by Lord Holt has never been departed from, 
but in cases which have been afterwards overruled. That rule is, 
that in executory contracts if the agreement be that one shall do an 
act, and for doing it the other party shall pay, etc. the doing the 
act is a condition precedent to the payment, for the party who is to pay 
shall not be compelled to part with his money till the thing be perform-
ed for which he is to pay. Thorpe v. Thorpe (55) Callonel v. Briggs (56) 
... It follows therefore, that though the condition be concurrent, yet if 
either party would bring an action against the other for non-performance, 
he turns his part of the contract into a condition precedent, and he 
must aver performance or a tender and refusal; the reason of which is, 
that when a man undertakes to do a thing, he ought to shew his utmost 
endeavour to do it, and if it be not done, the reason why it is not 
done. 
\~he re upon cases such as Lea v. Exe 1 by ( 57) , Lancashire v. Ki 11 i ngworth 
(58), Large v. Cheshire (59) and Austin v. Jervoise (60) were resuscitated 
and thrown into the fray! In fact, Serjeant Cockell had the answer to this, 
for he rightly stated that 'If it be not certain, which party is to do the 
first act, but both are to do something at the same time, and one refuse to 
do his part, in that case, ·he who was ready and offered to perform his 
part, may maintain an action against the other, according to the mode of 
reasoning adopted in Jones v. Barkley, and Kingston v. Preston.' However, 
the argument for the defendant had been too persuasive, and the court found 
against the plaintiff because he 'had not distinctly averred a sufficient 
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performance of his part of the agreement, by stating an actual surrender to 
the Defendant or a tender and refusal ... 1 (61). 
Clearly, there was some confusion about the nature of concurrent 
conditions, but this was not to be settled in the next case of importa~ce 
which must be mentioned. In Morton v. Lamb (1797) the plaintiff brought 
an action on the case for non-delivery of corn by the defendant, alleging 
that he had always been ready and willing to accept it. The plaintiff 
obtained a verdict at the trial, but the defendant argued in arrest of 
judgement that the plaintiff had said nothing of his own performance, i.e. 
to pay the price. The argument of defendant's counsel, Mr. Holroyd, was 
the same as had proved successful in Phillips v. Fielding: 
The question then comes to this, whether the defendant was bound to 
deliver his corn, the plaintiff not being there ready to pay for it. 
For if not, then it follows, according to all the late determinat-
ions, that he ought to have averred a tender of the price, or that 
he was there ready to pay for it, if the defendant had been there 
ready to receive it, and deliver the corn. And for this purpose 
it is not necessary to show that the tender of the price was a 
condition precedent, strictly so considered; for according to Goodison v. 
Nunn (62) and Kinqston v. Preston, if the acts are concurrent and in 
the nature of the transaction to be done at the same time, before one of 
the parties can maintain an action against the other for the non-
performance of his part, he must aver that he performed or was ready 
to perform everything in his own part. Callonel v. Briggs is in 
POiht··. (63). 
And again this was accepted by the Court, the defendant having 
judgement. Thus Lord Kenyon C.J.: 
- 198 -
The case decided by Lord Holt in Salk. 112 (Callonel v. Briggs), if 
indeed so plain a case wanted that authority to support it, shows 
that where two concurrent acts are to be done, the party who sues 
the other for non-performance must aver that he had performed, or 
was ready to perform, his part of the contract (64) (my underlini~g). 
It must be admitted that the phrase underlined makes the ratio of 
Lord Kenyon a little unclear but it seems fair to say from the context, and 
particularly with regard to the decision requiring strict performance in 
Callonel v. Briggs upon which his Lordship relied, that he meant that actual 
performance or its equivalent, viz. a tender or attendance at an appointed 
place until the last convenient time of day, was required and not merely an 
averment of willingness to perform. 
And Lawrence J., made this requirement of actual performance or 
tender, its legal equivalent, quite explicit: 
The payment of the money was to be an act concurrent with the delivery: 
and then the case is like that of Callonel v. Briggs which was on an 
agreement to pay so much money six months after the bargain, the 
plaintiff transferring stock; and there Lord Holt said, 'If either 
party would sue upon this agreement the plaintiff for not paying, or 
the defendant for not transferring, the one must aver and prove a 
transfer or a tender' .... The tendering of the money by the 
plaintiff makes part of the plaintiff's title to recover, and he 
must set out the whole of his title (65). 
However, despite this rather confused start to the career of the 
concurrent condition the matter was soon to be clarified. In Rawson v. 
Johnson (1801) the buyer again sued the defendant for non-delivery of goods, 
and again merely averred readiness and willingness rather than an actual tender 
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of the price. This time however, the 'ready and willing' clause was 
expressed to pay as well as to receive, and counsel for the plaintiff 
sought to distinguish Morton v. Lamb on the basis that in that case there 
had only been a readiness to receive the goods. But here, an averment of 
readiness to pay was sufficient, for an actual tender was not required 
according to Turner v. Goodwin (66) and Merrit v. Rane (67). 
Mr. Holroyd once again appeared for the defendant, and naturally used 
the ~rguments he had found so successful in Morton v. Lamb. He pointed 
out that in Morton v. Lamb: 
Lawrence J., there said, that the plaintiff must either aver perform-
ance or a tender; and that is the result of all the cases collected 
in the report of that case. 
Mr. Holroyd was also careful to emphasise (very likely with an eye on 
the passage in Lord Kenyon's judgement in Morton v. Lamb noted) that: 
It is different ... where an act is to be done at a particular time 
and place, there if the party does not attend a tender is impossible, 
and therefore not necessary to be shewn; but such non-attendance must 
be pleaded in order to excuse the necessity of the tender (68). 
Yet the decision of the court was now for the plaintiff, it being 
decided that a request to the defendant to deliver, coupled with the 
plaintiff's own readiness and willingness to perform, was quite sufficient. 
As Lord Kenyon C.J. now said: 
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To be sure, under this averment the plaintiffs must have proved that 
they were prepared to tender and pay the money if the defendant had 
been ready to have received it and to have delivered the goods: but 
it cannot be necessary in order to entitle them to maintain their 
action that they should have gone through the useless ceremony of 
laying the money down in order to take it up again (69). 
And Lawrence J. was also able to find for the plaintiff, distinguish-
ing his judgement in Morton v. Lamb on the basis that in that case there 
was only an avernment of readiness to receive, and not, as here, to pay. 
As for his previous statements about tender: 
I alluded there to some cases in order to show that the plaintiff 
must state in his declaration that he was ready to do everything 
that was required on his part to be done; but I did not mean to say, 
nor was the attention of the court called to it, that that averment 
was to be made in any particular form. In the case before the court 
there was no averment whatever of the kind (70). 
But it was Le Blanc J., who had been involved neither in Phillips v. 
Fielding nor in Morton v. Lamb who was to deliver the most penetrating and 
lucid judgement: 
According to the cases which have been determined on this question 
neither of the parties was bound to do the first act or to perform 
his part of the agreement before the other. If so, then neither 
can be bound to state that in pleading which is equivalent to 
performance. Now a tender and refusal has always been deemed to 
be equivalent to performance; therefore as performance in this case 
was not necessary, neither was it necessary to aver that which was 
equivalent to it. But all that is required of the plaintiffs to 
shew is, that they did everything which they were bound in fact 
to do. Then if they shew that they were ready to pay the price 
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provided the defendants were ready to deliver the malt, that is all 
that was necessary for them to do, and consequently their pleading 
a readiness to perform is equivalent to everything that they were 
bound to perform where the defendant refused to perform his part (71). 
It is, of course, possible to find fault with this judgement in the 
light of its apparent inconsistency with the previous cases (72). However, 
although such a comment would be fair in the sense that the case of Morton v. 
Lamb did present rather more difficulty than Le Blanc J. admitted, the 
criticiism does not alter the fact that the judgement was a masterful piece 
of judicial expertise. The judgement is in accord with the whole scheme and 
development of the law that I have attempted to illustrate up to the cases 
of Phillips v. Fielding (which seems a little known decision) and, of course, 
Morton v. Lamb, and since Le Blanc a. was party to neither of these last two 
decisions, it seems pardonable that in his analysis of the true legal position 
he should not have placed undue weight on the momentary uncerta.inty introduced 
by those cases. 
Although we might have reservations about the case, (in particular as 
to the consistency of the judgements of Lord Kenyon C.J. and Lawrence J. 
with their previous pronouncements) the law of conditions of performance now 
seemed to be placed on a firm footing (73). Stipulations could still be 
interpreted as being conditions precedent and, if so, performance or tender, 
its legal equivalent for the purpose, was required. But stipulations could 
also now be conditions concurrent and, if so, commensurately less was 
required to be proved by the plaintiff, it being finally settled in Rawson v. 
Johnson that a readiness to perform coupled with the defendant's knowledge 
of this was sufficient. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have come to the end of the task set at the outset, the 'investigation 
of the early nature of conditions, and the history and development of this 
concept in relation to performance of contract. But the line drawn to curtail 
investigation is something of an arbitrary one, for very much more could be 
said. 
For example, the famous rules in Pordage v. Cole (74), often thought to 
provide the starting point for discussion in this area, have not been 
discussed. However, these comments by Serjeant Williams cover a rather 
different time span than that with which we have been concerned, and merely 
consist of one commentator's summary of some of the relevant cases. For 
various reasons, it seemed better to omit yet another examination of the learn-
ed Serjeant's synthesis and instead devote examination to the original sources 
of the rules. 
Perhaps a more important omission is the case of Boone v. Eyre. This case 
was decided in 1777 and therefore falls within our allotted time span; indeed, 
we have investigated cases connected with other strands of development that 
were decided a few years after this decision. However, it is not proposed to 
examine this decision, for to do so would put the entire modern law of 
contract under examination. In order to clarify this statement, the case 
should perhaps be briefly outlined. 
The plaintifff had conveyed to the defendant the equity of redemption of 
a West Indian plantation, with the negro slaves, for a sum of money and an 
annuity for life. Subsequently, this annuity was not paid and the plaintiff 
brought an action of Covenant on the deed to enforce payment. To this 
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action, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff did not have legal title 
to the negroes and so had not fulfilled a condition precedent, for the 
clause by which the defendant, Eyre, had covenanted to pay the annuity 
stated 'he, the said John Boone, well, truly, and faithfully doing, ful-
filling, and perfonning all and singular the covenants, clauses, recitals 
and agreements in the said indenture contained', Eyre would pay the 
annuity. 
Traditionally the resolution of the case would have turned on the 
status of the words 'doing, performing' etc. Did such words, as a matter 
of law, mean that the performance of all the defendant's stipulations was 
a condition precedent to his cause of action? We have traced the history 
of the courts' interpretation of such phrases and have noted that, well 
before this time, considerations wider than the mere words used could be 
taken into account. Thus we saw in Hayes v. Bickerstaffe that the idea of 
inequality of damages was thought vital, the phrase 'paying and performing' 
being dismissed as words so often inserted in such agreements as to be mere 
clausula clericorum (75). In Boone v. Eyre the words were, of course, of 
a more specifically conditional nature and it was perhaps a moot point, on 
the authorities, whether there was a condition precedent; i.e.-were the 
covenants dependent or independent? Lord Mansfield, however, would have 
nothing of such a process of enquiry, and delivered a judgement which was 
to be cited verbatim in dozens of subsequent cases: 
The distinction is very clear, where mutual covenants go to the whole 
of the consideration on both sides, they are mutual conditions, the 
one precedent to the other. But where they go only to a part, where 
a breach may be paid for in damages, there the defendant has a remedy 
on his covenant, and shall not plead it as a condition precedent. If 
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this plea were to be allowed, any one negro not being the property 
of the plaintiff would bar the action. 
Judgement for the plaintff (76). 
It is, of course, true that this approach was not entirely new, for 
we have already seen that the problem of inequality of damages lay at the 
very heart of the old doctrine of independency, and it may also be pointed 
out that the pronouncement was in line with the general judicial movement 
from a strict 1 words 1 approach to a more flexible approach which took into 
account matters of suitability of remedy and the 'real intention•. However, 
one has only to look to the cases decided in the years following Boone v. 
Eyre to appreciate that that case was treated as establishing a much wider 
proposition or, more correctly, a judicial method of approach, for the 
resolution of performatory problems. Indeed, it is not too much to say that 
this single case forms a vital link between two distinct eras in the law. 
The ascendancy of the modern doctrine of a breach going to the heart of 
the contract and its attendant problems of failure of consideration and 
conditions and warranties over the older, more 1 pure 1 , concepts of conditions 
precedent, subsequent and, more recently, concurrent, can be traced to this 
single case. 
Boone v. Eyre marks the end of a distinct epoch in the law and it is 
that epoch that I have been concerned to examine. The line must be drawn 
somewhere, for if an end could not be reached neither could a ~tart be 
made. As Nicholas Boileau once observed, 1 qui ne sait se borner ne sut 
jamais ecrire 1 • 
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NOTES 
1. 11 The Contractual Concept of Condition 11 [1953] 69 L.Q.R. 485 at 486 ff. 
2. A.L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, West, St. Paul 1960 Vol. 3A, s.627. 
3. See the treatments in 3 Comyns Dig. 87; 5 Viner's Abr. 40 FE; 
2 Bacon's Abr. 103 ff.; Co. Litt. 201 A ff. 
4. These were not recognized as enforceable until the mid-sixteenth 
century, see post, Part II Chapter 3. 
5. Two reasons the historian would advance for the advent of conditions 
such as rent in addition to traditional feudal service might be the 
use of mercenaries by the king replacing the need for service with a 
need for money, and the advent of a money economy. 
6. Co. Litt. 201 A. 
7. The question sometimes arose whether a grant (as distinct from a 
contract to transfer) of land could actually be made with a condition 
precedent. Thus it was sometimes said that an inferior estate, for 
example a life estate, could be granted to A with a condition precedent 
that if condition X were performed, A would have the fee. This 
raised numerous and complicated problems concerning seisin, necessity 
for ceremonial transfer and distinction between various types of 
estates and leases all of which, fortunately, need not be examined here. 
Co. Litt. 216 A ff.; 2 Bacon Abr. 123 ff.; 3Com. Dig. 95 ff.; 
Colthirst v. Bejuskin (1552) Plowd. 21 at 34 and cases referred to at 
34, n (m); 75 E.R. 33 at 56. 
8. And see 5 Vin. Abr. 76 pl. 26 for another illustration, though perhaps 
a controversial one. 
9. H.W. Challis, Law of Real Property, Butterworths, London (2nd ed.) 
1892' 191. 
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10. I use the term 'estate' here rather loosely. 
11. Still of importance, Hall v. Busst (1960) 104 C.L.R. 206. For 
contemporary expositions, see Stukeley v. Butler (1614) Hob. 168, 
80 E.R. 316; 2 Bae. Abr. 130; Co. Litt. 222b ff. 
12. Supra, n.8. 
13. R.E. Megarry and H.lLR. Wade, The Law of Real Property Stevens, London 
2nd ed. 1957, 74. 
14. Co. Litt. 223 a; see 223b, 224 for the necessary incidents of estates 
tail and the matters which the parties could settle between themselves 
by private contract. See also 2 Bae. Abr. 130. 
15. 3 Leon. 58; 74 E.R. 539. 
16. Co. Litt. 206 a. 
17. Co. Litt. 214 a. 
18. Pollex. 70; 86 E.R. 515. See also Machel v. Dunton (1586) 2 Leon. 27; 
74 E.R. 235; Moodie v. Garnance (1615) 2 Bulst. 153, 81 E.R. 131; 
Egerton v. Brownlow (1853) 4 H.L.C. l, 10 E.R. 359. 
19. 2 Bacon Abr. 108. This is stated in the context of personal contracts, 
but it was undoubtedly a rationale of general application when a grant 
of land was made for valuable consideration and conditions rather than 
question of limitntion were in issue. See Lofield's Case (1612) 10 
Co. 106 a at 106 b, 77 E.R. 1086 at 1087; Hill v. Grange (1555) Plowd. 
164, 75 E.R. 253; Bullen v. Denning (1826) 5 B. & C. 842 at 850, 108 
E.R. 313 at 316; Neill v. Duke of Devonshire (1882) L.R. 8 A.C. 135 at 
149; Savill Brothers Ltd. v. Bethell (1702) 2 Ch. 523 at 537. 
Care must be taken not to state the principle too broadly though, 
lest one forget the perilous areas of presumption in favour of resulting 
trusts and distinctions such as that between reservations and exceptions. 
However such technicalities may be left to the text books on Real Property; 
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the proposition stated in the text is correct in its application to 
conditions subsequent which defeat vested estates. See also S.M. Leake, 
An Elementary Digest of the Law of Property in Land Stevens, London 
(2nd ed. by A.E. Randall) 1909, 178. 
20. (1853) 4 H.L.C. 1 at 144, 10 E.R., 359 at 417. For similar exposition 
of the position in the United States see 3 Corbin S.635 (p.534) and 
particularly the case of Hague v. Ahrens there cited. 
21. Pollex 70 at 75; 86 E.R. 515 at 518. And see Co. Litt. 204 a. 
22. Co. Litt. 203 a. 
23. Ibid. It was a much debated question whether an actual clause of 
re-entry had to be given or if a stipulation that the estate would be 
void on a given event was enough to give title to enter. Se 5 Vin. Abr. 
48. 
24. 5 Vin. Abr. 42 ff.; Co. Litt. 204 a. 
25. Co. Litt. 203 b. 
26. Co. Litt. 203 b. 
27. See 2 Bae. Abr. 117 ff. 
28. I Plowd. 60 at 67; 75 E.R. 96 at 107. 
29. Cro. Eliz. 657; 78 E.R. 876. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Anon. (1538) Dyer 19 A pl. 110; 73 E.R. 40; Anon. (1649) March 9 pl. 
22; 82 E.R. 388; Bush v. Coles (1692) Carth 232; 90 E.R. 739; Shower 
388; 89 E.R. 657; 1 Salk 196; 91 E.R. 176 and authorities collected 
therein. Cf. Anon. (1571) Leon. 15; 74 E.R. 511: 'A made a lease to B 
for life, and further grants unto him, that it shall be lawful for 
him to take fuel upon the premises; proviso, that he do not cut any 
great trees; it was holden by the Court that if the lessee cutteth 
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any great trees; that he shall be punished in waste: but in such 
case, the lessor shall not re-enter because that proviso is not 
a condition, but only a declaration and exposition of the extent 
of the grant of the lease in that behalf'. But contrast Anon. 
(1562) Moore (K.B.) 49; 72 E.R. 430. 
33. Supra, n.32. 
34. 2 Dyer 221 b; 73 E.R. 490, see n (A) at 221 b, 490 for other 
reports. I think Oyer is to be preferred. 
35. This case is outlined in Browning v. Beston (1552) l Plowd. 131 
at 135; 75 E.R. 202 at 208. 
36. And see V. Vin Abr. 45: 'Proviso added in the end of a covenant 
extends only to defeat the same covenant, unless there are words 
quod tune the grant shall be void. But proviso put absolute in a 
deed, without dependance upon any particular covenant or except-
ion, is to be construed for condition to all the estate. Agreed 
by all the justices. Mo. 106. pl. 249 Mich. 17 and 18 Eliz. in 
Andrews Case 1 • 
37. For a good example of the application of this strict separation 
of the two concepts of covenant and condition see Michell v. 
Dunton (1587) Owen 54; 74 E.R. 894. 
38. Popham III; 79 E.R. 1223; Cro. Eliz. 384; 78 E.R. 630; Gould. 130; 
75 E.R. 1044. 
39. Cro. Eliz. 385; 78 E.R. 631. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
Popham 118; 
Popham 119; 
Cro. Eliz. 
Poph. 118; 
Poph. 117; 
79 E.R. 1224-. 
79 E. R. 1225. 
386; 78 E.R. 631. 
79 E. R. 1224. 
79 E. R. 1224. 
45. l Dyer 7 b; 73 E.R. 15. 
46. Dyer 6 b; 73 E.R. 16. 
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47. For example, Browning v. Beston (1552) l Plowd. 131; 75 E.R. 202. 
See too, Archdeacon v. Jennor (1597) Cro. Eliz. 605; 78 E.R. 847: 
The case was, one made a lease for years the lessor covenanted 
that the lessee should have house-bate, hay-bote, and plow-
bote, without coJT11llitting any waste, upon pain of forfeiture 
of the lease: whether this were a condition? was the question. 
Anderson (J.) The covenant is not more than what the law 
appoints, and therefore vain; and so all what is subsequent 
is vain - quad Beaumont (J.) agreed. 
Walmsley (J.) It is a covenant on the part of the lessor; 
and therefore it cannot be a condition. 
48. Thus 5 Vin. Abr.: 
Note, for law, that proviso semper put upon the part of the 
lessee upon the words habendum, makes a condition. But 
contra of a proviso (to be performed) of the part of the 
lessor. Br. Condition, pl. 195 cites 35 H. 8. 
As it is covenanted in the indenture, that the lessee shall 
make reparation, provided always, that the lessor shall find 
the great timber. This is no condition. IbiQ_, 
49. 2 Bulst. 290; 80 E.R. 1129; Cro. Jae. 388; 79 E.R. 340. 
In fact the bulk of authority had come to favour Fitzherbert 
J. 's opinion well before this. See the authorities listed 
in the reports to Hhitchcocke v. Fox and also Thor.ias and l~ard's 
Case (1589) l Leon. 245; 74 E.R. 224; Alfa and Dennis v. Henning 
(1610) Owen 151; 74 E.R. 967 and the majority in Pembrook v. 
Barkley (1595) supra. 
50. Popham 118; 79 E.R. 1125. 
51. 2 Co. Rep. 69 bat 70 b; 76 E.R. 574 at 577. 
52. For a further example of a terse set of rules being laid down by a 
Court, see Ayer v. Orme (1562) 2 Dyer 221 b; 73 E.R. 490. 
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For further expositions, see II Bae. Abr. p. 340; V. Vin. Abr. 
I 
p.47; Co. Ltt. 203b; Scott v. Scott (1586) 2 Leon. 128, 3 Leon. 
225, 4 Leon. 70; 74 E.R. pp.415, 648, 736; Pembrook v. Barkley 
(1595) Popham 116; 79 E.R. 1223 but especially Gould. 130 at 131; 
75 E.R. 1044; Andrews v. Blunt (1571) 3 Dyer 311 A; 73 E.R. 704; 
Hayward v. Fulcher (1627) Palm. 491; 81 E.R. 1186. 
53. Moo. K.B. 280; 72 E.R. 489. 
54. Text at n. 33. See also Hollis v. Carr (1675) 2 Mod. 86; 86 
E.R. 956, and the case in Rolle Abr. 518, referred to by counsel 
ibid. 
55. 9 B. & C. 505; 109 E.R. 188. 
One of the earliest cases on this point seems to be Darfoot and 
Treswell and Picard (1675) 3 Keb 465; 84 E.R. 826; for a 
discussion of the authority of this case, see Farrall v. 
Hilditch (1859) 5 C.B. (N.S.) 840; 141 E.R. 337. 
See also Saltoun v. Houston (1824) l Bing 433; 130 E.R. 174; 
~ v. Mattram (1865) 19 C.B. (N.S.) 479; 144 E.R. 874; 
Knight v. Gravesend & Milton \~aterworks ( 1857) 2 H. 8t N. 6; 
157 E.R. 3. 
56. The principle \llas very early established. See Co. Litt. 139 b; 
Reade v. Bullocke (1543) l Dyer 57A; 73 E.R. 125; Swan v. Strarsham 
(1565) 3 Dyer 257A; 73 E.R. 570; Nape's Case (1598) 4 Co. 80 a; 76 
E.R. 1056; Holder v. Taylor (1613) Hob. 12; 80 E.R. 167. 
57. Cro. Jae. 73; 79 E.R. 62. 
58. For an illustration from a slightly different context which 
points up this intimate connection of covenant and estate, see 
Bishop and Redmans Case (1583) l Leon. 277; 74 E.R. 252. 
59. Williams v. Burrell (1845) l C.B. 407 at 429; 135 E.R. 596 at 607. 
60. 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law p. 31. 
61. Plucknett, A Concise Hist-0ry of the Common Law p. 540. 
62. (1828) 8 B. & C. 308 at 315; 108 E.R. 1057 at 1060. 
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63. Co. Litt. p. 204 a. 
64. Cro. Eliz. 242; 78 E.R. 498. 
65. Cro. Car. 129; 79 E.R. 713. 
66. 4 Leon. 50; 74 E.R. 722. 
67. See Proctor v. Johnson (1609) 2 Brown 1. 212; 123 E.R. 903 
and the cases referred to therein. 
68. Style 387; 82 E.R. 800. 
69. Style 406; 82 E.R. 816. 
70. Cf. Harrington v. Wise (1596) Cro. Eliz. 486; 78 E.R. 737; 
Allen v. Babbington (1666) 1 Sid. 280; 82 E.R. 1105. 
71. 1 Freem. 194; 89 E.R. 138. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Owen 54; 74 E.R. 894 at 895. 
74. 1 Freem. 189; 89 E.R. 138. 
75. E.g. Warren v. Asters {1681) Jones, T. 205; 84 E.R. 1219; 
Mucklestone v. Thomas (1739) Willes 146; 125 E.R. 1103; 
Dawson v. Dyer (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 584; 110 E.R. 906; 
Edge v. Boileau (1885) 16 Q.B. 120. 
76. E.g. Kay J. in Bastin v. Bidwell (1881) 18 Ch. D. 228 at 245: 
'I confess that I have some difficulty about this case, for 
this reason: If they were not conditional words, what was 
the effect of them? The lessee had previously entered into 
certain covenants in that lease, and if those words were 
merely a repetition of the covenants, then it seems to me 
they had no effect whatever'. 
77. 2 Bacon Abr., p. 108. See too, 5 Yin. Abr. p. 67 where, amidst 
discussion of real property law, there is the heading 'To what 
Things Conditions may be annexed (And How. pl. 1) 1 under which 
it is noted: 4. A Contract May Be Upon Condition. 44 E. 3 28. 
As in Debt for a house sold to the Defendant for£10 who said that it 
was sold for£10 and that the Plaintiff should pull it down and carry 
it to him, and that then he would pay the £10 and said that he was at 
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all times ready to pay in case the other would pull it down and carry 
it, by which the other said that the Bargain was simple, and the other 
E Contra. Br. Conditions, pl. 28. cites 44 E. 3 27, 28. 
78. 3 Com. Dig. 92. 
79. 2 Bae. Abr. 121. 
80. Williston On Contracts, 3rd edn. sect. 666. 
81. 3 Corbin On Contract, p. 510. 
82. Supra 2 Bae. Abr., p. 108. 
83. Edgecomb v. Dee (1670) Vaughan 89 at 101; 124 E.R. 984 at 990. An inter-
esting, but belated, protest against the relentless advance of Assumpsit 
after Slade's Case. 
84. Though, of course, there might well be an action of Debt or Covenant for 
the price or performance of consideration, the executed, non-conditional, 
estate could not be divested. 
85. 7 Co. 9b at lOb; 77 E.R. 425 at 427; and see the references there given. 
86. Hob. 37 at 41; 80 E.R. 189 at 190. 
87. 5 Co. Rep. 78b; 77 E.R. 174. 
See also Lovelace v. Reignalds (1597) Cro. Eliz. 563; 78 E.R. 807; 
Griffith v. Williams (1739) Say. 56; 96 E.R. 801; 
Kirchin v. Knight (1748) 1 Wils. 253; 95 E.R. 603; 
Waring v. Griffith (1758) 1 Burr. 441; 97 E.R. 392 and the 
cases there collected. 
88. e.g. Bragg v. Nightingall (1649) Style 140; 82 E.R. 594; Smith v. 
Cudworth (1692) 1 Show. 390; 89 E.R. 659. 
89. Sty. 187; 82 E.R. 633. 
90. Ld. Raym. 124; 91 E.R. 980. 
91. Supra (1675) 1 Freem. 194; 89 E.R. 138. 
92. Owen 54; 74 E.R. 894. 
93. Chitty On Contract 22nd edn. sect. 18 p.11. 
94. 1 Plowd. 300; 75'E.R. 457. 
95. Pollock On Contracts 13th edn. p. 110. 
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96. Sutton and Shannon On Contracts 5th edn. by K. \•ledderburn. 
97. Holdsworth's statement is clearly to be preferred: 
In the Middle Ages the action of covenant, as thus developed 
so as to remedy the breach of any agreement entered into by 
writing under seal, was a more purely contractual action than 
any other known to English law. By means of it alone could 
unliquidated damages be got for breach of an executory contract. 
It is therefore an important action because it helped to familiar-
ize English lawyers with the idea of contract. As we shall now 
see, debt was not properly a contractual action at all; and, 
owing to the limitations upon its scope which arose from this 
cause, and to other disadvantages from which it suffered, it was 
a very inadequate remedy for the enforcement of contracts ... 
History of English Law, 4th edn. p.d20. 
98. The basic threefold classification adopted is Professor Corbin's. 
As an examination of the abstract concepts of intention and con-
struction is only undertaken here in order to provide a foundation 
on which to proceed, I adopt Professor Corbin's basic terminology, 
with which I fully agree, rather than put forward a new system 
merely for the sake of being different. See also, Patterson 
'Constructive Conditions in Contracts' (1942) 42 Col. L.R. 903. 
99. Corbin On Contracts, Vol. 3 A, sect. 534. 
100. Ibid. 
1. Ibid. 
2. 3 Lev. 41; 83 E.R. 567. 
For similar cases where this factor of inequality was no doubt 
important see: Shower v. Cudmore (1682) Jones T. 216; 84 E.R. 
1224; Smith v. Cudworth (1692) Show. 390; 89 E.R. 659. 
3. (1649) Style 187 at 188; 82 E.R. 633 at 633. It should be emphasised, 
though perhaps ex abundanti cautela, that this principle of mitigation 
was of limited scope. What was being taken into account in computation 
of the plaintiff's damages was not a set-off due to his own breach of 
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covenant, but rather a considera~ion of all the facts (i.e. that in 
fact there were no soldiers raised) to compute damages. In this 
aspect, the fact that the plaintiff had covenanted as regards this 
fact was really irrelevant. 
4. Plowd. 145; 75 E.R. 223. 
5. 5 Co. 54b at 55a; 77 E.R. 137 at 138. See also the opinion of Robert 
Brook C.J., (dissenting on the point) in Throckmerton v. Tracy (1554) 
Plowd. 145; 75 E.R. 223 (supra). 
6. Cro. Jae. 645; 79 E.R. 556. 
7. 3 Leon. 219; 74 E.R.; affirming the Court of Common Pleas. sub nom 
Broccus 1 s Case (1587) 2 Leon. 211; 74 E.R. 486. 
8. Willes 496 at 497; 125 E.R. 1286 at 1287. 
9. Willes 416 at 419; 125 E.R. 1286 at 1288. 
It is interesting to compare this case with the earlier case of 
Mucklestone v. Thomas (1739) Willes 146; 125 E.R. 1103, and, of 
course, with the case of Hayes v. Bickerstaffe discussed supra. 
In Mucklestone v. Thomas, the defendant had covenanted to repair the 
premises he leased, but the deed went on to state: 1 5000 slates being 
found and delivered on the said premises ... (by the plaintiff) for 
and towards the repairing thereof 1 • The court did not find it 
necessary to decide the point, but they did express the opinion 
that these words •ought rather to be considered as a covenant than 
a condition precedent•. The form of the argument in this case is 
quite consistent with cases such as Thomas v. Cadwallader, and the 
opinion expressed as to the status of the stipulation is obviously 
to be explained by the particular facts of the case. It may well be, 
for example, that the covenant to repair extended to a number of 
things, the slates to be supplied being needed for only one of these 
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things. As stated in Thomas v. Cadwallader, the reason for finding 
a condition precedent in such cases was that the facts showed that 
the stipulation necessarily qualified a covenant. But if the 
facts were otherwise, as was probably the case, it was in keeping 
with contemporary authority to find that a covenant was intended, 
especially after.cases such as Hayes v. Bickerstaffe had emphasised 
the more flexible method of interpretation with reference to 
considerations such as suitability of remedies and inequality of 
damages. For more on this, see post. 
10. Y.B. 15 Hen. VII, fol. lOb., plac. 7 (Translated by Langdell). The 
decision in Clark v. Gurnell (1611) 1 Bul. 167; 80 E.R. 858 in 
favour of dependency might also thought to be relevant. However, 
this case involved the actual wording of the defendant 1 s covenant 
(payment pro tota transfretatione omnium praemissarum) rather than the 
interpretation of a word such as .P.!:Q_, and is therefore not a strong 
authority. 
11. 7 Co. Rep. 9b; 77 E.R. 425. It should perhaps be noted that the 
court may have misinterpreted the case of Pool v. Tolcelser, see the 
observation of Lord Holt in Thorp v. Thorp (1701) 8 Mod. 456 at 461; 
88 E.R. 1448 at 1451. Nevertheless, the important point is that the 
court in Ughtred 1 s Case did understand the case to stand for such a 
doctrine and did approve of the doctrine. 
12. (1639) 1 Rolle 1 s Abr. 415, plac. 8. 
13. Wms. Saund. 318 at 320; 85 E.R. 449 at 450. 
It should perhaps be noticed that Dr. Stoljar thought that the basis 
of this decision was not clear, and that perhaps it went on the rule 
of construction that where a certain day is fixed for the performance 
of a covenant, that covenant is independent of the consideration for 
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it. ('Dependent and Independent Promises•, 2 Sydney L.R. 217 at 
228). With the greatest respect, it is submitted that while such 
a rule undoubtedly existed, it is quite clear from the extract 
from Saunders (supra) and also the reports in 1 Levinz 274 and 
Sir T. Raym. 183 that it was clearly thought that the issue of 
availability of remedies was sufficient to decide the case. 
For a further illustration of the crucial importance of the 
availability of remedies, see Lock v. Wright (1723) 1 Str. 569; 
93 E.R. 703 where the defendant had judgement precisely because 
the deed was a deed poll and so mutual remedies were not available. 
14. 1 Str. 535; 93 E.R. 684. 
15. 8 Mod. 173; 88 E.R. 127. 
16. 1 Str. 615; 93 E.R. 735. For discussion of this case, see Part III, 
Chapter 1 post. 
17. 2 Str. 712; 93 E.R. 801. 
18. This problem of the offer to perform and tender will be discussed 
post, Part III, Chapter 1. 
19. Dawson v. Myer (1726) 2 Str. 712; 93 E.R. 801. _ 
20. Pecke v. Redman 2 Dyer 113 A; 73 E.R. 249. However, the facts of 
this case are rather unclear and I am not at all confident that 
the case does stand as authority for the proposition for which 
it is often cited. 
However, Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law relies on 
the case, inter alia, and states, at p.340, that 'the note of a 
reporter (i.e. in Strangborough v. Warner) in 1589, that a promise 
against a promise will maintain an action upon the case was remarkable 
not as a novelty but as the belated recognition of a fait accompli'. 
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21. 4 Leon 3; 74 E.R. 686. 
However, Professor H.R. Li.icke has discovered a case, l~Jest v. Stowel 
(1577) 2 Leo. 154; 74 E.R. 437, which is indeed an earlier decision 
based on mutual remedies. 'Slade's Case and the Origin of the 
Common Counts' (1965) 81 L.Q.R. at 539. This case will be described 
post, in part B of this Chapter. 
22. See, for examples, Kirby v. Coles (1589) Cro. Eliz. 137; 78 E.R. 384, 
Whitcalfe v. Jones (1597) Moore K.B. 575; 72 E.R. 768 Gower v. Capper 
(1597) Cro. Eliz. 543; 78 E.R. 790, Wicals v. Johns (1599) Cro. Eliz. 
103; 78 E.R. 938, Bettisworth v. Campion (1608) Yelv. 133; 80 E.R. 90, 
Nicols v. Raynbred (1614) Hob. 83; 80 E.R. 238, Flight v .. Crasden (1625) 
Cro. Car. 8; 79 E.R. 612. 
23. Yelv. 133; 80 E.R. 90. 
24. (1670) l Lev. 293; 83 E.R. 913. 
25. Hob. 88; 80 E.R. 238. 
26. 'Dependent and Independent Promises', 2 Syd. L.R. at 217. 
27. Ibid. 
28. See, for example, R.F.C. Milsom Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 
Chapter 12. 
29. See also on this point, H.R. U.icke, 'Slade's Case and the Origin of the 
Common Counts' (1965) (pt. 1) 81 L.Q.R. at 425, 426. 
30. R.F.C. Milsom Historical Foundations of the Common Law, p. 295. 
31. R.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, p. 288. 
32. Supra, 4 Leon. 3; 74 E.R. 686. 
33. History of the Common Law, Vol. III p.444. 
34. A dictum in Norwood v. Read (1558) 1 Plowd. 180; 75 E.R. 277. 
35. 'The Place of Slade's Case in the History of Contract' 74 L.Q.R. 
381 at 390. 
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36. This statement is generally true, but there may be an exception. 
The well known exception to the requirement of actual e~ecution 
of a promise in the action of Debt is to be immediately noted 
(th1s page) and more fully post. It may be, therefore~ 
that before Slade's Case one could not bring an assumpsit on the 
executory sale of a specific chattel - because Debt was available. 
If so, Slade's Case certainly removed this difficulty and there-
fore was directly responsible for an at least partial expansion 
of the doctrine of enforceable mutual promises. 
37. Supra, (1557) Plowd. 180; 75 E.R. 277. 
38. With respect, I think that Professor Ames has summed this up as 
well as anybody: 
From the mutuality of the obligations growing out of the parol 
bargain without more, one might be tempted to believe that the 
English Law had developed the consensual contract more than a 
century before the earliest reported case of assumpsit upon 
mutual promises. But this would be a misconception. The 
right of the buyer to maintain detinue, and the corresponding 
right of the seller to sue in debt, were not conceived of by 
the medieval lawyers as arising from mutual promises, but as 
resulting from reciprocal grants - each party's grant of a 
right forming the quid pro guo for the corresponding duty of 
the oth,er. Lectures on Legal History, p. 77. 
39. 4 Co. Rep. 92 b at 94 A; 76 E.R. 1074 at 1077. 
40. See too, A.K.R. Kiralfy, The Action on the Case, pp. 166, 167. 
41. 81 L.Q.R. 422, 539; 82 L.Q.R. 81. 
42. 81 L.Q.R. at p. 540. 
43. Cro. Eliz. 703; 78 E.R. 938. 
44. 81 L.Q.R. at p.541. 
45. Ye 1 v. 133; 80 E. R. 90. 
46. 1 Lev. 293; 83 E.R. 913. 
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47. l Lev. 87 at 88; 83 E.R. 311 at 311. 
48. Thus, see Gower v. Capper (1597) Cro. Eliz. 543; 78 E.R. 790; 
Spanish Ambassador v. Gifford (1616) l Rolle 336; 81 E.R. 526; 
Thorp 1 s Case (1639) March, N.R. 75; 82 E.R. 418; Olive v. Yeames 
(1652) Keb. 333, 342; 83 E.R. 977, 983 (and see sub nom. Oliver v. 
Evens l Lev. 70; 83 E.R. 301). 
49. op. cit. 81 L.Q.R. at p. 542. 
50. 2 Leon 154; 74 E.R. 437. 
51. 81 L.Q.R. at p. 540. 
52. (1681) 3 Lev. 41; 83 E.R. 567. 
53. Yelv. 133; 80 E.R. 00. 
54. Hob. 88; 80 E.R. 238. 
55. 1 Dependent and Independent Promises•, 2 Syd. L.R. at p.227. 
56. Discussed supra (1670) 1 Lev. 293; 83 E.R. 413. 
57. Supra, Part II at n.37. 
58. History of English Law, Vol. 3 p.355. 
59. Y.B. 17 Ed. IV. Pasch f. 1 pl. 2. Translated in Fifoot, 
History and Sources of the Common Law, p.252. 
60. (1470) Selden Society Vol. 47, p.163; Fifoot,, op. cit., p.251. 
61. Ibid. 
62. 1 Dyer 29 b; 73 E. R. 65. 
63. It is perhaps not necessary to give these details, but as the case is 
a rather difficult one to understand on a first reading they are 
briefly given so that the ground may be cleared for the point with 
which we are concerned. 
64. Dyer 75 a. at 76 a; 73 E.R. 160 at 162. 
65. Supra, Part II Chap. I. 
66. Hob. 39 at 41; 80 E.R. 189 at 190. 
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67. Supra. 
68. Post, at n. 71. 
69. I Freem. 196; 89 E.R. 139. 
70. Perhaps this thought is supported by a matter which Professor Lucke 
himself explores (though in a different context), the sixteenth 
century reforms of the law relating to jeofails and mispleadings. 
As the learned writer states, at p. 557 of 81 L.0.R., the statute of 
1540 attacked in stringent terms the practice of overturning juries• 
verdicts on technical grounds, and exhorted the courts against this 
practice. Professor Lacke also points out that the statute 
received a liberal construction by the courts. In the light of all 
this, it may well be that the courts were well disposed towards using 
technicalities to defeat technicalities. 
71. Supra, at n. 68. 
72. 2 Mod. 33 at 34; 86 E.R. 925. 
73. Supra, Part II, Chapter II. Sty. 187; 82 E.R. 633. 
74. 2 Mod. 34; 86 E.R. 925. 
75. 81 L.Q.R. at 542. 
76. 1 Lev. 152; 83 E.R. 344. Contrast the decision in Doctor Samways v. 
Eldsby (1676) 2 Mod. 73; 86 E.R. 949. 
77. 2 Wms. Saund. 350 at 352; 85 E.R. 1144 at 1146. Rainsford J. agreed 
with Hale C.J. but Twysden J. held that the promises were independent, 
each having a remedy. Although the majority were thus in favour of 
there being a condition precedent, in the event the case was decided 
in favour of the plaintiff because his averment that 1 he was ready 
and offered to perform etc. 1 was a sufficient averment of performance 
or attempted performance, see~. Part III Chapter 1. 
78. Numerous reports are available. For example, 1 Salk, 171; 91 E.R. 
157; l Ld. Raym. 662; 92 E.R. 722; l Com. 98; 92 E.R. 980. The report 
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in 12 Mod. 455; 88 E.R. 1448 is, however, the most complete and will 
be referred to here. 
79. 12 Mod. 456; 88 E.R. 1448. 
80. 12 Mod. 459; 88 E.R. 1450. 
81. It must be conceded that a number of commentators do not share my 
view of the nature or importance of this decision. Dr. Stoljar, 
for example, in his article 'Dependent and Independent Promises' 
already referred to stated that in a 'period of total confusion', 
'the existing state of conceptual disorganization is best 
exemplified in Thorp v. Thorp'. With respect, I must disagree. 
Perhaps Dr. Stoljar's opinion is, however, partially due to his 
interpretation of the facts of this case which, with the very 
greatest respect, appears to me to be incorrect. The learned author 
states, at 2 Sydney L. Rev. 237, that the plaintiff's argument was 
that 'A could sue B on mutual promises only where these promises were 
both independent and unperformed, but that A could not perform his 
promise and still claim that the promises were independent. Once A's 
promise was performed he could only recover provided he fully averred 
performance in the same way as if the mutual promises had originally 
been dependent'. Dr. Stoljar then observes that Holt C.J. accepted 
this argument, and proceeded from there. With respect, the argument 
was of a much more narrow and precise nature than this, and was as I 
have outlined it in the text. It turned on the interpretation of a 
specific release clause. Holt C.J. held that it would apply to all 
causes of action perfect before the release was executed but not those 
after. Therefore, the question was, was there a condition precedent 
to a perfect cause of action here? 
82. 12 Mod. 460; 88 E.R. 1451. 
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83. It may be tentatively submitted that original inspiration for this 
idea is to be found in the early executory remedies of Debt and 
Detinue in the sale of goods situation, discussed supra, part II, 
Chapter III. In any case, as Dr. Stoljar observed in the article 
already referred to, the application of such rules to contracts 
was not new, having been mentioned, for example, in the cases of 
Oliver v. Eames (1662), l Keb. 342; 83 E.R. 933 and Peeters v. Opie 
(1671) 2 Wms. Saund 350; 85 E.R. 1144. The rules were later to 
become famous through their incorporation in Serjeant Williams' 
'Rules in Pordage v. Cole'. 
It seems clear that Holt C.J. did not mean that the rules were to 
be of an inflexible nature, but only as a guide to the parties' 
intention. As Jervis C.J. was to observe many years later, 'But, 
after all, that rule only professes to give the result of the 
intention of the parties: and where, on the whole, it is apparent 
that the intention is that that which is to be done first is not 
to depend upon the performance of the thing that is to be done 
afterwards, the parties are relying on their remedy, and not on the 
performance of the condition; but where you plainly see that it is 
their intention to rely on the condition and not on the remedy, the 
performance of the thing is a condition precedent' (Roberts v. Brett 
(1856) 18 C.B. 561, 573; 139 E.R. 1489, 1494). 
84. 12 Mod. at 464; 88 E.R. at 1453. 
85. There was the further point that the plaintiff had not specifically 
pleaded the execution of the release, but only pleaded generally the 
performance of his obligations. This would have been fatal on demurrer, 
but as the defendant had 'pleaded over' (i.e. pleaded with regard to 
the effect of the release rather than its execution), this was taken 
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after verdict, to be an admission of the execution of the release. 
This rule seems to have been already well established: see, in par-
ticular, Vivian v. Shipping (1634) Cro. Car. 384; 79 E.R. 935. 
86. Holt, K.B. 148; 90 E.R. 980. 
87. 1 Salk, 112; 91 E.R. 104. 
88. For example, Lord Hardwicke was later to say that '(T)here can be 
no condition precedent here, for the reasons given; and the resolut-
ion in Thorpe v. Thorpe is certainly good law; for these cases do 
not so much depend on the manner of penning the covenants as the 
nature of them .... 1 (Russen v. Coleby (1733) 7 Mod. 236; 87 E.R. 
1213) And Lord Kenyon was later to say of Callonel v. Briggs, 
'The case decided by Lord Holt in Salk 112, if indeed so plain a 
case wanted that authority to support it, shews that where two 
concurrent acts are to be done, the party who sues the other for 
non-performance must aver that he had performed, or was ready to 
perform, his part of the contract'. (Morton v. Lamb (1797) 7 T.R. 
125 at 129; 101 E.R. 890 at 892. See discussion post, Part III 
Chapter II). 
89. (1773) 2 Doug. 690; 99 E.R. 437. 
90. 2 Syd. L.R. at 234. 
91. Yelv. 76; 80 E.R. 53. 
92. Cro. Eliz. 477; 78 E.R. 728. 
93. For the authorities, see Alington v. Yearhner (1607) Cro. Jae. 165; 
79 E.R. 144; Codner v. Dalby (1610) Cro. Jae. 363; 79 E.R. 311; 
Horseman v. Obbins (1621) Cro. Jae. 634; 79 E.R. 546; Dike v. Ricks 
(1632) Cro. Car. 335; 79 E.R. 893; Knight v. Keech (1691) 4 Mod. 188; 
86 E.R. 341. 
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For technical matters concerning procedure, see Manser's Case (1608) 
2 Co. Rep. 3a; 76 E.R. 393. 
94. 2 Salk. 498; 91 E.R. 427. 
95. Co. Litt. p. 206 b. 
96. Supra. Yelv. 76, at 76; 80 E.R. 53 at 53. 
97. 1 Dyer 30a; 73 E.R. 66. 
98. Cro. Eliz. 480; 78 E.R. 731; 5 Co. Rep. 20b; 77 E.R. 80. See too, 
Pilkington v. Winnington (1597) 2 Co. Rep. 59a; 76 E.R. 551; Nalmond 
v. Hill (1621) Hutt. 48; 123 E.R. 1091. 
99. 2 Bae. Abr. p.162. 
100. 3 Com. Abr. p. -120. 
1. Cro. Eliz. 694 at 695; 78 E.R. 930 at 930. 
2. Hob. 69; 80 E.R. 219. 
3. (1624) Hob. 69; 80 E.R. 219. To a similar effect see Anonymous (1622) 
2 Rolle's Rep. 238; 81 E.R. 771 where it was held that preparation of 
a deed (including the application of wax) was not sufficient on the 
obligor's part to perform his condition of executing a release, for he 
could have done more i.e. actually affixed his seal, even though the 
obligee refused to accept the tender of the prepared deed. 
4. Per Lord Holt in Lancashire v. Killingworth (1701) 12 Mod. 530; 88 
E.R. 1498. 
5. Although technical in the extreme and not sufficiently relevant to 
our topic to warrant close examination, these cases can provide an 
insight into the approach of the early law to problems of performance 
and tender. The reader is referred to: Kidwelly v. Brand (1550) l 
Plowd 71; 75 E.R. 113; Eli at and Nutcomb's Case (1556) 3 Leon. 4; 
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- 232 -
undoubtedly realised this, for they also.made a submission that 
there were in fact mutual remedies here, for the plaintiff became 
a 'trustee to the defendant for the judgement'. (10 Mod. 224; 
88 E.R. 700). These arguments were all weak, and none were referred 
to by the court in giving judgement. 
28. 10 Mod. 190; 88 E.R. 188. 
29. Fort. 149; 92 E.R. 797. 
30. Fort. 149; 92 E.R. 798. 
31. Fort. 150; 92 E.R. 798. The result of the case was therefore that 
the plaintiff had judgement because, the action being a bond, it was 
up to the defendant to show that he had done all necessary to acquit 
himself. The defendant did not, we have seen, have to pay the money 
absolutely (without an assignment), but he did have to tender it 
sub modo. As he had done nothing at all, he was liable on his bond. 
32. Ibid. 
33. 1 Str. 458; 93 E.R. 633. 
34. 2 Barn. K.B. 308, 337; 92 E.R. 519, 538. 
35. As Wray C.J. and Sir Thomas Gawdy J. picturesquely stated at one time, 
'as he who is a bastard born hath no cousin, 11 so every case imports 
suspicion of its legitimation, unless it hath another case which 
sha 11 be as a cous i n-german, to support and prove it 11 1 • ( 3 Co. Rep. 
at 23 a; 76 E.R. at 680). 
36. l Str. 535; 93 E.R. 684; 8 Mod. 105; 88 E.R. 83. This action ap~ears 
to be an action of Debt brought for a penalty,rather than an action of 
Covenant. However, the penalty was for non-perfor111ance of a covenant, 
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Marshall, who had been so successful in Phillips v. Fielding, again 
put forward the same argument, but this time it was rejected. For 
further examples and discussion, see Martin v. Smith (1805) 6 East 
555; 102 E.R. 1401; Levy v. Lord Herbert (1817) 7 Taunt. 314; 129 
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